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ABSTRACT
The book of Amos, in a fashion almost preternaturally relevant to contemporary
conditions, discusses issues of war and welfare. Amos condemns several foreign nations
for various war crimes and then turns to Israel, excoriating it for its mistreatment of the
poor. Specifically he indicts the wealthy for enacting policies that created new poor while
preventing the old poor from regaining their rightful positions in society. Israel’s elite
used economic and judicial methods to enrich themselves at the expense of the vast
majority of the population. As a result, Amos predicts the destruction of Israel just as he
predicted the destruction of the foreign nations. The nature of Amos’ prophecy as well as
the crimes with which he indicted Israel may potentially create some consternation to
members of modern society. Amos provides no standard by which the nations were
judged. Further, the punishments he announces seem suspiciously similar to the actions
for which the nations were first condemned. Nor do all of the crimes for which Israel was
condemned seem to have any basis in Hebrew law. Yet Amos announces that Israel will
share in the punishment of the foreign nations. It is my thesis that the book of Amos can
be best understood when read in the light of its ancient Near Eastern context. Three basic
Near Eastern concepts help provide clarity: an understanding of international customary
law; ancient customary treatment of the poor; and the concept of retributive punishment.
Finally, retributive punishment, especially as subsumed under the concept of virtuous
vengeance, is applied to the book.
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ancient international law, treatment of the poor, ancient Near Eastern customs, vengeance
This abstract is approved as to form and content

Dr. Victor Matthews
Chairperson, Advisory Committee
Missouri State University

iii

THE ETHICS OF AMOS IN LIGHT OF ITS ANCIENT
NEAR EASTERN CONTEXT
By
Mark D. Arnold

A Masters Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate College
Of Missouri State University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts, Religious Studies
May 2012

Approved:

Dr. Victor Matthews
Dr. Leslie Baynes
Dr. John Schmalzbauer
_______________________________________
Dr. Pawan Kahol, Interim Graduate College
Dean

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The members of my thesis committee were an invaluable resource and I want to
begin by thanking them for their input. Dr. Leslie Baynes and Dr. John Schmalzbauer
provided thoughtful questions and suggestions that vastly improved the final product. I
would especially like to thank by advisor, Dr. Victor Matthews, for his extreme patience
while shepherding this thesis to completion. It has taken far longer than either of us ever
expected. Nevertheless he has always been gentle in his suggestions and quick to offer a
relevant reference (and more often than not the use of a resource).
I also want to thank my grandkids; Isaiah, Eva, and Noah, for putting up with the
frequent Sunday afternoon excursions away from the house while Papa studied.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the influence of my parents, Dallas and
Alice Arnold. By training and example, they taught me the importance of justice and the
proper treatment of others, regardless of social or economic station. They have also
allowed me the freedom to seek my own way while gently (well, most of the time)
nudging me in the right direction.
I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Leslie Arnold. Our family circumstances
changed dramatically over the course of this adventure and, as a result, she has borne the
brunt of several years of labor which should have been shared while I chased down
another reference or made “one last change” to a paragraph. Yet she has always
encouraged me to continue (and threatened me a few times as well). It is perhaps cliché,
but it is nevertheless true that I could not have completed this thesis without her support.
This endeavor is as much hers as it is mine. Thank you, Leslie, for your love and
patience. Now, how many makeup chores did you say I have to do…?

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BOOK OF AMOS .........4
II. ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAWS PERTAINING TO AMOS ..............................27
International Customary Law ................................................................................27
The Law of the Oppressed .....................................................................................41
The Law of Retribution ..........................................................................................62
III. AMOS AND THE ORACLES AGAINST THE NATIONS ......................................73
The International Situation in Amos’ Day .............................................................75
The Form of the Oracles ........................................................................................77
The Standard of the Oracles ...................................................................................85
The Content of the Oracles ....................................................................................92
IV. AMOS AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE ............................................................................98
Eighth Century Israel .............................................................................................98
A Catalog of Israel’s Crimes................................................................................114
The Identity of the Offenders ...............................................................................149
Summary ..............................................................................................................155
V. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT ...................................................................................159
The Nature of Israel’s Punishment ......................................................................159
The Target of Yahweh’s Punishment ..................................................................172
Summary ..............................................................................................................175
VI. AMOS AND MODERN ETHICS .............................................................................177
Retributive Justice................................................................................................180
“Wild Justice” ......................................................................................................199
Conclusions ..........................................................................................................211
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................215

vi

INTRODUCTION
The opening chapters of the book of Amos chronicle the war crimes of six nonHebrew nations. The Hebrew nations of Judah and Israel fall under Amos’ condemnation
as well for various crimes in the domestic sphere. For their wrongs, Yahweh promises
punishment by fire, by exile, and/or by extermination. The book continues with a series
of oracles and visions which are directed primarily towards Israel (and possibly Judah)
while the rest of the nations mainly fade from the scene. Amos describes Israel’s sins
more fully, accusing them of economic, judicial, and religious crimes. For its crimes,
Amos predicts a punishment that matches in severity that reserved for the foreign nations.
In the eyes of Amos, Israel’s wrongs, though of a different nature, were of the same
degree as the war crimes of the nations.
The nature of Amos’ accusations and his condemnations potentially presents
several questions to the modern reader. Amos condemns the nations, predicting military
destruction while never providing an explicit standard by which these non-Hebrew
nations were judged. Are we to assume that the nations were condemned because Israel
was the target of their depredations? Yet Israel was not the only target of the nations’
actions. And why would the nations have been condemned for their interference in
Israel’s affairs when, in the final analysis, Amos predicts the ultimate destruction of
Israel by warfare? Or were the nations perhaps condemned for committing crimes against
Yahweh? Following this line of reasoning creates questions of its own. Did Amos
condemn the nations for violating some Hebrew-centric standard which they would have
neither recognized nor accepted? And how do we make sense of the condemnation of the
nations for war crimes when Amos then predicts that the nations, as well as Israel, will
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fall victim to the ravagings of an unnamed nation or nations? Why was this nation
exempt from Yahweh’s punishment?
Many of the crimes for which Israel was condemned seem to have little or no
basis in Hebrew law. Despite this the nation falls under the same condemnation as that
reserved for the nations. It also does not require a deep reading of Amos to recognize that
his attacks are aimed primarily at Israel’s wealthy. Yet the entire nation will apparently
be destroyed. Were there no innocents in Israel? There is a deep irony in the notion that
Amos, often called the “prophet of justice”, might be guilty of predicting what seems
such a gross injustice on a kindred nation.
If we are to acquit Amos of unfairness, our investigation must begin by looking
beyond the borders of Israel. It can be demonstrated, for example, that there existed a
nascent form of international law throughout the ancient Near East. The nations violated
provisions of this law. Israel’s crimes may also been seen as violations of contemporary
standards. Peoples of the ancient Near East widely recognized that the weakest among
them were to be protected. It was especially the duty of the king to defend the rights of
the poor. Yet Israel and her leaders openly flouted this law of the oppressed. While Amos
could have condemned Israel’s actions on the basis of her own laws, it is my thesis that
he instead drew on contemporary cultural standards to indict her activities.
Yahweh’s reaction to the crimes enumerated within the book of Amos can also be
explained by reference to a broader cultural principle. The concept of retribution served
as the basis for many of the law codes extant throughout the ancient Near East. As such,
it would have been clearly understood to Amos’ contemporaries that punishment should
be administered in a manner comparable to the harm which had been done.
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In the chapters that follow, each of these broader cultural principles will be
explored and applied to the book of Amos. In chapter one, modern literature relevant to
our study will be briefly surveyed. Chapter two will examine the three laws—
international law, the law of the oppressed, and the law of retribution—from within the
broader ancient Near Eastern context of which Israel was a part. Chapter three will
explore the opening chapters of Amos, the so-called oracles against the nations, from an
ancient international law perspective. A detailed examination of Israel’s crimes will be
the subject of chapter four. Comparisons with relevant ancient Near Eastern literature
will be utilized to gain an understanding of Amos’ accusations in the light of ancient
Near Eastern standards. Reference to other eighth-century prophetic literature will help
round out the unflattering picture of life in Amos’ day. Chapter five will survey the
various forms of punishment that Amos incorporates into his predictions for the nation of
Israel. Once again these predictions will be seen to easily fit within the broader cultural
context in which Amos lived. Finally, in chapter six Amos’ use of the law of retribution
will be compared to modern theories of punishment in an attempt to understand his
pronouncements in the light of modern ethics.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BOOK OF AMOS
Standing at the head of the book of Amos are eight oracles condemning Israel,
Judah, and their neighbors for various crimes.1 This opening section is usually labeled the
“Oracles against the Nations.” While similar oracles are found in other prophetic books in
the Hebrew Bible, the placement of Amos’ oracles is unique.2 These oracles set the
critical and pessimistic tone of the book. They also establish the fact that Amos
considered Israel’s crimes to be of a kind with that of the nations. Thus the oracles
against the nations play a pivotal role in the interpretation of the book of Amos. This
chapter will examine some of the lines of interpretation that modern scholars have
followed in their attempt to understand Amos’ oracles against the nations.
Modern readers reared within a strong common law tradition may find the
message of Amos’ oracles unsettling.3 The non-Hebrew nations are condemned for
specific crimes, but the standard by which they are judged is unclear. Although few today
would argue that ripping fetuses from their mother’s wombs constitutes acceptable
behavior, nevertheless the modern mind demands that even the perpetrators of such
heinous acts be given a fair trial. Modern law understands that, for a trial to go forward, it
must be clearly shown that the defendant knew or should have known the criminality of
their actions. Thus their actions must of necessity have been defined as criminal before
the actions were committed. This notion, for example, is enshrined in the Constitution of
1

It is generally recognized that the first major section of Amos encompasses Amos 1:3 – 2:16. Aside from
Israel and Judah, the other nations condemned in this opening section include Syria, Philistia, Tyre, Edom,
Moab, and Ammon.
2

Similar oracles can be found in Isaiah (Isa 13-23), Jeremiah (Jer 46-51), Ezekiel (Ezek 25-32), and
Zephaniah (Zeph 2:1-3:8). The books of Obadiah and Nahum might also be considered oracles against
specific nations.
3

The arguments in this section are admittedly made from a modern Western perspective.
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the United States. The Constitution expressly forbids “bills of Attainder” and “ex post
facto” laws.4 While clearly the book of Amos was never intended as a legal document,
nevertheless the fact that a clear and explicit standard is missing (at least from the
perspective of the modern reader) might well create consternation among modern readers
of the book of Amos.5
This concern was not always shared by pre-modern commentators, however. For
example John Calvin, in his lectures on Amos, simply assumes that the nations deserved
their announced punishments. He understood the announced judgments as benefiting
Israel. Calvin contended that the oracles revealed that Israel’s coming punishment was by
God’s design and not mere happenstance. The oracles demonstrated that Israel shared a
common punishment with the nations because she shared a common crime. Amos,
according to Calvin, hoped to prepare Israel to listen to and learn from the condemnation
that was soon to follow.6
Calvin apparently never considered the transaction from the perspective of the
nations. It did not occur to him that the nations might legitimately complain that they
were judged without regard to a standard they would have recognized. Calvin’s view is
not surprising considering his purpose. Calvin originally delivered his commentary on
Amos as a series of lectures to prospective preachers. His purpose was thus homiletical
4

Bills of Attainder are acts which declare someone guilty without the benefit of a trial. Ex post facto laws
declare an act illegal only after it has been committed. U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 9.
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html. Accessed 8/18/2010.
5

It must be noted that the book of Amos is not unique among biblical literature in failing to provide an
explicit standard by which various entities were judged. It is reasonable to assume that, either the concern
for a standard is a thoroughly modern construct, or the standard used was so thoroughly a part of the
prophets’ culture that mention of the relevant standard was unnecessary. It is my thesis that the latter better
describes the book of Amos.
6

Jean Calvin, A Commentary on the Twelve Minor Prophets, trans. John Owen, 1st ed., 3 vols., vol. 2
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1986), 154-57.
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rather than scholarly. Calvin’s view of God must also be presumed to play a large role in
his perspective. His famous view of God’s universal sovereignty allowed him to write
without discomfort, “we see that God appears here as a judge against all nations.”7 Calvin
presumed that God had both the authority and the responsibility to judge the nations.
Calvin’s older contemporary, Martin Luther, wrote from a similar perspective.
Commenting on the oracle against Ammon, Luther wrote, “God Almighty also avenges
harm done to the heathen, so that we may learn that God is Lord of all the world and that
all things are done in accordance with His will.”8 These early commentators focused on
God’s role as judge. His standard was the measure by which the nations were judged.
Little attempt was made to explain how the nations were to know the standard.
By the late nineteenth century, scholars began to explore the idea that the Hebrew
Bible (the Christian Old Testament) might contain elements within it that could be
explained without direct invocation of the divine. One of the more famous examples
comes from the hand of Julius Wellhausen.9 Wellhausen’s documentary hypothesis
postulated that the Torah actually consisted of the contributions of multiple authors

7

Calvin, Commentary on Amos, 163.

8

Martin Luther and Oswald C. Hilton, Lectures on the Minor Prophets I, American ed., vol. 18 (Saint
Louis: Concordia, 1973), 238.
9

Julius Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973).
Wellhausen’s original thesis was proposed in 1878 and published in German in 1883. The first English
edition appeared in 1885. Wellhausen claimed that extensive portions of the Hebrew Bible were written
after the exile. His reading of the Torah suggested that, despite ancient claims, the Law postdated the
prophets. The prophets, with Amos at their head, founded “what has been called ‘ethical monotheism.’
Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 474. (This statement actually comes not from his Prolegomena, but from an
article that Wellhausen wrote for Encyclopedia Britannica.) The Torah, rather than being the root from
which Judaism sprang, represented to Wellhausen a much later part of the tree. He wrote, “We cannot, then
peremptorily refuse to regard it as possible that what was the law of Judaism may also have been its
product; and there are urgent reasons for taking the suggestion into very careful consideration.”
Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 3.
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stretching over centuries of time.10 These multiple accounts were finally drawn together
into a single document by a late editor. Thus, instead of representing direct revelation
from God to the prophet Moses, Wellhausen considered the first five books of the
Hebrew Bible to be the product of an evolutionary process; a notion that fit well with the
zeitgeist of his time.
William Robertson Smith followed Wellhausen’s line of reasoning. He argued
that certain concepts contained within the Bible were not originally revealed during a
particular event, but rather became known by way of a process. Smith wrote,
Thus the analogies which the Bible itself presents as our guides in
understanding the work of divine grace lead us to expect that revelation
must have a history, conformed to the laws of human nature, and limited
by the universal rule that every permanent spiritual and moral relation
must grow up by slow degrees, and obey a principle of internal
development.11
Smith thus explored the idea that at least some of what had previously passed for
revelation instead constituted a product of normal human processes.
Smith applied this concept of revelation by evolutionary process to the book of
Amos. Unlike Wellhausen’s treatment of the Pentateuch, Smith did not engage in a
source-critical analysis of the book itself. Instead he focused on Amos’ use of tradition.
Smith, following Wellhausen’s thesis, noted that the Penteteuchal laws would not have
been available in their entirety until after the exile. Thus we should not expect Amos to

10

Although Wellhausen is often credited with the documentary theory and the evolutionary development of
the Torah that it presupposes, Wellhausen himself credits the basic ideas of his theory to Eduard Ruess,
Leopold George, Wilhelm Vatke, and ultimately to Martin Lebrecht de Wette as early as 1806. Wellhausen,
Prolegomena, 4.
11

W. Robertson Smith, The Prophets of Israel and Their Place in History (New York: AMS Press, 1982),
4. The Prophets of Israel was originally published in 1882.
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draw upon the law as a source for his condemnation of either Israel or the nations.12 The
Pentateuch could not serve as a guide to interpreting Amos (and the rest of the prophets).
Instead, he postulated that the prophets must be used to determine “what constituted the
sum of the extant knowledge of Jehovah in the time to which they belong.”13 Smith
advanced an evolutionary view of the Bible that reshuffled the basic understanding of the
prophets. In his view, the prophets did not (nor could they have) founded their preaching
on the basis of the Torah. Rather, Smith would have us to understand that the prophets
helped build the theological system from which the Torah eventually emerged. According
to Smith, the age of the writing prophets represented the apogee of Hebrew literature.14
Since the book of Amos usually claims priority as the first of the writing prophets, the
golden age of Hebrew literature started with Amos.
Smith’s understanding of the Bible led him to discover within Amos
anthropological rather than theological explanations for certain ideas. This is apparent in
Smith’s discussion of the oracles against the nations. According to Smith, “Amos teaches
that heathen nations are to be judged, not because they do not worship Israel’s God, but
because they have broken the laws of universal morality.”15 The nations’ guilt was
predicated, then, not on their violation of any Hebrew law, but on their disregard for laws
accessible to all humans. Whereas Calvin and Luther had mainly understood the oracles
from a theological viewpoint, Smith interpreted them from an anthropological
12

Smith, Prophets of Israel, 108-20. Smith does not claim that there was no written law prior to the exile.
Rather he states that the law did not play a central role in Israel’s thought until after the exile. Smith,
Prophets of Israel, 112.
13

Smith, Prophets of Israel, 112.

14

Smith, Prophets of Israel, 19.

15

Smith, Prophets of Israel, 134. Smith identifies these laws as “the universal laws of fidelity, kinship, and
humanity.” Smith, Prophets of Israel, 135.
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perspective. Smith’s arguments demonstrate an early attempt to appeal to natural law as a
basis of Amos’ condemnation of the nations.
Writing at about the same time as Smith, S. R. Driver agreed that the nations were
condemned for violating principles more universal than those found in the Torah. Driver
wrote that the nations were guilty of violating “some generally recognized principle of
humanity or morality.”16 More specifically, Driver writes, the nations “are judged not for
offences committed specifically against Israel’s God, but because they have broken some
dictate of universal morality, have violated some precept of the natural law of humanity
and mercy written on men’s hearts.”17 Smith and Driver both recognized that a purely
theological interpretation of the oracles created certain ethical dilemmas. They found a
solution by arguing from an anthropological perspective. The nations’ guilt came from
breaking those innate laws which were intuitively understood by all humans.
This anthropological viewpoint was remixed with a theological perspective by
Gerhard von Rad. Von Rad concluded that Amos learned of Israel’s guilt though divine
revelation. It was left to Amos, however, to provide the rationale for the condemnation.18
Thus the standard by which Israel was judged did not come directly from Yahweh but
was mediated through the human agency of the prophet Amos. If we may presume that
what was true of Israel could be applied to the nations as well, it follows that, in one
sense, the nations were guilty of violating standards held by Amos rather than those
16

S. R. Driver, The Books of Joel and Amos, with Introduction and Notes (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1897),
95.
17

Driver, Joel and Amos, 108-9.

18

Von Rad wrote, “Obviously, all that was initially communicated to the prophet was the bare fact of the
end and judgment…The greater part of Amos’s message must, then, be ascribed to his own pondering on
the situation which he saw before him. He had first to put his own stamp on everything he had learned from
Jahweh, for it constantly needed interpretation ad hominem.” Gerhard von Rad, The Message of the
Prophets (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1965), 103.
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which came from Yahweh. According to von Rad, the nations had breached “the
unwritten law of international relations.”19 Von Rad thus moved beyond citing an abstract
natural law and posited instead that the nations violated certain well known, but
undocumented, international rules.
The idea that the Hebrew Bible underwent some form of evolutionary
development suggests that influences beyond Israel’s borders might also have impacted
biblical authors. Similarities between Hebrew, Egyptian, and Mesopotamian stories,
concepts, and thought patterns had long been noted. The Danish scholar Aage Bentzen
suggested that Amos’ oracles against the nations were patterned after the Egyptian
Execration texts.20 He noted, for example, that both the oracles and the Execration texts
followed a fixed geographical order.21 After the imprecations against foreign nations
there immediately followed a “stroke against the centre of the world…denouncing single
traitors and other criminals and so purging the country of all sorts of iniquity.”22 Amos
utilized a similar pattern, condemning first the nations before turning to those within
Israel whom he regarded as criminals.

19

Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology (New York: Harper, 1962), 2:135.

20

Bentzen cautioned that postulating direct borrowing is a dangerous business. Rather than suggesting that
Amos borrowed directly from the Egyptian texts, he suggests that a shared culture might lead to similar
ideas originating simultaneously but independently. He wrote that “ideas may ‘hang in the air’ in different
areas and originate independently.” A. Bentzen, "The Ritual Background of Amos 1:2-2:16,"
Oudtestamentische Studien 8, no. (1950): 87. The Execration texts will be covered in more detail below.
The Execration Texts comprised curses which were written on pieces of pottery and then ritually broken,
thus making the curses efficacious and, hopefully, rendering the enemy powerless.
21

Bentzen, "Ritual Background," 89. Bentzen’s conclusions concerning the similarities between the
Egyptian Execration texts and Amos’ oracles against the nations enjoyed currency for a time, but has since
been widely repudiated. For example, see Andrew E. Steinmann, "The Order of Amos's Oracles against the
Nations: 1:3-2:16," Journal of Biblical Literature 111, no. 4 (1992).
22

Bentzen, "Ritual Background," 91.
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Bentzen thus argues that Israel shared its cultural space with other ancient Near
Eastern kingdoms. Amos, breathing the same cultural air as the Egyptian priests
responsible for the Execration texts, hit upon a method of conveying his message that
closely paralleled theirs.
Hans Walter Wolff’s commentary has been one of the most influential books on
Amos written within the past fifty years.23 Relying heavily on form-critical analysis,
Wolff posited that the book of Amos went through six redactional stages; the earliest
coming from the hand of Amos himself and the latest dating from the postexilic period.
Thus the shape of the book of Amos came into being over a period of centuries.
Generally Wolff recognized the original words of Amos in chapters 3-6.24 A second
redaction mainly involved parts of chapter seven of the canonical book. This edition
Wolff also attributed to Amos although dating it later than that of the composition of the
original oracles. Wolff also accepted that certain of the oracles against the nations came
from the hand of Amos.25 A “School of Amos” produced a third redaction to the book.
This school comprised disciples who apparently knew the prophet and carried on his
editorial work not long after the completion of his ministry. These disciples were
responsible for the superscription to the book as well as the first-hand account of Amos’
confrontation with Amaziah (Amos 7:10-17). Further additions to the book were made
during the Josianic Age. The Josianic redactor utilized his edition to criticize the Bethel
cult. Wolff contends that this redaction reflected the centralizing tendency of the
23

The Hermeneia edition carries a copyright of 1977. However, the work first appeared in German in 1965.
Hans Walter Wolff, Joel and Amos: A Commentary on the Books of the Prophets Joel and Amos, ed. Frank
Moore Cross, trans. S. Dean McBride, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), xii.
24

The above treatment is a schematic view of Wolff’s in-depth analysis.

25

Specifically, Wolff dates the oracles against Ammon, Damascus, Moab and Philistia were from the hand
of Amos. The oracles against Tyre, Edom, and Judah were later additions. Wolff, Amos, 140.
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Jerusalem cult during the reign of Josiah. A Deuteronomic editor provided the
penultimate edition of the book. This editor cast Amos’ message in such a manner as to
condemn his own exilic generation. The final redaction took place in the postexilic period
by an editor who added the final, hopeful verses to an otherwise pessimistic document.26
Wolff’s redactional model has been both widely followed and widely debated.27
Wolff’s contributions did not stop with his redactional scheme. He also discussed
both the theological and anthropological elements introduced by earlier commentators.
From a theological viewpoint, Wolff posited that Amos was a thoroughgoing monotheist.
He argues that it would have been axiomatic for Amos to consider the nations’
accountable to Yahweh; he would have recognized no other deity to whom they might
have been responsible.28 As there was a single deity, so there existed a single standard by
which the nations, both Hebrew and non-Hebrew, were to be judged. A “transmitted list
of atrocities” presumably known to all of the nations, served as the anthropological basis
for this standard. This list, Wolff argued, found its home in an international wisdom

26

Wolff, Amos, 106-13.

27

J. Alberto Soggin substantially accepts Wolff’s entire argument. J. Alberto Soggin, The Prophet Amos: A
Translation and Commentary (London: SCM, 1987), 12. Robert Coote simplifies Wolff’s scheme by
reducing Wolff’s six stages of composition to three. Robert B. Coote, Amos among the Prophets:
Composition and Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981). Francis Andersen and Donald Freedman,
however, argue that the entire enterprise of searching for an author’s original words is a chimera that has
“exhausted itself.” Francis I. Andersen and David Noel Freedman, Amos: A New Translation with
Introduction and Commentary, 1st ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 143. They, as well as Shalom Paul,
argue that the bulk of the book of Amos comes from the hand of Amos and did not proceed through the
complex compositional stages posited by Wolff. Shalom M. Paul, Amos: A Commentary on the Book of
Amos, ed. Frank Moore Cross, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991). See the chapter on the
composition of the book of Amos in Gerhard Hasel for a synopsis of recent scholarship on this issue.
Gerhard F. Hasel, Understanding the Book of Amos: Basic Issues in Current Interpretations (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Baker Book House, 1991), 91-99.
28

Wolff writes, “That Yahweh is the only God of Israel and of the world of nations is not a theme of his
message but its self-evident presupposition.” Wolff, Amos, 101.
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tradition.29 He argued that Amos used traditional wisdom forms to create a singular
standard by which both the Hebrew and non-Hebrew nations would be judged.30
According to Wolff, Amos’ wisdom tradition transcended that of Israelite wisdom. Amos
was familiar with the broader ancient Near Eastern culture and this familiarity with the
broader culture allowed him to “…categorically subsume all people under the same
juridical order.”31 The basis of Amos’ standard was thus found in the broad ancient Near
Eastern culture as deposited in its wisdom traditions.
Both Israel and the nations were guilty of violating a single standard; they
perpetrated what Wolff describes as “crimes against humanity.”32 He noted that the
nations, “like Israel, are guilty before Yahweh because they have mistreated weaker
human beings. Essentially, there is no different standard of justice for them than for
Israel.”33 All nations were to be judged based on their mistreatment of the defenseless.
This, according to Wolff, was one of Amos’ original contributions to Hebrew thought.
Wolff writes, “The exclusivity with which Amos determines guilt, solely on the basis of

29

Wolff recognized Amos’ use of a wisdom tradition by his utilization of a consistent formal structure (“for
three transgressions of x, and for four”) in the oracles. Wolff noted that the formal structure of the crimes
“reflects the influence of oral traditions of popular wisdom which, like other wisdom material, linked Israel
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behavior manifested towards the weak and the helpless, is likewise a new feature in his
prophecy…..The cause of the helpless is a priori the cause of Yahweh.”34
There has thus been a common thread that runs through the writings of the
modern authors surveyed thus far. Although not always explicit, each author seems to
understand that the law which was violated; whether Driver’s “natural law”, von Rad’s
“unwritten law”, or Wolff’s “transmitted list of atrocities”, ultimately derived from
Yahweh. The anthropological principle merely reflected the theological one. The next
author to be reviewed turns this order upside down.
John Barton has written extensively about biblical ethics. In an attempt to
understand the oracles against the nations, Barton posited that Amos drew the standard by
which he judged the nations from what he termed “international customary law.”35 As the
name suggests, these laws were based on international customs rather than on explicit
legislation or divinely revealed law. Being international, these laws were generally
accepted by all the nations of the ancient Near East. The laws did not necessarily form a
coherent code, as found, for example, in the medieval codes of chivalry or the modern
Geneva Convention. They nevertheless defined the boundaries, for example, by which
war could be legitimately prosecuted. It was on the basis of this customary law that Amos
condemned the nations. Barton argues that, “the nations are condemned for infringing
customs of war accepted or believed to be accepted by all civilised nations.”36
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A critical difference exists between Barton’s ideas and those of his predecessors.
Barton elevates the anthropological principle above the theological one. Previous authors
regarded Amos’ standard, however defined, as ultimately deriving from Yahweh. Barton,
on the other hand, considers Yahweh’s role as subservient to those principles embodied
in the customary laws. Those principles demonstrate that Yahweh shared with humanity a
certain moral viewpoint. Thus these laws are not divine laws filtered through human
agents. Rather, they appear to be laws that had their own existence. Barton wrote that the
norms or standards held by the nations “are thought of as part of the common moral sense
of all right-minded people; that God shares this moral sense is taken for granted, since he
is the very epitome of right-mindedness. But there is no real suggestion that the rightness
of the moral norms actually derives from God.”37 Barton relegates Yahweh’s role to a
purely judicial one. As he states, “Thus the principles at stake in these oracles are
essentially part of a conventional morality, which God is assumed to back up with fiery
sanctions, rather than actual laws supposed to be issued by God for all the nations of the
world to observe.”38
In Barton’s analysis, the anthropological level wins out over the theological one.
Barton admits to as much when he writes that the nations were guilty of breaking God’s
law only if we “understand ‘God’s law’ to mean a law which God enforces rather than

standard by which the nations were condemned. Hayes is less abstract in his understanding of what that law
entailed. Hayes writes that international customary law “would have embodied conventions hammered out
in response to the pragmatics of routine life.” John H. Hayes, Amos, the Eighth-Century Prophet: His
Times and His Preaching (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1988), 58.
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one which God enacts. In that case, the ‘law’ is not theological in its root but only in its
application.”39
In later writings Barton gravitates towards natural law as an explanation of Amos’
standard. Whether understood as violations of international customary law or some other
standard, the nations were ultimately condemned because they committed offenses that
were obviously wrong as a matter of nature. Barton writes, “Never mind how people first
came to see that these offences were wrong: their wrongness now is obvious; they
contravene a law of nature just as would an attempt to plough the sea. However what we
may call Amos’s ‘sources’ may have viewed such sins, he himself sees them as breaches
of an order which we can only call natural law.”40 This natural law appears to be most
clearly manifested in the various wisdom traditions of the ancient Near East.
Natural law served not only as the basis for the condemnation of the nations, but
also the agency by which Yahweh punished them. Barton argued that Yahweh’s
punishments derived from the sins of the nations in what he termed “poetic justice.”41
This has important implications for Barton, as it demonstrates the rationality of Yahweh.
Barton writes, “To say that the sinner is punished in a way that fits the sin is to say that
Yahweh is consistent and rational in his dealing with us as one would expect a human
judge to be; he gives people what they deserve, pays them back in their own coin, makes
39
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the punishment fit the crime.”42 Yahweh’s justice, according to Barton, “is analogous to
ours and observes much the same principles – principles available to human reason, not
inscrutable and unaccountable.”43 The source of Yahweh’s justice is thus not selfdefined—his actions are not just simply because he does them. Rather, Yahweh’s justice
is based on the same kind of standard that humans use when arriving at notions of
justice.44 Yahweh’s justice is ultimately rational in its basis.
Barton’s musings on Amos serve a larger purpose. Barton attempted to show that
the Hebrew Bible did not, as originally composed, contain only a single system of ethics.
While it is often supposed that obedience to the revealed word of Yahweh constituted the
main source of ethics in the Hebrew Bible, Barton argued that Amos still had the latitude
to draw on sources of ethics other than divine revelation with which to condemn Israel
and the nations.45 Barton thus argued that Hebrew Bible contains clues suggesting an
evolution of ethics.
In the late twentieth century an interpretation became popular that predicated the
condemnation of the nations on an erstwhile Davidic Empire of which the nations had
once been a part. This interpretation reduces the number of ethical questions which the
oracles against the nations raise. If the nations were guilty of breaking the terms of a
previously agreed upon treaty, than Amos’ condemnations are obviously just. This
42

Barton, "Natural Law," 42. The emphasis is in the original.

43

Barton, "Natural Law," 44.

44

Barton writes, “His justice is not simply a matter of definition, as in a wholly theonomous ethical system
in which justice simply means ‘what God does or commands,’ but is a matter of empirical experience when
judged by the standards which human beings use in assessing the conduct of other people.” Barton,
"Natural Law," 42-3.
45

John Barton, "The Basis of Ethics in the Hebrew Bible," in Understanding Old Testament Ethics :
Approaches and Explorations (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 47. This article was
originally published in 1995. The imitation of God provided another ethical model available in ancient
Israel before divine revelation became the norm. Barton, "Understanding Old Testament Ethics," 29.

17

viewpoint moves the conversation from one that is primarily ethical to one that is
political.
Menaham Haran was an early proponent of this line of thought. He wrote, for
example, that, “In truth, the onlooker is liable to be misled by the moralistic demands on
the nations uttered in this prophecy… In actual fact, these demands are national rather
than moral in nature and the major portion of this prophecy is designed according to the
older nationalistic pattern.” 46 John Mauchline also argued that memories of a Davidic
Empire underlie the oracles against the nations. Although Mauchline posits that a form of
natural law served as the ethical basis for Amos’ condemnation, he understands that
ethics was not primarily Amos’ concern.47 Mauchline writes, “The conclusion seems
inevitable that Amos believed that these peoples had a bond of association which they
had treated with contempt, a bond in the name of Yahweh which meant that, in spite of
their political separation from Israel now, they were still a spiritual unity.”48
Duane Christensen understood Amos as part of an evolving idea of which the
concept of empire played a role. Christensen developed the idea that Amos’ oracles
against the nations constituted a step in the evolution of the war oracle. The war oracle
was known both within the Hebrew nations and in the surrounding culture. It dated back
46
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at least as far as the time of Balaam. The pre-monarchic Hebrew prophets used the war
oracle to divine the answer to military questions, to predict defeat or victory, to call
members of the Israelite league to battle, or to summon the people to flee from
destruction.49 The pre-literary prophets converted the war oracle into a judgment oracle in
which foreign nations served as the target.50 Amos used this ancient form to express his
persistent belief in the spiritual unity of the Syro-Palestinian nations. In his view, then,
the nations were condemned because they were in rebellion against the Davidic Empire
and its deity. Amos, however, included Israel among the nations condemned and so
facilitated the transformation of the war oracle into a “judgment speech against Israel.”51
Haran, Mauchline and Christensen, then, put a political slant on Amos’ oracles
against the nations.52 In their reading of the book, Amos’ ethics take on a subsidiary role.
As noted above, there is an ethical consequence to a political reading of Amos. Yahweh
is absolved of punishing unwitting nations. A previous covenant bond had existed
between Israel and the nations. According to the customs of the day, this bond would
have been formalized before Yahweh. Thus the nations would have been explicitly
answerable to him.53
Perhaps the most comprehensive recent volume on the book of Amos was written
by Francis Andersen and David Freedman for the Anchor Bible commentary series.
49
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Andersen and Freedman, like several earlier authors, understand the crimes of the nations
to be breaches of natural law. The crimes of the non-Hebrew nations, they wrote, are
“…civil rather than religious and they seem to be violations of a kind of ‘natural law.’”54
Andersen and Freedman reject a political reading of Amos. They argued, “Those
nations may never have been under the suzerainty of Yahweh and may not now
acknowledge it, but he is their Lord—just as he is and should be acknowledged Lord of
Israel (and Judah).”55 They posit instead that the nations owed their allegiance to Yahweh
because of an “unusual doctrine” of grace preached by Amos. Amos 9:7 claims that God
brought the Philistines and the Aramaeans to the land of Palestine. This constituted an act
of grace which must be requited through obedience. Andersen and Freedman wrote,
“Because [Yahweh] has acted on behalf of the Philistines and Aramaeans he has the right
to impose demands and to insist on compliance with rules and requirements, just as in the
case of Israel.”56 Although the nations may not have recognized Yahweh’s actions of
grace, they were nonetheless responsible to him. Andersen and Freedman claim that,
“[the nations] have their own gods and explain their history in a different fashion, no
doubt; but Amos insists that the truth is as he has stated it. Whether the nations are aware
of the action of divine grace in bringing them out of one place to another and establishing
and providentially guiding their history, they are not less responsible because of their
ignorance.”57 They label Amos’ theology of grace unusual, not because it demoted Israel
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to “the level of common humanity,” but rather because it elevated the nations to occupy
the same privileged space claimed by Israel.58
Andersen and Freedman do not provide a vigorous attempt to explore the practical
basis for Amos’ condemnation of the nations. Their recognition of grace as the
foundation of the nations’ responsibility to Yahweh is unique and highlights their
primarily theological reading of the book of Amos.
Shalom Paul contributed a second volume on the book of Amos to the Hermeneia
series. Unlike Wolff, Paul concluded that much of the book came directly from the hand
of Amos. He rejects the complicated redactional structure posited by Wolff. For example,
unlike many modern commentators, Paul argued that all eight oracles that constitute the
oracles against the nations probably came from the hand of Amos.59
Paul argued that Amos had a “universalistic concept of the God of Israel.”60 As
sovereign of the world, the nations owed their allegiance to Yahweh. The nations “flout
divine authority” when they committed barbarous acts against neighboring nations and as
such Yahweh had no real choice but to punish them. In Paul’s view, the nations were
punished because they violated Yahweh’s moral law. Amos 2:1 notes, for example, that
Moab’s crime consisted of burning of the bones of the king of Edom to lime (Am 2:1).
Paul remarked that this crime cannot be construed as having been committed against the
nation of Israel. Rather, he wrote, “Such a crime is a direct offense against the Lord,
whose moral laws operate and are binding within the international community of nations.
58
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He who flouts the will of the God of Israel will be punished directly by the Judge of all
the nations.”61 While Paul never explicitly addressed how the nations were to be aware of
Yahweh’s moral law, he implied that the nations were guilty of violating natural law.62
Like many authors beginning from a theological perspective, Paul does not seem overly
concerned with exploring the details of a natural law viewpoint. He argues that, if the
standard by which the nations were judged remains somewhat nebulous, the Hebrew
nations violated an obvious standard. Paul stated, “…the prophet still makes a clear-cut
distinction between the nature and essence of the transgressions of the nations and those
of Judah and Israel. Because the latter are bound by an intimate covenant relationship,
they are specifically indicted for infractions of a religious-moral-ethical nature.”63 Paul
understands there to be a dichotomy between Israel’s condemnation and that of the
nations.
The final work to be reviewed maintains a primarily anthropological
interpretation of the book of Amos.64 This should come as no surprise as the author,
Carly L. Crouch, was a student of John Barton. Crouch argued that Israel’s ethical ideas,
while unique in their own right, nevertheless shared cultural space with those of her
neighbors.65 Crouch wrote that, “…Israel and Judah were first and foremost part of a
broad ancient Near Eastern ‘historical stream’, and that, though they did have unique
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qualities which differentiated them from their neighbours, they also shared more
characteristics than they disputed.”66
Crouch utilized Assyrian texts to demonstrate that Amos’ ethics were completely
at home in the ancient Near East.67 She contended that warfare in Assyria (and
throughout much of the surrounding culture) had its basis in an ideology of “indigenous
order over and against enemy chaos.”68 The enemy was the enemy because they were
“other,” and as such represented a threat to the known order. Assyria’s expansion was not
(just) about greed and power, but should be understood as a fight for the nation’s very
existence against the forces of chaos.69 The king served as the deity’s human agent in the
fight for order. Actions against the king or those that existed outside of his sphere of
influence were considered unnatural and hence unethical. Ethics, then, were defined
nationalistically. While each nation would have regarded its own existence as the basis of
that ethic, nevertheless all of the nations in the region would have used a shared
vocabulary in defining that ethic.
Crouch contended that the apparent difference between biblical and Assyrian
literature resulted from a difference in the social location of the authors. The Assyrian
monarch commissioned much of the extant Assyrian texts. Non-elitists contributed much
of the biblical material, however.70 This is especially the case in the book of Amos. The
Assyrian propagandists assumed that the actions of their monarch coincided with the will
66
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of their gods. Military victories represented the triumph of their gods over those of the
vanquished. Amos, on the other hand, does not ascribe to Israel’s king a similar
relationship to Yahweh. While Amos envisioned that the nations would be punished, it is
notable that he does not credit the victory to Israel’s monarch. Rather an unnamed human
agent carries out Yahweh’s pronounced punishments. Crouch argues that this results from
Amos social location outside of elite circles. Unlike Israel’s elite, he was not beholden to
a king he regarded as corrupt. The result of Amos’ unique viewpoint was that an
unnatural moral act could no longer be defined as an action against the king. Rather,
Crouch writes that unnatural acts become a “…violation of some sort of right to
existence…accorded all nations.”71 The severing of the interests of the national god with
that of the nation’s king led to the innovative idea that Yahweh could use foreign kings
for the purpose of punishing nations; Israel included. It also led Amos to understand his
ethical concerns in non-nationalistic terms. Thus some of his ethical ideas were at
variance with those of the ancient Near East and of Israel. Crouch argued, for example,
that Amos expected restraint in the prosecution of war, an idea not otherwise found in the
Hebrew Bible.72 Likewise Amos objected to the enslavement of prisoners of war.73
Crouch noted the irony that has Amos condemning the nations for inflicting total
destruction on an enemy while simultaneously ascribing to Yahweh the utilization of
similar methods in punishing the nations.74 Crouch writes, “this creates something of a
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moral paradox: nations employed as Yahweh’s agent are apparently permitted to do what
the nations they punish are not.”75 The way out of the morass, according to Crouch, is to
postulate that Amos employed a “loose form of lex talionis” when he condemned the
nations.76 She wrote that, “Like the lex talionis, the punishment inflicted, though like the
crime, is not itself subject to punishment.”77 The principle of lex talionis, according to
Crouch, dictated that punishment “is commensurate with and contained within the
offence itself.”78 The human agent that carried out the will of Yahweh was thus not
subject to punishment for their actions. Rather the actions of the agent were sanctioned,
even required, by Yahweh.79 Crouch understands Yahweh to be the upholder of a moral
system that guarantees that each action is balanced by its appropriate consequence. 80
The positions of the scholars surveyed above can be roughly broken into two
groups; those beginning from a theological viewpoint and those holding an
anthropological one. One could also understand these two positions as, respectively, one
which gave primacy to Israel’s perspective of the world, and one which privileged the
perspective of the nations. Scholars holding to a theological perspective for the opening
chapters of the book of Amos often argue that Yahweh’s authority to judge the nations
stems from his sovereignty over them. This position has the advantage of creating a
unifying link between the opening chapters of the book, focusing on the nations, with the
75
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following chapters which concern Israel. Both the nations and Israel are answerable to
Yahweh by virtue of his universal sovereignty. The disadvantage of this position,
however, is that its proponents rarely explain the basis of Yahweh’s judgment of the
nation’s other than by a (usually) vague reference to natural law. Yahweh’s authority is
also assumed, not established. The crimes of the nations are presumed to be crimes, but it
is rarely demonstrated that the nations would have (or could have) recognized that their
punishments were just.
Scholars arguing from the anthropological perspective explicitly provide a basis
for the condemnation of the nations; typically by reference to some form of customary
law. This has the advantage of rooting the book of Amos in its ancient Near Eastern
context. The nations become culpable for actions which they knew to be wrong. It can be
further demonstrated that Amos indicted Israel on a similar basis. Her actions violated
ethical norms known throughout the ancient Near East, thus making Israel’s punishment
deserved and inevitable. This viewpoint, however, carries the danger that Yahweh’s role
can become minimized. If Amos derives his ethics only from the surrounding culture,
than Yahweh simply serves as the judge and executioner for laws of an unknown
provenance. This would seem to violate Amos’ conception of Yahweh.
It is my contention that Amos intentionally used the customs of his surrounding
culture to indict both Israel and the foreign nations. He would have been able to do so
without surrendering his view of the sovereignty of Yahweh. Thus an examination of
Amos’ culture, and especially of three relevant ancient Near Eastern laws, is in order and
will be the subject of the next chapter.
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II. ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAWS PERTAINING TO AMOS
The book of Amos contains references and allusions to cultural norms that were
well understood by its original readers but which today seem somewhat opaque.1 An
examination of the ancient Near Eastern context in which Amos lived will help the etic
observer better understand the book of Amos. Specifically, three Near Eastern “laws”
will help us place Amos’ ethical ideas within his cultural milieu.2 An examination of
ancient Near Eastern and biblical ideas concerning justice will also aid in our
understanding of the book. This chapter will explore international customary law as it
was practiced in the ancient Near East. The “law of the oppressed” will also be discussed
along with its twin theme of social justice. Finally the law of retribution or lex talionis
will be briefly surveyed.
International Customary Law
International law is invested with a particularly difficult task. By definition, it
involves the relationship between two or more nations, each of which views itself as
sovereign. Often the nations have customs and traditions which differ, sometimes
radically so, from that of their neighbors. The foreignness of the “other” often creates a
sense of mistrust, making interactions between nations fraught with difficulties.3 Yet
1

The original recipients of the Amos’ message almost certainly heard rather than read his sermons. This is,
for example, presumed by Matthews when he writes that the rhetorical strategy of the Oracles against the
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nations must interact. Only rarely (and then only for a limited time) are nations accorded
the luxury of isolation. At a practical level, either a nation will desire (or require)
resources from a neighboring state or it will have resources sought after by surrounding
nations. Or a nation might simply occupy territory important to another state for any
number of reasons. Thus, despite the perceived otherness between nations and the distrust
this often engenders, nations must develop methods of social intercourse to prevent a
constant state of war. As Olga Butkevych writes, “Due to primarily negative treatment of
foreigners on the one hand, and sheer necessity of establishing international contacts with
them on the other, international law comes to the forefront in order to make such contacts
possible and prevent international conflicts.”4 The task of international diplomacy, as
onerous as it may have been, would have become more manageable if the participating
countries shared a common culture. This was the situation in the ancient Near East. The
nations shared a common diplomatic language (Akkadian) and worshipped many of the
same gods. As Amanda Podany writes, “With so much in common, it is hardly surprising
that they were able to find common ground and to agree on principles of diplomatic
engagement.”5
In antiquity the methods of intercourse which developed were often obscured
behind various rituals.6 Yet the rituals and the international dialogues they made possible
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constituted a form of ancient international law.7 While this law was not necessarily well
developed, it nevertheless existed.8 Ancient nations interacted and thus needed a
consistent framework upon which to base those interactions. Without some form of law,
international relations would have been entirely chaotic.9
Law, at any level, has as its purpose the preservation of order. It can be
characterized by its three distinct functions: legislation, adjudication, and execution.10
Law works on the national level because the state promulgates statutes that its citizens
must follow, interprets statutes by applying them to real life circumstances, and enforces
its ordinances against those who would break them. Law works because some entity sits
above the quarreling parties and adjudicates between them. Either by the agreement of
the citizens or the compulsion of the state, the legal institutions of a nation are understood
to have authority over its citizens. The three functions of law can be invested in a single
individual (at least theoretically, in the case of an absolute monarchy or a dictatorship); in
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utilized in international dialog, but the international laws underlying the rituals were often based on reason.
Bederman, International Law, 4.
8

Butkevych alluded to a school of thought that seriously questioned the existence of international law in
antiquity when she wrote, “The idea was generated that international law was absent in antiquity as the
conditions necessary for its birth were absent at that time, among other things, due to the fact that ancient
international relations were not studied adequately.” Butkevych, "History of Ancient International Law,"
196. Butkevych concludes, however, that international law flourished because the need for trans-ethnic
discourse existed from the earliest tribal times.
9

Bederman writes, “International law is impossible without a system of multiple states, each conscious of
its own sovereignty and the choice between relations being premised on order or on anarchy.” David J.
Bederman, "Religion and the Sources of International Law in Antiquity," in The Influence of Religion on
the Development of International Law, ed. Mark W. Janis (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1991), 5.
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This enumeration of functions obviously mirrors the structure of the US government and that of many of
the states and thus reflects a modern perspective. While there may be other ways to subdivide the functions
of law, nevertheless this division serves as a useful analytical tool.
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a small group of individuals (in, for example, an oligarchic form of government); or, in
the case of modern democracies, in separate branches of the government. Wherever the
functions of law are vested, however, law at the national level operates because there is
an overarching power that insures that the functions of law are carried out.
International law, like law at the domestic level, seeks to provide order.
Formulating and enforcing international law is problematic, however, because it exists
between nations which, by definition, consider themselves sovereign. The sovereignty of
a nation precludes the idea that another power sits above it and regulates its relationships
with other nations. The ancient Near East, unlike the modern world, had no international
bodies to serve the functions of law.11 With no international congresses to develop
statutes, no institutions given the power to adjudicate between quarreling states, and no
international constabulary to police breaches in statute or etiquette, only two options were
available. Either the nations had to agree among themselves to abide by negotiated laws;
or one nation, by virtue of its power or influence, dictated the rules of international law to
others within its sphere of influence. Both these forms of international law manifested
themselves in antiquity.12 Lacking formal institutions, ancient international law became
governed by treaty and custom.13
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The modern world has attempted to create by agreement international institutions to carry out the
functions of law. The United Nations carries out some international legislative functions. The International
Court of Justice serves as the judicial branch of the UN. Absent a clearly defined executive authority,
however, the International Court of Justice must rely on nations to accede to its judgments. Needless to say,
not all nations do so. For example, the United States refused to accept the ruling of the Court concerning its
affairs in Nicaragua in the 1980s and no longer views the Court’s decisions as compulsory. The execution
of modern international law remains highly problematic.
12

Stipulations of these agreements are most readily contained in the various extant treaties known from the
period. There were two types of treaties which match the two conditions given. Nations of similar power
and influence negotiated terms and agreed to abide by them. Treaties governing this type of relationship
have been labeled parity treaties. (Treaties between Egypt and Hittites during the Amarna Age serve as a
ready example.) At times in the ancient Near East, a single country asserted hegemony over a large area.
While this state may not have directly ruled neighboring countries, they were able to dictate the terms of
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The use of treaties in the ancient Near East has a long history. The desire for
international order was even older. Dennis McCarthy, for example, notes that the Vulture
Stela of Eannatum of Lagash contained elements found later in most ancient Near Eastern
treaties.14 He concludes that “the practice and the concept of the later treaties are already
at work because the societal structures which produced them are already present.”15
Treaties were not only very old, but were found throughout the ancient Near East. John
Walton notes that portions of almost sixty treaties are still extant and come from Asia
Minor, Syria, and Assyria.16 Treaties served to regularize the customs that governed the
relationships between nations. These treaties spelled out specific actions expected from
each party.17 Although these treaties were bilateral rather than truly international, they

intercourse between the nations. Treaties which were imposed by a more powerful overlord usually
involved stipulations that bound the weaker nation to the stronger. These have been labeled vassal treaties.
(The Hittites held sway over most of Asia Minor during the New Kingdom period. Many of the treaties
dating to this time period are of the vassal type.) Dennis J. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant: A Study in
Form in the Ancient Oriental Documents and in the Old Testament, New ed. (Rome: Biblical Institute,
1978), 44.
13

Even with the modern legislative experiments in international law, custom still plays a major role in
defining acceptable behavior. Goldsmith and Posner note that customary international law is typically
defined as “the collection of international behavioral regularities that nations over time come to view as
binding as a matter of law.” Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, "A Theory of Customary International
Law," The American Journal of International Law 66, no. 4 (1999): 1116.
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McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant, 30-1. Amélie Kuhrt dates Eannatum to circa 2450 BCE. Amélie Kuhrt,
The Ancient Near East: c. 3000-330 BC, 2 vols., Routledge History of the Ancient World (London ; New
York: Routledge, 1994), 1:27. I will attempt to provide the provenance and dates for as many texts as
possible in this chapter in order to demonstrate that the ideals expressed were both widespread and
persistent.
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McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant, 31.
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John H. Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual
World of the Hebrew Bible (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2006), 69. McCarthy mentions treaties
that involved the Hurrians, the Egyptians, and the Babylonians. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant, 46.
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For example, the treaty between the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II and the Hittite monarch Hattusilis III
specified that each king would come to the aid of the other in case of invasion by a foreign army. The treaty
also specified that each party would recognize and support the eventual successor of the reigning monarch.
A mutual extradition clause was a part of the treaty, stipulating that each party would refuse to grant
asylum to fugitives. Victor Harold Matthews and Don C. Benjamin, Old Testament Parallels: Laws and
Stories from the Ancient Near East, Fully rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), 88-89.
John Walton notes that, “Typical stipulations include loyalty, payment of tribute, reception of ambassadors,
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demonstrate that the nations recognized the need for a system of maintaining order
between sovereign nations. Treaties, along with custom, provided the framework
necessary to govern international relations in the ancient Near East.
Unlike modern laws and treaties, international agreements in the ancient Near
East were between monarchs, not between their respective nations. Raymond Westbrook
writes,
International law was not separate from internal law, as it is today. The
paradigmatic form of the state was monarchy. Its theoretical basis was the
domestic household, that is, the territory and population of the state
constituted a household, and the king was head of household. Like any
head of household, he could enter into obligations that bound his subjects
and was responsible for crimes committed by and upon them. International
law was therefore based on principles in law common to all the
civilizations of the region.18
Westbrook argues that society was hierarchically constructed and the king was
understood to stand at the top of the hierarchy. Just as the householder could make
agreements binding upon his family as a whole or upon individual members, so too could
the king enter into treaties which affected his nation without receiving the consent of his
citizens.19 These agreements were considered binding on the people of the state. The
people could also be held responsible for crimes committed by the king. Punishing the
community was tantamount to punishing the king.

provision for garrison troops, participation in military campaigns when requested, information concerning
conspiracies, and extradition of enemies.” Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought, 69.
18

Raymond Westbrook, "The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law," in A History of Ancient Near
Eastern Law, ed. Raymond Westbrook and Gary M. Beckman, Handbook of Oriental studies Section one,
The Near and Middle East, (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 83. Note Westbrook’s contention that international law in
the ancient Near East was essentially local customary law writ large.
19

So, for example, the head of a household could sell a family member into slavery to satisfy a debt entered
into by the householder.
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While custom and treaty played a major role in defining the laws governing the
intercourse between nations, there still remained the problem of enforcement of the
treaties. The nations of the ancient Near East developed a solution to that problem, a
problem that still plagues the modern world. 20 They recognized an authority that
transcended the monarchs of individual nations while still allowing the nations to
maintain their sovereignty. The nations of the ancient Near East turned to their gods to
guarantee order in international relations. Donald Magnetti writes,
In the absence of any international legal authority and frequently despite
genuine cultural and religious discrepancies, e.g. Mesopotamia-EgyptAnatolia, a common structure nevertheless appears by means of which
promises made between different states were realized. The promises made
had to be sanctioned by, and thus derive their validity from, a power above
the parties involved. Since the supernatural or theological dimension
thoroughly permeated life and activity in all of the ancient Near Eastern
civilizations, that power was the gods.21
The nations entered into treaties that technically bound them, not to another nation, but to
the gods.22 The gods held the ultimate authority to maintain international order. Dennis
McCarthy asserts that,
In fact, the special character of the treaty as opposed to the contract or
edict was that it bound by oath and not by witnesses who could ensure its
enforcement in court—with the help of police internally or an army
externally in a ‘police action.’ The treaty thus invoked the ultimate
guardians of world order, the gods who blessed and punished, to give
added insurance that they would intervene against a particular instance of
20

Lacking any real executive power, Richard Posner argues that international order in the modern world is
essentially maintained by retributive justice. He writes that it is the “possibility of retaliation by victim
against aggressor” which keeps nations in check. He continues, “…not perfectly to be sure but on the whole
effectively.” Richard A. Posner, "Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment," The Journal of Legal
Studies 9, no. 1 (1980): 76.
21

Donald L. Magnetti, "The Function of the Oath in the Ancient Near Eastern International Treaty," The
American Journal of International Law 72, no. 4 (1978): 823.
22

Raymond Westbrook, "International Law in the Amarna Age," in Law from the Tigris to the Tiber: The
Writings of Raymond Westbrook, ed. Raymond Westbrook, Bruce Wells, and F. Rachel Magdalene
(Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 281.
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disorder, the violation of a relation which they had been pledged to
protect.23
Thus the nations of the ancient Near East developed a working form of international law
in which custom and treaties played the legislative role while the gods provided the
executive function.
The gods also constituted a form of international court, fulfilling the judicial role
of law as well. The gods were called on to witness the various agreements made between
sovereign nations. Treaties were sealed with oaths made before the gods.24 These treaties
were considered binding and the divine sanctions that backed them up were taken
seriously. Westbrook writes,
The divine legal system governed human behavior no less than human
courts, and its sanctions, if less certain in their application (but not by
much), were equally feared. Notwithstanding the occasional breach and
the rationalization of misconduct, the behavior of states was conditioned
by what they saw as an effective legal system. Natural calamities such as
plague, drought, flood, and defeat in war were attributed to divine justice,
and steps were taken to make legal reparation in light of them.25
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McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant, 41.
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Magnetti views the oath as the centerpiece of ancient treaties. It was the element which allowed peace to
be substituted for war. Magnetti writes, “An instance of nonobservance of a binding contract under civil
law can result in an appeal to a court of law or to the ruler, and such was the case in the ancient Near East.
But in an agreement between states, the agreed points can only be enforced peacefully by an appeal to an
international legal structure. In the absence of such an established structure, as was the case in the ancient
Near East, only an appeal to the gods could be an effective means to guarantee observance of the treaty –
other than a resort to military force. The solemn appeal to the gods to bear witness to the promises made
and to punish nonrealization of those promises was subscribed under oath. As such, the oath by the gods
was the constitutive element—that which provided the sanction—in the ancient Near Eastern international
treaty.” Magnetti, "Function of the Oath," 815. Jan Assmann notes that Hammurabi’s Code was ‘protected’
by one hundred lines of curses (against three lines of blessings). Jan Assmann, "When Justice Fails:
Jurisdiction and Imprecation in Ancient Egypt and the Near East," The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology
78, no. (1992): 158.
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Westbrook, "International Law," 269.
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An example of the use of oaths to guarantee treaties can be found in the treaty
between the Hittite Mursili and Duppi-Tessub of Amurru.26 The treaty concludes with the
following oath/curse: “All the words of the treaty and the oath which are written on this
tablet – if Duppi-Teshub [does not keep these] words of the treaty and of the oath, then
let these oath gods destroy Duppi-Teshub together with his head, his wife, his son, his
grandson, his house, his city, his land and together with his possessions.”27 These curses
were considered to be efficacious and reached into the realm of life where law often
could not reach. Assmann comments, “Oaths and curses extend the range of efficiency of
‘connective justice’ beyond the sphere of legal institutions into the sphere of divine
maintenance of cosmic order. They presuppose and confirm a world-view where both
cosmic and social order follows the same principle of retribution.”28
War often resulted as a result of the violation of a treaty’s terms. These wars
involved not just the armies of the nations involved; the national gods also played a
role.29 It was understood that the earthly outcome of battles mirrored the outcome of
cosmic battles and it must be presumed that the nation on the losing side of the battle
26

Mursili is known in modern literature as Mursili II. Kuhrt dates his reign from 1330-1295 BCE. Kuhrt,
Ancient Near East, 1:254.
27

William W. Hallo and K. Lawson Younger, The Context of Scripture, 3 vols. (Leiden ; New York: Brill,
1997), 2:98.
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Assmann, "When Justice Fails," 151. ‘Connective justice’ is Assmann’s term for the processes and
institutions tasked with insuring that actions are balanced with appropriate consequences. He enumerates
two occasions in which connective justice fails: when the criminal is unknown, and when later society or
the state ignores laws promulgated by their ancestors. From the standpoint of international law, a third
instance of the failure of connective justice might be added; when a state is unable to maintain its own laws
against a stronger nation.
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Amnon Altman, "Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law: The Near East 12000330 B.C.E," Journal of the History of International Law 12, no. (2010): 106. Mario Liverani states,
“Needless to say, battles are won by divine aid. On this point the Egyptian, Assyrian and Hittite views are
almost identical: at the same time alongside and above the king, his gods protect him and fight for him.”
Mario Liverani, International Relations in the Ancient Near East, 1600-1100 B.C, Studies in Diplomacy
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 103.
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occupied that position because their gods were punishing them for breaches of right
conduct.30
Ancient international law consisted of only a small subset of elements covered in
modern international law. Among the limited sphere of ancient Near Eastern customs
relating to international law were the customs relating to the prosecution of war.
Bederman notes that the scope of ancient international law was limited mainly to customs
related to embassies, treaties, and war.31 Specifically, he writes, “While further nuances
on the rules of diplomatic contact, treaty-making, and war-making were developed as
time went on, the essential contours of the norms did not change: envoys were not to be
killed, treaties were to be kept in good faith, aggression was not to be rewarded, and basic
restraints in warfare were to be observed.”32
While it may appear counterintuitive that war should have limits, there are good
reasons to believe that certain practices were generally proscribed even in antiquity. War
is normally a voluntary and rational activity.33 It is also an expensive proposition. It
30

Walton writes, “Though the gods in a community clearly vie with one another for power, the conflicts of
the gods emerge at yet another level when they are seen representing various polities (whether on the
domestic or international level). In this context the strengths and weaknesses of deities emerge as their
clients succeed or fail.” Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought, 102. Breaches of right conduct could
include, for example, a monarch failing to provide justice for his realm. Victor Harold Matthews, "The
King's Call to Justice," Biblische Zeitschrift 35, no. 2 (1991): 214.
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Bederman, International Law, 7.
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Bederman, International Law, 278.
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Wars, although ubiquitous throughout human history, should not be thought of as being inevitable. Victor
Matthews notes that war is only one method (among many) of restoring order. He writes, “Social conflict at
any level is not simply a way to manifest and ease pent-up anger or to express superior status. It is more
likely to be seen as one means of resolving disputes so that there can be a restoration of social cohesion.”
Victor Harold Matthews, "Introduction," in Writing and Reading War: Rhetoric, Gender, and Ethics in
Biblical and Modern Contexts, ed. Brad E. Kelle and Frank Ritchell Ames (Atlanta: Society of Biblical
Literature, 2008), 5. Stephen Neff has also written that wars were not simply emotional events. Rationality
played an important role in the declaration of war. Neff notes that there were many religious rituals that
preceded war in the ancient Near East. These rituals should not be written off as meaningless. He writes,
“These practices may be scorned as mere superstition, but that would be too hasty a judgment. The deeper
point about them is the way in which they indicated that war-making was a methodical and painstaking
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consumes the resources of the victor even as it destroys those of the vanquished.34
Warfare was a seasonal activity in the ancient Near East, so efficiency was important. As
such, it only made sense for nations to attempt to win a victory via diplomacy if at all
possible. Since warfare was often conducted to gain wealth and territory, it was in the
interest of the attacking nation to minimize the damage to the land, infrastructure, and
citizenry of the opposing nation as much as possible. Although perhaps not motivated by
altruistic ideals, ancient monarchs nevertheless were often not as cruel as supposed. Sima
Parpola, for example, makes the argument that the Assyrians were not as cruel as they are
often portrayed by modern authors. He writes,
The alleged cruelty of Assyrians is a modern myth exaggerated beyond all
proportion. It is true that Assyrians, like their contemporaries and
successors, did commit terrible atrocities in war and that they did cause
civilian populations considerable sufferings both during and after war.
However, such atrocities were not inflicted summarily but as just
punishments for perjury prescribed in the curse sections of broken treaties.
There is good evidence that the Assyrian government was concerned to
reduce civilian suffering even in military actions against rebels and that
the Assyrian army carefully refrained from atrocities in military operations
rendered as aid to friendly regimes.35

affair, a far cry from a mere blind lashing out at enemies.” Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A
General History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 22.
34

Bederman writes, “Ancient wars were fought for territory – and for glory. Most ancient States were
socially organized on a footing that facilitated the marshaling of resources for armed conflict. These
resources were finite. Blood and treasure came in limited supplies. The Israelites, the Greeks, and the
Romans all came to understand that war depleted social and economic capital so quickly that the very
integrity of the State was jeopardized. All ancient belligerents had an incentive, therefore, to make war
quick and cheap.” Bederman, International Law, 264.
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Sima Parpola, "International Law in the First Millennium," in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law,
ed. Raymond Westbrook and Gary M. Beckman, Handbook of Oriental Studies Section 1, The Near and
Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1060-1. Parpola cites an unpublished letter (BM 132980) from
Assurbanipal to the elders of Elam as demonstration that Assyria could exercise restraint. In that letter,
Assurbanipal wrote, “When Ummanigash came to grasp my feet and I sent my army with him, and (when)
they went and defeated Teumman, did we lay our hands on the temples, cities or anything? Did we take
spoils of war? Did we not pour oil on blood and become (your) benefactors.” Parpola, "International Law,"
1061 n. 73.Of course Parpola seems to take Assurbanipal’s letter at face value. Parpola assumes that
Assurbanipal’s motives were altruistic. It might be argued that Assurbanipal was constrained by other
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The “atrocities” of the Assyrians were considered, by the Assyrians, as nothing more than
just retribution for the sin of breaking a treaty. In this view, the Assyrians merely acted as
a police force, enforcing treaties entered into by an opposing nation. They were thus
acting at the behest of the gods. Douglas Johnston agrees that unnecessary bloodshed was
often avoided. He writes, “Despite the absence of accords governing the conduct of war
in those early times, some efforts were apparently made to reduce unnecessary
slaughter.”36 Bederman concurs, noting that total war was virtually unheard of in
antiquity.37 It has also been argued that respect for opposing warriors created an
atmosphere of restraint.38 None of this is to suggest that hard and fast rules for
prosecuting war existed. As Raymond Westbrook notes, “Humane treatment seems to
have depended on political expediency and internal inhibitions rather than on recognized
legal rules.”39 There did, however, seem to be the expectation in antiquity that certain
behaviors during times of war were acceptable while others were not.40
motives or forces. It should be noted that Parpola’s position seems to be a minority one. Many modern
authors presume that the Assyrians were overly cruel.
36

Douglas M. Johnston, The Historical Foundations of World Order: The Tower and the Arena (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 163. Johnston cites various alternatives to general warfare; activities
such as individual combat, surrender followed by forced labor, and the offer to allow a besieged city to
capitulate rather than being destroyed. As mentioned above, this last may have been as much for the benefit
of the besieging nation as for that of the besieged.
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“Civilians were usually left alone, if for no other reason that that if armies killed peasants and burned
fields, soldiers would probably starve before the inhabitants of the district did. Total war was virtually
unheard of.” Bederman, International Law, 263.
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Douglas Johnston writes, “… legend has passed down stories of magnanimity and decency among
famous warriors, suggesting that the earliest warrior tribes and peoples may have developed a grudging
respect for one another in times of peace. In certain early civilizations, a rough, unwritten code of military
honor might have emerged from distant battlefields, at least among the chiefs and captains with most
reason to hope for the benefits of reciprocity.” Johnston, Historical Foundations, 163.
39

Westbrook, "Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law," 86.
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Bederman sums up his chapter on restraint in warfare thusly, “Whether there was a law of war in
antiquity is the ultimate test of whether there was a cohesive idea of a law of nations at all in ancient times.
I have argued here that there indeed was a common core of ideas leading to the exercise of restraint by
ancient States in armed conflict.” Bederman, International Law, 265.
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To summarize, the purpose of law is to maintain order, and the nations of the
ancient Near East desired order just as nations today do. International law in the ancient
Near Eastern was based on custom and formalized through the use of treaties between
nations. The gods served as witnesses to these treaties and they were expected to
adjudicate between nations. Breached customs and treaties often lead to war, the outcome
of which was assumed to be determined by the gods. War was governed by a fluid set of
rules in the ancient Near East. Although those rules were customary rather than statutory,
they were nevertheless generally expected to be observed.
Before proceeding to ancient Near Eastern attitudes concerning the poor, a brief
excursus on the religious establishment’s role in war is in order.41 During periods of war,
the religious leaders (perhaps at the behest of the king) could call upon their gods to assist
their nation in a time of crisis. War oracles might be uttered against an enemy. An
example from the book of Numbers illustrates the use of the war oracle. There Balaam
was invited to curse Israel, thus assuring a Moabite victory.42 Balak, the Moabite king,
hired Balaam to deliver the war oracle. The text relates that Balak,
… sent messengers to Balaam son of Beor at Pethor, which is on the
Euphrates, in the land of Amaw, to summon him, saying, ‘A people has
come out of Egypt; they have spread over the face of the earth, and they
have settled next to me. Come now, curse this people for me, since they
are stronger than I; perhaps I shall be able to defeat them and drive them
from the land; for I know that whomever you bless is blessed, and
whomever you curse is cursed.’ (Numbers 22:5-6)
41

I use the word religious advisedly. Walton notes that the distinction between religious and secular is a
modern one. He writes, “There is no such word as ‘religion’ in the languages of the ancient Near East.
Likewise, there is no dichotomy between sacred and secular, or even between natural and supernatural. The
only suitable dichotomy is between spiritual and physical, though even that would be a less meaningful
distinction to them than it is to us. In the end, there is a distinction between the heavenly realm and the
earthly one, but events in the two were often intertwined or parallel.” Walton, Ancient Near Eastern
Thought, 87.
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The story is found in Numbers 22-24.
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Duane Christensen notes that in this text Balaam seems to bear the characteristics of a
Mesopotamian bārû priest.43
War oracles might also predict the success of a military venture. For example, an
Assyrian oracle concerning Ashurbanipal reads in part, “Fear not, O Ashurbanipal! Now,
as I have spoken, it will come to pass: I shall grant (it) to you. Over the people of the four
languages (and) over the armament of the princes you will exercise sovereignty.”44
Middle Kingdom Egyptian priests developed the Execration Texts as a means of
thwarting the enemy’s intentions.45 Several sets of these texts have been recovered.46 The
priests recorded the names of the enemies of Egypt on pottery or clay figurines. These
items were then ritually broken, activating the attendant curse. Although similar
Mesopotamian texts appear to be lacking, we have already noted that treaties and even
law codes from the region were backed by oaths and curses which called upon the gods to
adjudicate between the signatory nations.
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International law and warfare was thus not solely the domain of political figures
in the ancient Near East. Religious personages played their part in assuring the victory of
their nation.
The Law of the Oppressed
Amos concludes the oracles against the nations by condemning Israel for various
domestic crimes. Specifically, Amos accuses Israel of oppressing the poor and perverting
justice. He would return to these themes in several more oracles scattered throughout the
book of Amos. The dual themes of oppression and justice are well known throughout the
ancient Near East. In the following paragraphs we will examine the ancient Near Eastern
concept of justice. This will be followed by a brief examination of some texts which
conveyed ancient attitudes towards poverty.
Justice in the ancient Near East encompassed more than just the dispensing of
punishment to law-breakers. It also included the modern notion of social justice. At its
base, justice concerned the proper ordering of society and the world. Each individual was
responsible for maintaining his or her part in that order. As such, their notion of justice
served as an ideal vehicle for the maintenance of an hierarchical society. At the top of the
hierarchy sat the king, who carried a special responsibility in the administration of
justice.
Justice is defined, according to K. D. Irani, as “an abstraction emerging from an
intuition embedded in human nature, that in any interaction among humans a person
should get what he or she deserves.”47 The shape of justice, however, depends to a large
degree on the society that demands it. For example, the modern world views justice from
47

K. D. Irani, "The Idea of Social Justice in the Ancient World," in Social Justice in the Ancient World, ed.
K. D. Irani and Morris Silver (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), 3.
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the standpoint of rights. The duty of justice, in this view, is to guarantee that one’s
various rights are not infringed upon. Ancient Near Eastern society, however, articulated
its sense of justice differently. To do justice in the ancient world was to “restore the
person who suffered deprivation, or harm to the state that he or she deserved to be in.”48
Justice demanded that an individual be allowed to carry out his/her assigned role in
society without undue restriction. By virtue of their lack of power and influence, the poor
were vulnerable to exploitation. Thus the goal of justice throughout the ancient Near East
was often the protection of the poor.49 Perhaps because of the prevalence of poverty,
Norman Lohfink maintains that the ancient world was actually more cognizant of the
status of the poor than are many modern societies. He writes, “Reality may often have
been cruel; nevertheless, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, among the Hittites and the
Canaanites, the care for the poor probably had a higher profile in ethical consciousness
than in our modern societies.”50
This care for the poor should not be confused with the modern concept of equal
rights, however. Justice in the ancient Near East was viewed from within the context of
an hierarchical society. As Harriet Havice notes, humane treatment of the poor was
“imbedded in the hierarchical world-view and ethos common in the ancient Near East.”51
Each person had a definite place in society. It was equally wrong for a person to attempt
48

Irani, "Idea of Social Justice," 3.

49

Charles Fensham writes that “the protection of widow, orphan, and the poor was the common policy of
the ancient Near East.” F. Charles Fensham, "Widow, Orphan, and the Poor in Ancient Near Eastern Legal
and Wisdom Literature," Journal of Near Eastern Studies 21, no. 2 (1962): 129.
50

“Reality may often have been cruel; nevertheless, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, among the Hittites and the
Canaanites, the care for the poor probably had a higher profile in ethical consciousness than in our modern
societies.” S.J. Lohfink, Norbert, "Poverty in the Laws of the Ancient Near East and of the Bible,"
Theological Studies 52, no. (1991): 34.
51

Harriet Havice, “The Concern for the Widow and the Fatherless in the Ancient Near East: A Case Study
in Old Testament Ethics” (Yale University, 1979), Abstract.

42

to rise above their place, or for a third party to attempt to remove them from the place
they currently occupied. Raymond Westbrook writes,
The concept of social justice in [a hierarchical] society was not at all one
of equality, nor was it identified with the relief of poverty as such, given
that large sections of the population existed at subsistence level. Social
justice was conceived rather as protecting the weaker strata of society
from being unfairly deprived of their due: the legal status, property rights,
and economic condition to which their position on the hierarchical ladder
entitled them.52
Or, to put it another way, justice in the ancient Near East concerned the maintenance of
order over against chaos. As S. Todd Lowry writes, “Security and stability in possessions
and uniformly administered laws contribute to efficient planning and have the appearance
of justice; but if such practices are based on the administrative purposes of authority
systems, not on the assertable rights of the individual, we are then dealing primarily with
order and not with justice in a modern sense.”53 The goal of justice in the ancient Near
East, then, was not the creation of a level playing field in which every individual had
equal opportunities to advance. Rather, it was an attempt to preserve the status quo. Thus,
justice in the ancient Near East looked backward rather than forward.
The king had a special role in the administration of ancient Near Eastern justice.
Only the king, for example, had the power to enact meaningful social reform. Reform
could take several shapes. Weinfeld enumerates a few of the mechanisms available:
“…liberation of slaves, restoration of land to their original owners, and cancellation of
debts are among the striking features of ‘social reforms’, whose aim it is to establish
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social justice and equality and to assist the weaker members of society.”54 A common
thread in each of these tools is the idea of restoration.
While social reform in the modern world carries the connotation of change (as, for
example, witnessed by the tremendous change brought about in US society by the Civil
Rights movement of the 1960’s), social reform in the ancient Near East had an almost
opposite meaning. The term liberation might more appropriately be translated restoration.
Benjamin Foster writes, “What is most important for our present purpose is the
understanding that the Babylonians had that these [edicts] did not constitute reform in the
sense of a new departure but constituted ‘restoration’ to a former, natural state.”55 The
various liberations or reforms promulgated by ancient Near Eastern monarchs attempted
to reestablish an older social order that was perceived to be changing. Westbrook writes
that social justice, in general, sought to maintain the status quo. He noted that, “social
justice was regarded in the ancient Near East as the preservation of the status quo—as the
privileges owed to each citizen as member of a family unit with a certain recognized
socioeconomic status. Where those privileges were lost through an act of oppression,
certain mechanisms were available to restore the balance.”56 Reform, then, served to
restore what had been lost, not necessarily to gain what had never been possessed.
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Two Akkadian phrases, andurārum šakānum and mīšarum, expressed the idea of
liberation or restoration.57 Liberation, however, was more than just a Babylonian concept.
It extended throughout the Ancient Near East. Westbrook mentions, for example,
Sumerian documents dating from the third millennium BCE, an Old Babylonian Period
decree, and a twelfth century BCE Hittite edict, all of which provided liberation by
specifically cancelling certain debts.58 Weinfeld notes that Egypt released prisoners at the
coronation of a new king from the New Kingdom period up through Hellenistic times. He
also mentions various types of liberation known from the Sumerian, Old Akkadian,
Kassite, Isin/Larsa, and Old Kingdom Hittite periods. Texts from Mari and Nuzi
document forms of liberation as well.59 The Hebrew Sabbatical year also served as a form
of liberation. Weinfeld notes the pervasive nature of social reforms in the ancient Near
East when he writes, “We have evidence of releases and liberations in Mesopotamia
through the ages: from the middle of the third millennium to the end of the first
millennium BCE.” 60
Ancient Near Eastern monarchs utilized grants of liberation in an attempt to
provide stability for their reigns. A quick reading of ancient Near Eastern history will
demonstrate the ephemeral nature of monarchies and dynasties. In an attempt to forestall
for themselves the fate of their predecessors, kings promulgated reforms to help ensure
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the stability of their realms.61 Justice, however, was not the sole domain of the monarchy.
Fensham notes that Hammurabi’s Code identifies the god Shamash as the god of justice
over both men and gods. He concludes that “religious and social ethics are closely
connected here. The protection of the weak is regarded vertically and horizontally.”62
Specifically, Fensham argues that “the general conception of protection of the weak is,
furthermore, expanded as a common way of life to ordinary people. They have to respect
the rights of the poor or else receive punishment, if not through legal means, then through
direct punishment of the god.”63 Thus throughout the ancient Near East all citizens were
invested with the responsibility of protecting the poor.
Social Justice in Mesopotamia and Syria. The Sumerian leader Uru-inimgina
promulgated the world’s first known legal and social reforms. He ruled the city of Lagash
in the late third millennium BCE.64 Uru-inimgina espoused the principle that the strong
should not oppress the weak. Specifically it was written of him, “A citizen of Lagash
living in debt, (or) who had been condemned to its prison for impost, hunger, robbery,
(or) murder – their freedom he established. Uru-inimgina made a compact with the divine
Nin-Girsu that the powerful man would not oppress the orphan (or) widow.”65
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Ur-Nammu, a Neo-Sumerian monarch of the Ur III dynasty, echoed these
principles in a law code that bears his name.66 Ur-Nammu boasts that, under his rule, “I
did not deliver the orphan to the rich. I did not deliver the widow to the mighty. I did not
deliver the man with but one shekel to the man with one mina. I did not deliver the man
with but one sheep to the man with one ox.”67 Another similar claim was made by
Hammurabi. In his famous law code he claims that the gods made him king “to make
justice prevail in the land, to abolish the wicked and the evil, to prevent the strong from
oppressing the weak, to rise like the sun-god Shamash over all humankind, to illuminate
the land.”68 Hammurabi reiterated this claim in the epilogue of his code. There he had his
scribes write,
In order that the mighty not wrong the weak, to provide just ways for the
waif and the widow, I have inscribed my precious pronouncements upon
my stela and set it up before the statue of me, the king of justice, in the
city of Babylon, the city which the gods Anu and Enlil have elevated,
within the Esagil, the temple whose foundations are fixed as are heaven
and earth. In order to render the judgments of the land, to give the verdicts
of the land, and to provide just ways from the wronged.69
The code is fragmentary and many of its provisions are lost. Despite Hammurabi’s lofty
claims, however, it must be noted that most of the existing laws, especially those dealing
with the economic realm, primarily address the concerns of upper classes. Only one law
(§177) specifically mentions widows and it placed restrictions on their ability to marry.
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The restrictions sought to protect the estates of both the deceased and the prospective
husbands. Orphans are not mentioned in the laws at all, although children with only one
surviving parent are protected under various statutes if that parent remarried.70
Ammisaduqa, a member of Hammurabi’s First Babylonian dynasty issued a
mīšarum edict, part of which is still extant.71 The mīšarum proclaimed the release of debt
and was a common tool of ancient Near Eastern kings. Although the mīšarum edict might
have been especially beneficial to the merchant class, it also had a positive impact on the
poor. For example, although Ammisaduqa’s decree appears to be primarily directed at
voiding the debts of business men, the edict also contains a provision that manumits some
of those sold into debt slavery. The relevant portion of the edict reads, “If an obligation
has resulted in foreclosure against a citizen of Numhia [and a list of six other cities], in
consequence of which he placed his own person, his wife, or his children in debt
servitude for silver, or as a pledge – because the king has instituted a misharum in the
land, he is released; his freedom is in effect.”72 The release of debt was not absolute,
however. Foreigners were not absolved of their obligations (§8) and house born slaves
70
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were not freed (§21). Thus, despite their claims, the Mesopotamian law codes often gave
little real relief to the oppressed. Mention of widows and orphans primarily occurred in
either the prologue or the epilogue of the various law codes. It appears that, even as early
as the reign Ur-Nammu, the plight of the widow and orphan mainly served
propagandistic purposes. Nevertheless, it is obvious that concern for the oppressed was
considered to be a desideratum of the king. Concern for the poor represented an
important ancient Near Eastern ideal, whether or not ancient society carried through on
their claims.
Other Mesopotamian genres beyond the law codes expressed concern for the poor
as well. For example, a hymn from ancient Sumer identified the goddess Nanshe as a
protector of the oppressed. According to the hymn, Nanshe, “knows the orphan, she
knows the widow. She knows that person oppresses person. A mother for the orphan,
Nanshe, a caretaker for the widow, finding a way for houses in debt, the lady shelters the
abducted person, seeks a place for the weak, swells him his collecting basket, (and)
makes his collecting vat profitable.”73
Epic literature from Ugarit, in Syria, also regarded protection of the poor as an
important ideal. In the Kirta Epic, the king’s oldest son became impatient and desired the
throne for himself immediately. The son, Yassubu, accused Kirta of a series of crimes in
an attempt to discredit his father. Yassubu claimed,
You let your hands fall slack: you do not judge the widow’s case, you do
not make a decision regarding the oppressed, you do not cast out those
who prey upon the poor. Before you, you do not feed the orphan, behind
your back the widow. Illness has become as it were (your) bedfellow,
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sickness (your) companion in bed. So descend from your kingship, I will
reign, from your dominion, I, yes I, will sit (on your throne).74
Yassubu intended to demonstrate that Kirta’s disinterest in the poor disqualified his father
from sitting on the throne of Ugarit.
The Ugaritic Legend of Aqhatu similarly suggests that protection of the poor
constituted an important role of the ancient Near Eastern king. In the tale, the king
Dani’ilu (also referred to as Danel or Daniel) desired a son to carry on his lineage. In an
attempt to portray Dani’ilu as a worthy king, the author gives this account: “Dani’ilu the
man of Rapa’u, the valiant Harnamite man, arose and sat at the entrance of the (city) gate,
among the leaders (sitting) at the threshing floor. He judged the widow’s case, made
decisions regarding the orphan.”75 The point, of course, is that the gods should look
favorably on Dani’ilu and grant him a son because of his righteous actions.76
Social Justice in Egypt. Rulers from Mesopotamia and Syria were not the only
ancients to be concerned with the plight of the oppressed. Egyptian literature also
demonstrated an interest in the welfare of widows and orphans as well as those on the
lower levels of the social hierarchy. Scott Morschauser writes that, “Obligations to a
transcendent principle of ‘justice’ were specifically expressed in Egyptian texts as
demands for personal tolerance, forbearance, and mercy toward the disadvantaged.”77
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Egyptians expressed the concept of justice through the word ma’at.78 Ma’at had ethical,
political, and religious ramifications. According to Morschauser, “ma’at encompassed
specific ethical requirements, characterized as both the official and personal
responsibilities of the socially advantaged toward their inferiors, as well as the
obligations of subjects toward the state—which was embodied in the figure of the
king.”79
Egypt’s society was strongly hierarchical. Not surprisingly, then, Egyptian ethics
operated within a worldview that encouraged adherence to a strict social structure.
Concern for those of lower status became one of the primary ethical requirements for the
upper classes (for whom most of the texts were intended). In return, the lower class owed
loyalty to those of higher social status. Havice writes,
The two primary duties of [the Egyptian] system are beneficence to one’s
inferior and loyalty and obedience to one’s superior. They correspond to
the reciprocal rights to receive beneficence and loyalty. Thus the
superior’s duty to the inferior is beneficence; the inferior has the
corresponding right to the beneficence of his superior. The inferior has a
duty to be loyal and obedient to his superior; and the superior has the
reciprocal right to his inferior’s loyalty and obedience.80
As in Mesopotamia, Egypt evidenced a strong desire to maintain social stability and this
was embodied in their system of ethics as demonstrated through their texts.
The biography served as a popular genre of Egyptian literature.81 Biographies
were often written on funerary stela and included a list of important ethical characteristics
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about the deceased. The list demonstrated to the gods that the departed deserved a happy
afterlife. The list of characteristics found in the biographies is fairly stereotypical and
apparently represented the “ideal Egyptian.” Extant biographies date from the Fourth
dynasty all the way through to the Hellenistic period. Harriet Havice is of the opinion that
the ideals reflected in these biographies were ancient, originating in the Fourth through
the Sixth Dynasties.82 These ideals continued to be considered paradigmatic behavior for
over two millennia. Among the phrases often found in the Egyptian biographical material
were those such as: “I spoke for the widow on the day of justice”; “I listened to the cry of
her who was bereft of her husband, I brought up the orphan”; “I gave to the beggar, I
nourished the orphan”; and “I was one…who banished the troubles of those who have
nothing, a shade of the fatherless, helper of the widow.”83 The stela of Intef, son of Sent,
included not just the widow and orphan, but generally the indigent in the class of those to
be protected. The deceased claims, “I am bright-faced, open-handed, an owner of food
who does not cover his face. I am a friend of the poor, one well-disposed to the have-not.
I am one who feeds the hungry in need, who is open-handed to the pauper.”84
The Egyptian genre known as “Instruction” also illustrates a marked concern for
the lower classes. The Instruction to King Merikare, for example, admonished the king to
“Do justice, then you endure on earth; Calm the weeper, don’t oppress the widow…”85
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The Instruction of King Amenemhet I, written for his son Sesostris I, contained similar
advice. The king says, “I gave to the beggar, I raised the orphan, I gave success to the
poor as to the wealthy.”86 The work known as The Eloquent Peasant reiterates the same
ideal. In the text, a peasant appeared before a steward to make an appeal. He prefaced his
petition with flattering words. To get in the good graces of the steward, the peasant tells
him, “…you are the father to the orphan, husband to the widow, brother to the rejected
woman, apron to the motherless.”87 Finally, from the New Kingdom, the Instruction of
Amenemope warns of “robbing a wretch, of attacking a cripple.”88 The author also
admonished his readers; “Do not be greedy for a cubit of land, nor encroach on the
boundaries of a widow.”89
Clearly the concern for the oppressed, whether genuine or not, remained an ideal
both ancient and ubiquitous throughout Egypt and the rest of the ancient Near East. Thus
it is not surprising that the Hebrew Bible counted the protection of the oppressed as a
minimum standard for the people of Israel.
Social Justice in the Hebrew Bible. Concern for the poor can be found in all
three divisions of the Hebrew Bible. At least eight different Hebrew words represented
the western notion of poverty. We will briefly survey several of the terms here. A
common Hebrew noun referring to the poor was ( ֶאבְיֹוןebyôn). This term occurs 61 times
in the Hebrew Bible. It was used to identify those so destitute that they depended on the
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benevolence of others to provide them with the basic necessities of life.90 Likewise the
term ( דַּ לdal) speaks of economic deprivation.91 It occurs 48 times in the Hebrew Bible.
M. Daniel Carroll R. speculates that this term referred to poor peasant farmers that, while
not totally destitute, were nevertheless open to exploitation due both to their poverty and
their lack of social status.92
The lack of social status played an important role in Hebrew poverty. W. R.
Domeris notes that poverty should also be understood “…in the context of shame and
honor.”93 Thus poverty was a social as well as an economic condition. This is well
illustrated by the word ( ָענִיānî), used 37 times in the Hebrew Bible. The word bears the
connotation of having been humbled or afflicted. W. J. Dumbrell believes the ‘ānî
occupied an economic position somewhere between the slave and the free man.94 They
were probably without property and dependent on others. Dumbrell speculates that they
were probably excluded from normal community life.95
As in the Near East, widows and orphans served as the face of poverty and
vulnerability in Israel.96 The Hebrew Bible sought to provide provision and protection for
them as, by virtue of their social and economic status, they could be easily exploited and
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oppressed. The primary Hebrew term for the widow (ַא ְל ָמנָה, almānâ) occurs
approximately 55 times in the Hebrew Bible.97 The term for orphan was ( י ָתֹוםyātôm). It
occurs 41 times.98 The two terms occur in the same context thirty times.99
Hebrew law specifically forbade the oppression of the poor. The Deuteronomist
wrote, “You shall not deprive a resident alien or an orphan of justice; you shall not take a
widow’s garment in pledge. (Deut 24:17)”100 A curse was called down upon those who
defied this injunction. Part of the covenant renewal ceremony on Mounts Ebal and
Gerezim included the following imprecation: "Cursed be anyone who deprives the alien,
the orphan, and the widow of justice. (Deut 27:19)" The Book of the Covenant also
sought to protect the widow and orphan. It warned, “You shall not abuse any widow or
orphan. If you do abuse them, when they cry out to me, I will surely heed their cry; my
wrath will burn, and I will kill you with the sword, and your wives shall become widows
and your children orphans. (Ex 22:22-24)”101
Besides seeing to their protection, the Hebrew law also attempted to provide for
the poor. For example, the Holiness Code contained this stipulation: “When you reap the
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harvest of your land, you shall not reap to the very edges of your field, or gather the
gleanings of your harvest. You shall not strip your vineyard bare, or gather the fallen
grapes of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and the alien: I am the LORD
your God. (Leviticus 19:9-10)”102
In an interesting twist, the Deuteronomist seems to suggest that poverty might be
the product of sin.103 Deuteronomy 15:4 reads, “There will, however, be no one in need
among you, because the LORD is sure to bless you in the land that the LORD your God
is giving you as a possession to occupy, if only you will obey the LORD your God by
diligently observing this entire commandment that I command you today.” Yet just a few
verses later the writer states that there will always be poor and maintains that they are to
be treated well. The text says, “Since there will never cease to be some in need on the
earth, I therefore command you, ‘Open your hand to the poor and needy neighbor in your
land.’ (Deut 15:11)” Apparently the poor were to be cared for even if their poverty was
the result of their own actions.
The ancient Hebrew poets also had much to say about the treatment of the poor in
general, and of widows and orphans in particular.104 The author of the book of Job clearly
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described the plight of the poor when he wrote; “Like wild asses in the desert they go out
to their toil, scavenging in the wasteland food for their young. They reap in a field not
their own and they glean in the vineyard of the wicked. They lie all night naked, without
clothing, and have no covering in the cold. They are wet with the rain of the mountains,
and cling to the rock for want of shelter. (Job 24:5-8)” The author subscribed to the
ancient Near Eastern mandate that the poor were to be protected. This is revealed when
Job’s friends sought to discover the cause for Job’s calamity. Eliphaz decided that Job’s
suffering came about because of his ill treatment of the weak. He says,
Is not your wickedness great? There is no end to your iniquities. For you
have exacted pledges from your family for no reason, and stripped the
naked of their clothing. You have given no water to the weary to drink,
and you have withheld bread from the hungry. The powerful possess the
land, and the favored live in it. You have sent widows away emptyhanded, and the arms of the orphans you have crushed. Therefore snares
are around you, and sudden terror overwhelms you, or darkness so that
you cannot see; a flood of water covers you. (Job 22:5-11)
Job did not dispute the impropriety of mistreating the poor. Rather, he agreed with
Eliphaz. He responded, “The wicked remove landmarks; they seize flocks and pasture
them. They drive away the donkey of the orphan; they take the widow’s ox for a pledge.
They thrust the needy off the road; the poor of the earth all hide themselves. (Job 24:24)” He also recognizes, with Eliphaz, that mistreatment of the poor is a punishable
offense. He said of those who oppress the poor,
They build their houses like nests, like booths made by sentinels of the
vineyard. They go to bed with wealth, but will do so no more; they open
their eyes, and it is gone. Terrors overtake them like a flood; in the night a
whirlwind carries them off. The east wind lifts them up and they are gone;
it sweeps them out of their place. It hurls at them without pity; they flee
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from its power in headlong flight. It claps its hands at them, and hisses at
them from its place. (Job 27:18-23)105
While Job agreed with Eliphaz that mistreatment of the poor is a punishable
offense, he professed his innocence. He claimed that, contrary to Eliphaz’s accusation, he
was a friend to the poor.
When the ear heard, it commended me, and when the eye saw, it
approved; because I delivered the poor who cried, and the orphan who had
no helper. The blessing of the wretched came upon me, and I caused the
widow’s heart to sing for joy. I put on righteousness, and it clothed me;
my justice was like a robe and a turban. I was eyes to the blind, and feet to
the lame. I was a father to the needy, and I championed the cause of the
stranger. (Job 29:11-16)
It was because he knew his actions were righteous that created in Job a crisis of faith. He
had expected that his deeds would be rewarded. He lamented, “Then I thought, ‘I shall
die in my nest, and I shall multiply my days like the phoenix; my roots spread out to the
waters, with the dew all night on my branches; my glory was fresh with me, and my bow
ever new in my hand.’ (Job 29:18-20)” Instead Job found himself a new member of the
oppressed class that he had previously protected.
The Psalms also portrays the mistreatment of widows and orphans as the domain
of the wicked. The author of Psalm 94 used harsh imagery to describe the wicked and the
arrogant: “Rise up, O judge of the earth; give to the proud what they deserve! O LORD,
how long shall the wicked, how long shall the wicked exult? They pour out their arrogant
words; all the evildoers boast. They crush your people, O LORD, and afflict your
heritage. They kill the widow and the stranger, they murder the orphan, (Ps 94:2-6)” The
Psalmist, on the other hand, describes Yahweh as caring for the oppressed. Psalms 68:4-6
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read, “Sing to God, sing praises to his name; lift up a song to him who rides upon the
clouds—his name is the LORD— be exultant before him. Father of orphans and protector
of widows is God in his holy habitation. God gives the desolate a home to live in; he
leads out the prisoners to prosperity, but the rebellious live in a parched land.” According
to the Psalmist, Yahweh protects the oppressed. Those opposing the poor, on the other
hand, he describes as rebellious.
The author of Proverbs also characterized Yahweh as guardian of the indigent.
For example, he wrote, “The LORD tears down the house of the proud, but maintains the
widow’s boundaries. (Prov 15:25)” He also warns, “Do not remove an ancient landmark
or encroach on the fields of orphans, for their redeemer is strong; he will plead their
cause against you. (Prov 23:10-11)” Although it is not explicit, the author presumably
understands the poor’s redeemer as Yahweh. Even if a human redeemer is in view,
however, the author maintains that the redeemer’s position is a strong one. As such, the
one abusing the orphan should not expect to elude punishment.
The prophets often considered the mistreatment of the poor as a symptom of
Israel’s repudiation of the covenant. The covenant involved both a vertical and a
horizontal aspect, so the neglect of one aspect signaled the repudiation of the other. As
far as the prophets were concerned genuine worship of Yahweh was necessarily
accompanied by the compassionate treatment of the poor. The prophet Isaiah, a near
contemporary of Amos, decried what he saw as empty worship; that is, ritual
unaccompanied by consideration for the poor. Isaiah appealed to Judah,
Wash yourselves; make yourselves clean; remove the evil of your doings
from before my eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do good; seek justice,
rescue the oppressed, defend the orphan, plead for the widow. Come now,
let us argue it out, says the LORD: though your sins are like scarlet, they
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shall be like snow; though they are red like crimson, they shall become
like wool. (Isa 1: 16-18)
Isaiah implied that the neglect of the poor was tantamount to sin against Yahweh.
Isaiah, like Amos, recognized that exploitation of the poor led to judgment. He
wrote, “Ah, you who make iniquitous decrees, who write oppressive statutes, to turn
aside the needy from justice and to rob the poor of my people of their right, that widows
may be your spoil, and that you may make the orphans your prey! What will you do on
the day of punishment, in the calamity that will come from far away? (Isa 10:1-3a)” This
seems to imply that judgment would come at the hands of an enemy. Amos was not alone
in proclaiming that oppression might well result in military defeat.
Like Amos, Isaiah also portrayed Yahweh as directly sending retribution on
Judah. Isaiah wrote,
The people did not turn to him who struck them, or seek the LORD of
hosts. So the LORD cut off from Israel head and tail, palm branch and
reed in one day—elders and dignitaries are the head, and prophets who
teach lies are the tail; for those who led this people led them astray, and
those who were led by them were left in confusion. That is why the Lord
did not have pity on their young people, or compassion on their orphans
and widows; for everyone was godless and an evildoer, and every mouth
spoke folly. For all this his anger has not turned away, his hand is
stretched out still. For wickedness burned like a fire, consuming briers and
thorns; it kindled the thickets of the forest, and they swirled upward in a
column of smoke. (Isa 9:13-18)
Ironically, Isaiah claimed that even the widows and orphans, those normally protected by
Yahweh, would suffer from the destruction to come because of Judah’s appalling
behavior.
Jeremiah, writing a century and a half after Isaiah, promised a retraction of the
promised exile if Israel, in part, would only “execute justice.” He wrote, “For if you truly
amend your ways and your doings, if you truly act justly one with another, if you do not
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oppress the alien, the orphan, and the widow, or shed innocent blood in this place, and if
you do not go after other gods to your own hurt, then I will dwell with you in this place,
in the land that I gave of old to your ancestors forever and ever. (Jer 7:5-7)” Again note
the correspondence between justice and respect for the poor.
Zechariah argued that Israel’s oppression of widows, orphans, and aliens led to
her recent exile. He wrote, “Thus says the LORD of hosts: Render true judgments, show
kindness and mercy to one another; do not oppress the widow, the orphan, the alien, or
the poor; and do not devise evil in your hearts against one another. But they refused to
listen… Therefore great wrath came from the LORD of hosts. (Zech 7:9-12)”
There is a clear sense that the Hebrew prophets closely equated justice with the
proper treatment of the poor. Doing so, they echoed Israel’s legal and wisdom literature.
And, as we have seen, their understanding of justice closely paralleled that of their
surrounding culture.
To summarize, justice in the ancient Near East concerned the preservation of the
status quo. In the context of a hierarchical society, this meant that justice was more
concerned with equity than it was with equality. People were to be treated fairly, but
there was no attempt to eliminate the existing class structure. On the contrary, justice in
the ancient Near East sought to preserve the integrity of the classes. Although the poor
had little power or influence, they constituted a large segment of society. Hence it was
necessary to attend to the needs of the lower classes. Widows and orphans often served as
a proxy for the poor in ancient Near Eastern texts. Virtually every culture in the ancient
Near East held to the ideal that the poor were to be protected from the rich and powerful.

61

The Law of Retribution
In the modern world three primary theories of punishment compete for
recognition.106 The “consequentialist” position argues that it is “morally permissible” to
punish an offender because of its “presumed good consequences.”107 This view of
punishment dominated the discourse concerning justice in the United States in the early
and middle decades of the twentieth century.108 Consequentialists base their ideas on the
utilitarian theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.109 The purpose of
punishment should be to reduce bad behavior.110 Punishment might be seen as “…an
incentive to reform.”111 The harm caused the offender in the process of punishment is
considered legitimate because a larger purpose is served. (One objection to the
consequentialist position is that, at least in theory, an innocent person might be punished
as long as it resulted in a net benefit to society.) Punishment may benefit a society in
several ways. For example, it has deterrence value, perhaps preventing someone else
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from committing the same crime.112 It might also prevent further crime by incarcerating
(or even executing) the criminal. Punishment may also serve to reform the criminal,
“liberating him from his asocial and criminal habits and inclinations and making him fit
to return among honest, law-abiding citizens and to a normal, constructive social life.”113
A second modern theory of punishment argues that punishment is morally
wrong.114 This view states that punishment involves the deliberate invocation of harm in
ways that would normally not be permitted. The state, proponents say, has no more right
to inflict harm than does an individual.115 Punishment, therefore, should be replaced with
some alternative method of deterring crime. This might be accomplished by offering
treatment to the offender, seeking their rehabilitation or reform, or requiring restitution
for the victim.116 While several of the ancient law codes substituted restitution for
punishment as compensation for certain crimes; the same codes also prescribed various
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forms of punishment, including capital punishment.117 The notion that the state had no
moral right to punish was, as far as is known, unheard of in the ancient Near East.
A third theory of punishment is often labeled retributive punishment. In recent
decades this form of punishment has reasserted itself, at least at the legislative level.118
This theory states that an offender should be punished because they deserve to be
punished. As one scholar put it, “People who do evil deeds have less moral merit than
those who do not.”119 John Rawls described the retributive view thusly: “What we may
call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing
merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in
proportion to his guilt, and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the
depravity of his act.”120
While most offenses are committed against an individual, nevertheless the theory
of retributive punishment understands that the community itself has been harmed.121 John
Darley explained why offenses are community affairs when he wrote

117

Ur-Nammu’s law code (approx 2100 BCE) demands restitution for rape (of another man’s slave-§8),
bodily injury (§§18-22), and perjury (§28). The death penalty, however, was mandated in cases of murder
(§1), rape (specifically of another man’s wife-§6), and seduction (§7). Hallo and Younger, Context of
Scripture, 2:408-10.
118

Writing in 1997, David Dolinko stated, “The retributive theory is arguably the most influential
philosophical justification for the institution of criminal punishment in present-day America.” David
Dolinko, "Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment," Law and
Philosophy 16, no. 5 (1997): 507.
119

Peter A. French, The Virtues of Vengeance (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 192.
French is adamant that retributive punishment is a necessity. He writes, “I am convinced that failure to
punish retributively does a gross injustice to the very meaning of the concept ‘morally wrong.’ Wrong
actions require hostile responses; the very notion of wrong does not otherwise make sense. Those who do
wrong deserve punishment.” French, Virtues of Vengeance, 161.
120

Quoted in Posner, "Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment," 71.

121

Karen Hegtvedt writes, “Justice is not simply in the eyes of an individual beholder, but it is in the eyes
of a community, however defined.” Karen A. Hegtvedt, "Doing Justice to the Group: Examining the Roles
of the Group in Justice Research," Annual Review of Sociology 31, no. (2005): 25.

64

Societal norms and worldviews are typically absorbed early in
development, tend to be subjectively accepted as reality rather than simply
one of many cultural worldviews, and are likely to be fundamental aspects
of a person’s way of comprehending reality. They are thus likely to be
defended with real vigor when threatened, and this reaction must be a
large part of the underpinnings of the motivation to give an offender his or
her just deserts.”122
Darley seems to argue that the proclivity to punish is deep-seated. Susan Jacoby concurs.
She writes that, “On a practical level, the human desire for retribution requires no
elaborate philosophical rationalization. A victim wants to see an assailant punished not
only for reasons of pragmatic deterrence but also as a means of repairing a damaged
sense of civic order and personal identity.”123 Offenses disturb the moral order.
Punishment attempts to restore that order.124
Retributive punishment not only serves the modern legal system, but it also
provided the foundation for many ancient Near Eastern law codes. The earliest law codes
often mingled the notion of restitution with punishment. The law code of Ur-Nammu, for
example, states that, “if a man shatters the …-bone of another man with a club, he shall
weigh and deliver 60 shekels of silver.”125 Nevertheless, within the same law code capital
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punishment was also prescribed. For example, §1 reads, “If a man commits a homicide,
they shall kill that man.”126 Statute §7 prescribes the death penalty for seduction. “If the
wife of a young man, on her own initiative, approaches a man and initiates sexual
relations with him, they shall kill that woman; that male shall be released.”127 The Laws
of Eshnunna also mixed restitution with retribution. For example, §12 states, “A man
who is seized in the field of a commoner among the sheaves at midday shall weigh and
deliver 10 shekels of silver; he who is seized at night among the sheaves shall die, he will
not live.”128
The Code of Hammurabi often prescribed capital punishment. For example,
kidnapping of a child was considered a capital offense, as was robbery and adultery.129
Death was also dictated for assisting runaway slaves or for dodging the draft.130 Some
forms of punishment seem odd to the modern reader. For example, if a slave woman
“curses someone acting with the authority of her mistress,” Hammurabi’s Code specified
that the slave woman’s mouth be scoured out with a quart of salt.131
Although some have argued that the ancient Near Eastern law codes were never
functional, Tikva Frymer-Kensky argues that the laws were not merely theoretical. She
gives as an example a letter written by the king of Carchemish. The letter, addressed to

126

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 2:409.

127

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 2:409.

128

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 2:333.

129

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 2:335-53. See specifically §§ 14, 22, and 26. Statutes §§9-11
and §22 relate to robbery. Statute §14 mandates death for a kidnapper. Provisions dealing with adultery are
found in §§129 - 130.
130

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 2:335-53. Assisting runaway slaves was forbidden, on pain of
death, in §16. Eschewing military service is condemned in §26.
131

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 2:408-10.

66

the king of Mari concerned the case of two men accused of treason. The king of
Carchemish decided to keep the accuser in prison while the accused underwent the river
ordeal. He wrote that, “If these men will come through safely, I will burn their accuser
with fire”132 Thus the king of Carchemish took literally a similar statute in Hammurabi’s
code which read, “If a man accuses another man and charges him with homicide but
cannot bring proof against him, his accuser shall be killed.”133
The Hebrew Bible also utilized retributive punishment. In many cases, the
prescribed penalty was death. For example, capital punishment was mandated for murder,
kidnapping, or for the cursing of one’s parents (Ex 21:12-17). Perhaps most famously, the
Hebrew Bible is known for the concept that is known by the Latin phrase lex talionis
(literally, the law of retaliation).134
There are three extended descriptions of the talion principle in the Hebrew Bible.
The text in Leviticus 24:17-21 concerns murder and bodily injury. The text reads,
Anyone who kills a human being shall be put to death. Anyone who kills
an animal shall make restitution for it, life for life. Anyone who maims
another shall suffer the same injury in return: fracture for fracture, eye for
eye, tooth for tooth; the injury inflicted is the injury to be suffered. One
who kills an animal shall make restitution for it; but one who kills a
human being shall be put to death.
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Deuteronomy 19:16-21 utilizes the talion principle regarding false accusations. A false
witness was to be punished with the same punishment that would have been meted out to
the alleged offender.
If a malicious witness comes forward to accuse someone of wrongdoing,
then both parties to the dispute shall appear before the LORD, before the
priests and the judges who are in office in those days, and the judges shall
make a thorough inquiry. If the witness is a false witness, having testified
falsely against another, then you shall do to the false witness just as the
false witness had meant to do to the other. So you shall purge the evil from
your midst. The rest shall hear and be afraid, and a crime such as this shall
never again be committed among you. Show no pity: life for life, eye for
eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.
The classical description of lex talionis is found in Exodus 21:22-25. The text
describes an altercation between two men. In the fight, a pregnant woman is injured and
her fetus aborted.
When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a
miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be
fined what the woman’s husband demands, paying as much as the judges
determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for
eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for
wound, stripe for stripe.
Jesus, in his Sermon on the Mount, alluded to the lex talionis when he said, “You
have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you,
Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also.
(Matt 5:38-39)” Apparently by New Testament times the talion principle had been
interpreted as an excuse to exact vengeance on a rival. This understanding of the
principle has carried over into modern times.
Frequently people in the modern world consider the practice of lex talionis
barbaric. However, many scholars argue that the talion limited punishment and thus
represented a humane reaction to an egregious offense. Robert Solomon writes,
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‘An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’ sounds horrifying to our innocent
ears, but in the context of the ancient world this dictum was not so much a
cry for vengeance as a civilizing revision of vengeance. One should only
extract an eye for an eye, rather than kill the offender and his entire
family. Justice demands balance, restraint, limits.135
Peter French agrees when he states, “Some legal historians view the talion
principle (lex talionis) as barbaric, which, however, is something of a misunderstanding
of its role in ancient legal systems. The talion principle played the part of a limiting or
braking device on revenge-taking.”136 Speaking specifically of Israel’s Mosaic Law, Fish
writes that the lex talionis “…may be seen to have introduced restraint and rationality as
the defining features of lawful punishment in place of the unbridled and unchecked
vengeance that had earlier prevailed.”137 Perhaps it is the inherent rationality of the
concept that led one author to suggest that lex talionis constitutes a “legal symmetry,”
that “…is so well known in law and so in accord with our own sense of justice and fair
play that we tend to think it as universal and primeval, almost a part of the Natural Law
of Mankind.”138 Bernard Jackson believes the modern, negative view of the talion
principle is based on a false assumption. He notes that many understand the classical
Hebrew description as “you must give/take an eye for an eye.”139 He notes, however, that
the Hebrew texts describing the principle of lex talionis use only an implicit verb. He
writes that “without a verb, there is nothing explicit to indicate which modality—
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prescription or permission—is intended.”140 Lex talionis provided an upper limit to the
severity of punishment allowed. It did not mandate a lower limit.
Properly speaking, the lex talionis limited the severity of the assigned punishment
by making it proportionate to the crime committed. The concept of lex talionis was not
the unique domain of biblical literature. Mesopotamian law codes contain examples as
well. For example, Hammurabi’s Code specifies that the penalty for breaking someone’s
bone was to have one’s own bone broken (§196).141 Similarly, the action of putting out
the eye of another resulted in having one’s own eye put out (§197).142 Hammurabi’s code
also contains a case of vicarious talion. That is, the code mandated that if a man struck a
woman, causing her to miscarry and subsequently die, his own daughter would be put to
death in return.143 The Middle Assyrian Laws contained a similar provision.144 Biblical
law specifically forbade the use of vicarious talion.145
The development of lex talionis seems to imply an increasing role by the state in
legal affairs. Revenge involving individuals or families might quickly spiral into a
devastating feud if the opposing faction launched reprisals of their own. The lex talionis,
however, represented the state’s regulation of revenge. The state’s involvement would
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have made it more difficult for the offender or his family/clan to retaliate in kind.
Frymer-Kensky notes that the talion principle marked a transition from retribution as a
purely private affair to one that began to involve the state. She writes that the aftermath
of a crime was no longer a “purely private affair to be settled by the offering of monetary
compensation to the victim.”146 Instead, it marked the beginning of the state’s central role
in the prosecution of crimes.
Retributive punishment could be extended into the international sphere as well.
Crimes perpetrated by one nation on another might be avenged by the offended nation (if
they had the means) or perhaps by the gods. Crouch recognizes the talion principle at
work in the Hebrew prophetic books of Amos, Isaiah, and Nahum. For example, she
asserts that the opening verses to the book of Nahum allude to the talion principle. She
writes, “The appearance of the idea of Yahweh being involved in ensuring due
recompense for extreme actions engaged upon during war is apparent from the start of the
book: ‘A jealous and avenging God is Yahweh...’ (1.2a).”147 Retribution on this scale
would be particularly effective because a nation would find it difficult to retaliate against
the gods as they were presumably too powerful and, at any rate, unavailable (although
destruction of their worshippers might be considered an adequate proxy).
The point of this discussion has been to highlight the fact that the Hebrew Bible
shared with its broader ancient Near Eastern culture the idea that punishment was to be
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inflicted on an offender as payment for their crime. There is no evidence to suggest that
these cultures maintained a consequentialist view; that is, that punishment was of purely
utilitarian value. Israel shared with Mesopotamian law the concept of lex talionis, a
concept that can be conceived of as a method to limit the possible excesses of retributive
punishment. Retribution seeks, among other goals, to restore order to a disordered
situation. Retribution could be carried out on a national scale as well as an individual one.
It will be noted that the three laws discussed in this chapter, as well as the ancient
Near Eastern concept of justice, share a common foundation. They all manifest the
ancient culture’s fear of chaos and desire for order. The writers of the Hebrew Bible lived
in the same conceptual world as did the authors of the literature of Egypt, Mesopotamia,
and the regions bordering Israel. They were thoroughly embedded in the same social
matrix that connected the peoples of the ancient Near East. As such Israel shared
common principles of international and domestic law and social justice with her
neighbors. This is not to say that her understanding of these concepts was identical with
that of the broader culture. Israel’s laws and customs were colored by its local
circumstances as well as by its unique relationship with Yahweh. Nevertheless,
knowledge of the broader culture of the ancient Near East can illuminate our
understanding of the Hebrew Bible in general and the book of Amos in particular. In the
next chapter I will explore Amos’ Oracles against the Nations as set against its broader
ancient Near Eastern background.
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III. AMOS AND THE ORACLES AGAINST THE NATIONS
The first two chapters of Amos constitute what scholars have labeled the Oracles
against the Nations. In this text Amos, in a highly formulaic fashion, condemns seven
foreign nations for various crimes before finally turning his sights on Israel itself. With
the exception of the oracles against Israel and Judah, all of the other oracles condemn the
nations for war-related crimes. As a result of their crimes, Amos predicts that each of the
nations, Israel and Judah included, will experience military defeat. The text does not
provide the standard by which the nation’s actions are judged criminal. Rather, he takes
for granted—and supposes that his audience agrees with him—that the nations deserved
punishment. It must be deduced that the guilt of the nations stemmed from notions so
deeply embedded within Israel’s culture that Amos did not need to elucidate his standard.
This chapter will attempt to identify the source of Amos’ standard by looking beyond
Israel and examining the international context in which she lived.1

1

It should be noted at the outset that, although the Oracles condemned nations other than Israel, there is no
indication that Amos’ pronouncements were delivered to any nation other than Israel. As one commentary
states, “Amos did not travel to the nations surrounding Israel to proclaim the oracles to them.” Billy K.
Smith and Franklin S. Page, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah (Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman Publishers,
1995), 43. With this in mind, the argument could be made that the oracles should not be taken as an
explanation to the nations for their impending judgment. Rather, it could be concluded, the oracles simply
served a rhetorical purpose within Israel and no further concern needs to given to the nations. Stated
another way, the purpose of the oracles must be found within the function they served in Israel itself. This
seems to be the position of John Hayes. He notes, “The importance of the speeches must not be sought,
therefore, in what they ‘said’ to the enemy but rather in the function which they performed within the
context of Israelite society.” John H. Hayes, "The Usage of Oracles against Foreign Nations in Ancient
Israel," Journal of Biblical Literature 87, no. 1 (1968): 81. While it is true that Amos intended his primary
message for Israel, nevertheless he appeared to expect that all of his oracles would be fulfilled. Presumably
his audience understood him that way as well. The judgments cannot be taken, therefore, as simply
rhetorical and theoretical pronouncements. It has been suggested that, although the nations were not Amos’
primary audience, nevertheless they were aware of his predictions. Kenichi Kida advanced the theory that
Amos may have delivered the oracles on the occasion of a visit to the “Judean king” by envoys of the
neighboring nations. Kenichi Kida, "The Sovereignty of God and the Destiny of the Nations in the
Prophecies of Amos, Isaiah and Jeremiah.," in Konsequente Traditionsgeschichte: Festschrift für Klaus
Baltzer zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Rüdiger Bartelmus et al. (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1993),
179.
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Before turning to the oracles, a brief discussion of the dating of the text of Amos
is in order. The book of Amos places the ministry of Amos during the reigns of Uzziah of
Judah and Jeroboam (II) of Israel, thus placing Amos in the mid eighth century BCE. The
general consensus among modern scholars, although this is by no means unanimous, is
that the book accurately reflects this time period. Specifically scholars place the date of
Amos’ ministry to within a few years surrounding 760 BCE.2 Thus an examination of the
international situation in the eighth century BCE will help place Amos within its broader
context.
A more contentious question has to do with the dating of the text of Amos. If, as
some modern scholars argue, much of the text of Amos derived from a later date, then we
must be prepared to ask whether the book reflects eighth century events and thought. If a
later editor inserted new text or reinterpreted Amos’ original intent, then conclusions
drawn from the book of Amos may well be anachronistic. As we have already learned,
scholars are divided on this question. Wolff recognizes six redactional stages in the book
of Amos, the first coming from the hand of Amos himself. He argues that various
accretions were added later and the text rearranged until the book reached its final form
in or shortly after the early exilic period.3 Jeremias posits instead a “continual updating”
of the book. He dates the first edition from sometime in the seventh century after the fall
of Jerusalem. The text was then continuously updated until the final edition was
2

Wolff writes, “When Amos was born and when he died, we do not know. How old he was at the time of
his appearance around 760 B.C. remains hidden from us.” Wolff, Amos, 90. Andersen and Freidman give a
range between 765-755, Andersen and Freedman, Amos, 19. Jeremias concludes that Amos’ ministry
occurred sometime within the decade bracketed by the years 760 and 750. Jörg Jeremias, The Book of
Amos: A Commentary, 1st American ed. (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 2. James
Linville, on the other hand, ascribes the book to the latter half of the Persian period while allowing that
many of the passages are much older. James Richard Linville, Amos and the Cosmic Imagination, Society
for Old Testament Study Monographs (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008).
3

Wolff, Amos, 106-13.
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completed sometime late in the postexilic period.4 If these scholars are correct, any
historical conclusions drawn from the book of Amos must be carefully made because
they risk reflecting events and attitudes of a later time. However, other scholars are more
sanguine about the text of Amos. Shalom Paul attributes most of the text of the book to
the prophet himself.5 Andersen and Freedman, while unconvinced that the book has
“been miraculously preserved from error,” agree to work mostly from the received text.
They state they are not confident in the results of earlier scholarship’s attempts to
decipher the various compositional stages of the book.6 The position taken in this
monograph is that the text of the book derives substantially from the hand of Amos.
While it is possible that the book underwent editorial changes after its initial compilation,
I am unconvinced that major additions and changes were made to the text. Without
compelling evidence to the contrary, I prefer to believe that later editors/copyists valued
Amos’ words and treated them with care. Henceforth I will assume that the text of the
book of Amos comes primarily from the eighth century BCE and thus accurately reflects
eighth century thoughts and attitudes.
The International Situation in Amos’ Day
The domestic situation in the mid eighth century will be treated more fully in the
next chapter. However, it must be noted that both Judah and Israel enjoyed something of
a renaissance during the first half of the eighth century. Of the two kingdoms, Israel was

4

Jeremias, Amos 5.

5

Paul, Amos, 16-27.

6

Andersen and Freedman, Amos, 139.
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the more dominant.7 The stability associated with Jeroboam’s long reign of forty years
allowed Israel to re-expand into territories that it had not occupied since the reign of
Solomon.8 Israel’s resurgence cannot be attributed only to the prowess of Jeroboam,
however. Through none of his own doing, the surrounding nations were themselves at a
nadir.
The first half of the eighth century coincides with a period in Egyptian history
known as the Third Intermediate Period.9 This capped an almost four hundred year slide
in Egypt’s fortunes. The period began auspiciously with the invasion of Judah by
Sheshonq I, the first ruler of the XXIInd dynasty. However, subsequent Egyptian rulers
preferred to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and deal instead with internal
issues. Egypt did not intervene militarily in Israel throughout the first half of the eighth
century.10
Assyria had also entered a long period of decline following the Middle Assyrian
Period.11 Assyria re-emerged as a local power in Mesopotamia in the tenth century.
Under Ashurnasirpal II, Assyria reestablished its empire and began to expand and amass
considerable wealth.12 Their expansion temporarily ran out of the steam, however during

7

J. Maxwell Miller and John H. Hayes, A History of Ancient Israel and Judah, 1st ed. (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1986), 307.
8

Jeroboam II reigned from 785-745 BCE. Miller and Hayes, History of Ancient Israel 307.
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Kuhrt dates the Third Intermediate Period from 1069-664 BCE. Kuhrt, Ancient Near East, 2:623.
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Kuhrt, Ancient Near East, 2:628. Egypt went into a tailspin during the reign of Takelot II (850-825 BCE)
and began to fragment even further.
11

The Middle Assyrian Period dated from approximately 1400 to circa 1050 BCE. Kuhrt, Ancient Near
East, 1:348.
12

Ashurnasirpal II reigned from 883-859, approximately a century before Amos’ ministry. Kuhrt, Ancient
Near East, 2:483.
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the last quarter of the ninth and first half of the eighth centuries. Assyria would not regain
its momentum until just after the time of Amos.
Assyria’s earlier expansion weakened Damascus, thus setting the stage for a
resurgent Israel in the mid eighth century.13 Second Kings 14:25 relates that Jeroboam
(II) “…restored the border of Israel from Lebo-hamath as far as the Sea of the
Arabah…”14 The combined Hebrew states under Jeroboam and Uzziah ultimately
occupied their greatest territorial extent since the reign of Solomon. Amos’ ministry
coincided with a time in which Israel was on the ascendant while Assyria’s expansion
had stalled, Egypt was mired in a century’s long eclipse, and the power of Damascus had
been considerably weakened. Amos’ prophecy that Israel was soon to be defeated was
thus a bold one. Israel’s ultimate demise would have seemed improbable to the people of
Israel.15
The Form of the Oracles
Amos’ oracles against the nations are not unique. Amos drew on forms of
literature that were already extant. Yehezkel Kaufman, for example, notes that, “Amos
was an original poet and thinker, yet he utilized styles and material that were ready at
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Menehem Haran writes, “The time interval commencing in 755 (or somewhat earlier) would thus be the
most likely for the hegemony of Jeroboam in southern and central Syria. During this time-lag the region
was completely free of any Assyrian influence and the vacuum could well be filled by Jeroboam’s power.”
Haran, "Empire of Jeroboam," 279.
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II Kings 14 says that Jeroboam recovered Damascus and Hamath for Israel. Hayes and Miller are
skeptical that Damascus was actually conquered and instead suggest that Damascus and Hamath may have
paid token tribute to Israel or perhaps allowed commercial concessions to Israel. Miller and Hayes, History
of Ancient Israel 309.
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Miller and Hayes date the end of Israel to 720 BCE. Miller and Hayes, History of Ancient Israel 337.
Kuhrt dates the fall of Samaria to 722/21. Kuhrt, Ancient Near East, 2:468. Thus a scant forty years
spanned the dates between Amos’ ministry and the end of Israel. It is easily conceivable that some of those
who heard Amos’ prophecies first-hand lived to see their fulfillment.
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hand.”16 Subsequent prophets also used a similar form, although whether they borrowed
from Amos or derived their form from the same antecedents is unknown.17 Texts with
similar sentiments have also been found in other parts of the ancient Near East.
As previously noted, the ancient Egyptians utilized a ritual to handicap the enemy
that some scholars compare to Amos’ oracles. In that ritual, the names of Middle
Kingdom Egyptian foes were written on pottery vases which were then broken,
presumably symbolizing the breaking of the power of the enemy. Aage Bentzen
recognized the similarities between the Execration texts and Amos’ oracles early on. For
example Bentzen observes that the Execration texts followed the “corners of the world,”
that is they followed a consistent geographical order.18 Amos’ oracles similarly begin to
the northeast of Israel, before jumping to the southwest, moving to the northwest, and
concluding in the southeast. The Execration texts finally move to the “center”,
condemning “traitors and criminals” within Egypt itself.19 Likewise Amos, after
condemning the various nations, turns his attention to Israel’s domestic enemies.
Bentzen locates the original delivery of Amos’ oracles during an Israelite New
Year’s Festival. He postulated that the festival featured a ritual judgment speech
condemning Israel’s political enemies, identifying them as “incarnations of the foes of
God in his fight against Chaos, when he created the world….”20 Bentzen surmises that
Amos may have (perhaps unconsciously) borrowed an “ancient formulae” when
16

Yeòhezkel Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, from its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 303.
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formulating his oracles, giving them a new interpretation.21 Bentzen thus connects Amos
with the broader ancient Near Eastern culture in which Israel participated.22
Norman Gottwald generally accepts Bentzen’s conclusion. He suggests that
Amos’ oracles against the nations were drawn from a liturgy practiced in the Israelite cult
which ultimately derived from the Egyptian tradition of which the Execration texts are a
part.23
Bentzen’s thesis was widely accepted for a time. Writing in 1969, Meir Weiss
wrote, “the vast majority of scholars regard Bentzen’s thesis as one of the conventions of
modern biblical study…”24 Weiss identified himself as one of “the small minority” that
disagreed with the “general consensus.” He argued that the order found in the Execration
texts was found in all Egyptian literature and was thus merely a part of the “general
orientation” of the Egyptians. It did not constitute a ritual pattern. Amos’ use of the
sequence, according to Weiss, “constitutes a unique expression particular to the personal
intent of the prophet,” and not a borrowing of Egyptian forms.25 Weiss’ conclusions have
become widely accepted and Bentzen’s thesis has fallen out of favor. H. W. Wolff’s
analysis of Bentzen’s conclusions may serves as an example. Wolff has suggested that
the geographic pattern found in Execration texts may simply have reflected the
positioning of contemporary trade routes.26 He also notes that the purposes of the two
21
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texts are quite different. The Egyptian texts were meant to curse current and potential
enemies. Amos’ oracles, on the other hand, were presented as judgments from Yahweh.
The nations were condemned, not because they opposed Israel, but because they broke
Yahweh’s laws. Wolff despairs of finding any commonality between the two sets of
texts. He writes, “the small number of formal agreements … scarcely allow us to suppose
that Amos had been influenced, even if only indirectly, by an ancient execration ritual.
The points of agreement are circumstantial, being quite understandable as independent
developments within their respective setting.”27 Whether or not Amos’ oracles represent a
borrowing of the Egyptian Execration texts (and they probably do not), the similarity of
the two forms suggest that the form of Amos’ oracles would have been recognizable to
the literati of his day.
Duane Christensen suggests a different origin for Amos’ oracles. He argues that
the form of Amos’ oracles originated in the war oracle. This form has ancient roots with
examples dating as early as eighteenth century BCE Mari. A series of texts from the city
document the attempts of bārû priests to determine the success or failure of certain
military missions through the use of extispicy (the reading of the livers of a sacrificial
sheep).28
Israel utilized the war oracle from its infancy. Christensen notes, for example, that
Joshua first consulted the Urim (through the mediation of the priests) before leading
Israel into battle.29 Even earlier in its existence, Israel benefitted from the failure of
Balak’s war oracle. Balak, a Moabite king, had hired Balaam to curse Israel and to ensure
27
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a positive outcome to an impending battle.30 Yahweh, however, dictated that Balaam
bless rather than curse Israel. According to Christensen, Balaam’s actions were
reminiscent of those of the bārû priest in this context.31 The first uses of the war oracle in
Israel, then, were primarily aimed at securing a positive outcome in battle.
The war oracle appeared again during the reign of Ahab and its function began to
change at that time. An unnamed prophet predicted that Israel would be victorious in an
upcoming battle (1 Ki 20:13). He explained that Aram would be defeated because they
said, “the Lord is a god of the hills but he is not a god of the valleys (1 Ki 20:28).” The
text makes explicit that Israel’s victory (and presumably the prophet’s prediction) came
about so that Ahab would know that Yahweh was “the Lord.” Thus the war oracle, while
still promising victory, now served as a sign of Yahweh’s power and presence.
Ahab later appeared on the losing side of a war oracle. The prophet Micaiah
delivered the message that, despite the unanimity of the four hundred cult prophets to the
contrary, Israel would be defeated by Aram, her armies scattered, and Ahab slain.32 This
last example, Christensen says, shows how the war oracle had begun its transformation
into a judgment oracle.33 The war oracle was no longer solely in the domain of the
military; it had now found a home in the literary sphere as a means to announce
judgment.34
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According to Christensen, Amos’ oracles against the nations represent another
modification of the original war oracle, this time set against the backdrop of an idealized
Davidic Empire. He writes, “The Davidic Empire later became an ideal type which was
persistent, particularly within prophetic circles, long after the disintegration of the actual
empire as such.”35 Christensen sees Amos’ oracles as a type of judgment oracle against
the nations for breaking the various treaties that had presumably held the empire together.
Amos added a new twist to the war oracle by condemning Israel itself.36 Christensen says
of Amos, “In this composition Amos has made an important contribution to the
developing OAN [oracles against the nations] tradition. He has taken the earlier speech
form of a war oracle, in the form of a judgment speech against a specific nation or
people, and transformed it into a judgment speech against Israel.”37 Note Christensen’s
mention of a “developing OAN tradition.” He argues that the form of Amos’ oracles
against the nations were not unique but merely part of a tradition that dated back
centuries. While Christensen does not explicitly make many connections to ancient Near
Eastern parallels, both the war and judgment oracles are known from outside Israel. Thus
Amos’ oracles can be seen as standing in a long line of literary tradition within the
ancient Near East.
While it now seems doubtful that the Execration texts and Amos’ oracles against
the nations were linked in the way the Bentzen thought, nevertheless the Execration texts
35
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demonstrate that imprecations against a nation’s enemies was a recognizable genre.
Amos’ listeners would also have been familiar with the form of the war/judgment oracle.
Amos melded the two forms into a unique style that served as an effective
communication tool, a tool later borrowed by Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel.
Amos’ reliance on older traditions extends beyond just the larger patterns he
utilized. His modes of expression were, in many instances, borrowed from the Near
Eastern wisdom tradition. For example, Samuel Terrien notes that Amos used numbers in
pairs, a common device of the wisdom tradition.38 He notes that, “there can be little doubt
that this formula is a device which is typical of the wisdom style.”39 This use of
numerical pairs may perhaps be traced as far back as some second millennium BCE
Ugaritic literature.40 Terrien also writes that Amos’ use of rhetorical questions coupled
with common sense thinking is evocative of wisdom literature. Writing of Amos 3:3-8,
Terrien observes, “the fact that the prophet expects to stimulate audience approval in a
matter of logical thinking involving assent to the principle of empirically observed
causation is strongly reminiscent of the teaching method of the wise.”41 Terrien discerns a
total of eight distinct elements that suggest Amos had “an acquaintance with the language
and speech habits of the wisemen.”42
38

He gives the example, “On account of three transgressions of Damascus, yea, even four…” (Amos 1:3).
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H. W. Wolff further detected the influence of wisdom forms on Amos. He notes,
for example, the use of antitheses.43 The use of antitheses, says Wolff, is “widespread in
the language of sapiential counseling.”44 He reiterated Terrien’s observation that Amos
utilized the graduated numerical sequence, a common tool of wisdom literature. The use
of this numerical sequence, says Wolff, “reflects the influence of oral traditions of
popular wisdom instruction which, like other wisdom material, linked Israel to the
surrounding world.”45
Thus Amos drew upon many sources as the raw material from which to construct
his oracles against the nations. His sources were not exclusive to Israel. It is not
necessary to prove that Amos directly borrowed from any particular set of texts, nor is it
possible to do so. It is sufficient to note that the forms that Amos used would have been
recognizable, and hence understandable, by his audience. The form of Amos’ oracles,
however, is of less import then their contents. Would the standard that Amos used to
condemn the nations have been as recognizable? It is to that task to which we now must
turn.

thus far advanced, is the use of numerical pairs, which seem to have been a favorite pedagogic device of the
wise.” J. L. Crenshaw, "The Influence of the Wise upon Amos," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche
Wissenschaft 79, no. 1 (1967): 49.
43

Wolff gives as an example, Amos 5:4-5, “Seek me…do not seek Bethel.” Wolff, Amos, 96.

44

Wolff, Amos, 126.

45

Wolff, Amos, 148.

84

The Standard of the Oracles
The standard by which the nations were judged has occupied the attention of
numerous scholars. John Barton has conveniently broken down the various responses into
four categories.46
The first category Barton labels “Nationalism and covenant.” This view holds that
the nations “are denounced for opposing Israel, Yahweh’s chosen covenant people.”47
The basic idea is that the nations should have recognized Israel’s privileged position
before God. The nations are guilty of hubris for dealing with Israel in a hostile fashion.48
Menahem Haran illustrates this position well. He claims that Amos’ standard was
primarily political. He writes,
In truth, the onlooker is liable to be misled by the moralistic demands on
the nations uttered in this prophecy, appearing as they do not quite as
much on their own account, as when viewed against the background of
Israel’s relations vis-à-vis its foes. In actual fact, these demands are
national rather than moral in nature and the major portion of this prophecy
is designed according to the older nationalistic pattern.49
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Barton’s categories are not necessarily comprehensive. For example, Barton ignores the position that
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Max Polley makes similar claims. He posits that the purpose of the oracles (indeed of the
entire book of Amos) was to convince Israel to join Judah in a reunited empire.50
This nationalistic position commonly translates the Hebrew word ( ּפׂשעיpš‛y, plural
pš‛ym); found in each of the oracles, as “rebellion” or, according to Michael Barré, “‘acts

of rebellion’ against a sovereign or overlord.”51 Barré labels this “treaty language” and
thus also views the nation’s crimes as primarily political. He writes that
the pš’ym are not simply wrongs against neighboring peoples, wrongs that
would violate the contemporary standards of ethical behavior among
peoples of the Near East. The concentration of treaty vocabulary in this
section suggest that the actions are deemed wrong not primarily in terms
of the people to whom they are done but because they are violations of a
relationship to Yahweh that may generally be characterized as that of
subject to sovereign.52
The nationalistic position often, then, defines the misdeeds of the nations in terms of
revolt and the abrogation of a treaty. Ancient Near Eastern treaties usually carried
stipulations within them that called for retribution against those who would violate the
treaty’s terms.53 Thus characterizing the nations’ crimes in nationalistic terms presumably
relieves Yahweh of any culpability for the punishments predicted against the nations.
Yahweh is not only allowed, but even obligated to punish those who have broken their
treaty with Israel (and thus implicitly with Yahweh).
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Duane Christensen indicates that the nations broke a covenant, not with Israel, but
with Yahweh. This has the advantage of holding Israel to the similar standard; like the
foreign nations she violated terms of her covenant with Yahweh.54 Christensen writes,
“Taking the Davidic Empire as an ideal type, Amos composed an oracle of judgment
against each of its member nations, including Israel. Yahweh, the Divine Warrior, was
about to punish each of these nations for breach of covenant.”55
Perhaps the most serious argument leveled against this position concerns the
notion of an all-encompassing Davidic empire. The existence of such an empire in the
eighth century goes beyond the evidence.56 Further, except for the single Hebrew word
discussed above, explicit treaty terminology can be found in only two of the oracles.57
Barton labels a second standard “logical extension.” This position states that “the
moral obligations which Israel is known to owe to Yahweh are supposed by extension to
apply also to the nations.”58 Those holding this view would state that the moral rules
valid for Israel also applied to the nations.59 This seems to be the view of James Luther
Mays. He writes, “[The nations] are subject to Yahweh’s norms, can be indicted by him
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for misconduct, and their punishment justified in terms of a system of responsibility to
him.”60
Barton rejects this view on rhetorical grounds. He argues that the extension
standard is actually antithetical to Amos’ rhetorical purpose. In Barton’s view, Amos did
not attempt to raise the nations up to the same moral plane occupied by Israel. Rather, he
sought to knock Israel off of its self-erected pedestal and hence demonstrate that they
were subject to the same standards that were applied to the nations.61
The extension position, in my view, creates an ethical problem. It argues that the
nations were responsible for keeping laws that they may well not have known.62 It also
ignores the broader cultural context that Amos and Israel occupied. As I will argue
shortly, consideration of this broader context may well mitigate this problem. Amos’
apparent familiarity with the wisdom tradition and the fact that he knew something of the
history of the nations surrounding Israel suggests that Amos had knowledge of and an
interest in the wider world. He used this knowledge in formulating his indictments of the
nations.63
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Some scholars seek the origin of Amos’ ethical standard in what Barton labels
“universal law.” According to this view, “all nations, Israel included, are subject to divine
law which derives from Yahweh’s dominion over all mankind.”64 This universal law
emanates from Yahweh, so it is ultimately Yahweh’s law that the nations are
contravening. This law, however, was not the exclusive property of Israel. It belonged, at
least implicitly, to all of the nations. Amos is thus “invoking ethical principles common,
or supposed by him to be common, to all mankind.”65
This position recognizes the primacy of God as the ultimate lawgiver and his law
applies to all the nations of the earth. As J. Lindblom has written, the nations were
condemned because they “offended against the holy will of Yahweh, which is valid for
all peoples.”66 As such, the nations deserved punishment. Lindblom notes, “The fact that
Yahweh’s ethical demands are valid for mankind, and that these demands are flouted by
the people of the earth, is one of the roots from which grew the idea of Yahweh’s world
judgement.”67
This position, without further qualification, suffers from the same critical problem
as does the previous position. It is unclear how Yahweh’s “ethical demands” came to be
known to those nations that did not worship him. Presumably it was not through direct
revelation. It would also seem that the nations were held to a higher standard than that
applied to Israel. Amos condemns both the Tyrian and Philistine nations for selling entire
communities into slavery. Yet the Hebrew Bible does not contain a blanket rejection of
64
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slavery. The Hebrew people were prohibited from permanently enslaving fellow Hebrews
(although members of the Hebrew nations were permitted to allow themselves to be
permanently indentured.) Apparently foreign slaves, even within Israel, had no such
protection. What standard did these nations violate when they sold entire communities
into slavery? To resolve the ethical dilemmas of this and the previous position, some
mechanism must be posited which allows the nations to be fully aware of the severity of
their crimes. Barton attempts to provide that mechanism in the fourth of his categories.
Barton labels the final viewpoint “international customary law.” According to this
view, “the nations are condemned for infringing customs of war accepted or believed to
be accepted by all civilised nations.”68 Barton subscribes to this position. He says that
Yahweh condemned the nations for ethical breaches that were recognized (or at the very
least should have been recognized) by all right-thinking individuals of that time and
place. The relevant standards have their basis in what Barton identifies as “natural law.”69
Barton views natural law as springing from the consciences of humans (as contrasted
with revealed, divine law).70
Not surprisingly, Barton’s viewpoint has met with some resistance. As we have
already noted in chapter one, Barton reduces Yahweh’s role to simply that of enforcer of
preexisting laws. These laws have human origins. Noble objects to Barton’s viewpoint on
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the ground that, in his view, Yahweh plays more than a judicial role in Amos.71 Noble
argues that Amos does not defend Yahweh’s right to judge the nations, he presupposes it.
He writes that “it is far more natural to see the norms by which he judges [the nations] as
being standards of morality which [Yahweh] himself enacts, rather than human
conventions which he has adopted.”72
Each of the four categories of ethical standards that Barton enumerates carries its
own problems. It seems that a way forward can be found by melding components of
Barton’s third and fourth categories. There seems to be little doubt that Amos considered
Yahweh sovereign and thus his rules would be applicable to all nations. We have already
identified the ethical problem this position creates. I suggest that Amos could hold his
position yet still condemn the nations by implicating them of breaking cultural norms.
Amos used his knowledge of the customs of his day to indict the various nations for
crimes which his audience would understand. He then continued in the same vein,
judging Israel for committing crimes that were also violations of the norms of his day.
This does not necessitate, however, accepting Barton’s view that Yahweh was merely the
enforcer of man-made rules. As Barton himself suggested, Yahweh shared a certain
ethical outlook with all right-thinking people. This is akin to Driver’s (and others)
reliance on natural law. This view posits that there is an innate sense of right and wrong
within most humans. This is not to suggest that each would delineate an exact list of
proscribed activities. Defining criminal acts constitutes a culturally conditioned activity.
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Nevertheless, within a particular culture, there are behaviors which are almost universally
regarded as forbidden. It is my contention that Amos utilized his knowledge of his
broader culture to condemn the nations on these universally held principles. He was able
to do this without giving up his recognition of Yahweh’s sovereignty. This approach had
the additional benefit of allowing him to condemn Israel for her crimes on identical
terms. By co-opting his culture’s definition, Amos could demonstrate the culpability of
Israel in terms that could not be ignored. The placement of the oracles against the nations
at the head of the book of Amos signals his intention to utilize cultural norms to convict
Israel of her crimes. To demonstrate the validity of this thesis, however, it will be
necessary to show that the nation’s crimes were indeed violations of well-known
standards.
The Content of the Oracles
The eight oracles of Amos 1-2 begin with exactly the same stanza; “For three
transgressions of [country/ethnic name], and for four, I will not revoke the
punishment…” Each oracle then continues with a single indictment (the only exception
being the final oracle against Israel), followed by the pronouncement of the verdict
against the guilty nation. This pronouncement was always written in the first person, as if
coming from Yahweh himself. Of the eight oracles, six condemned the behavior of
nations bordering the Hebrew states. The final two oracles indicted Judah and Israel.
Each of the foreign nations is accused of committing some form of war crime: Damascus
“threshed” Gilead with iron sledges, Gaza (the Philistines) and Tyre captured and sold
entire communities into slavery, and Edom “pursued his brother with a sword.” The
Ammonites “ripped open pregnant women” as a means to expand their territory. Moab
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burned to lime the king of Edom’s bones. For these crimes, Yahweh said he would
“send” (“kindle” once) fire on the offending nations.73
Amos obviously believed that the nations’ crimes deserved the direst of
punishments. He also assumed that his audience would share his viewpoint. He was able
to do so because Israel did not exist in a vacuum. We have already explored ancient Near
Eastern attitudes about restraint during war. Undoubtedly Israel’s ethics of war would
have been similar to those of her neighbors. I am not suggesting that there were written
rules or rudimentary international bodies to monitor war crimes. Such innovations would
have to wait until the twentieth century C.E. Nevertheless, there were unwritten rules that
had to be followed. By violating those rules, the nations opened themselves up for
punishment.
The potency of unwritten rules cannot be minimized. Within a society there are a
variety of unwritten rules that govern interactions between individuals. These rules are
taught and/or absorbed from childhood. Those who break the rules, even though
unwritten, often are forced to live on the fringe of society. Despite the fact that the rules
are unwritten, most citizens of a society know that they exist, even if they rarely think
about them. These rules are necessary to govern the peaceful interaction of the many
members of society. We often think of these rules more in terms of customs and forget
the force that they carry. Customary laws also govern the relations that exist between
societies. In order for nations to coexist, there must be a common set of standards by
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which to govern their interactions. We have already noted that such unwritten rules
existed throughout the ancient Near East.74
The rules of war were presumably somewhat fluid in the ancient Near East and
were sometimes ignored (as they are today). Certainly atrocities were committed. That
does not, however, diminish the sense of outrage that would have been felt by the victims
of such behavior when these rules were ignored. The ancient Assyrians had a reputation
for committing various atrocities. In many instances, the reputation comes from the
Assyrians themselves. According to some modern scholars, they used these atrocities as a
form of psychological warfare. They expected, and indeed desired, a sense of outrage not
only in their victims but in observing neutral parties. They engaged in shocking activities
in order to motivate their victims to cooperate with them.75 As Wolfram vod Soden
writes, “the Assyrians publicized their atrocities as a type of propaganda, so that peoples
would submit to them without combat on account of their horrifying illustrations.”76 It
should be noted that this tactic would not have worked if the Assyrian behavior had not
been considered outrageous, even by their peers. It should also be noted that atrocities
were apparently committed as a reaction to broken treaties. The Assyrians felt justified in
their actions as they were merely doing the work of the gods by punishing the miscreants
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for their offending behavior.77 Von Soden notes the Assyrian atrocities, however, were
more the exception than the rule. Boasting of atrocities, he says, was not the usual
practice in the ancient Near East. “That there was always humaneness alongside
barbarism did not appear to [the Assyrians] to be worth mentioning, and was therefore
forgotten, then as now.”78
There seems to be sufficient evidence to suggest that Amos was justified in
condemning the behavior of the foreign nations on cultural grounds. This condemnation
had its foundation in the conventional morality of the culture of the ancient Near East.
This should not detract from the idea that Amos recognized himself as a spokesman for
Yahweh. Although he was delivering a message from Yahweh, he couched it in terms
that anyone in his culture should have been able to understand.
Before concluding this chapter, a brief excursus into the ancient Near Eastern
concept of order versus chaos will also help place the book of Amos within its cultural
background. Most ancient Near Eastern cultures possessed origin myths which explained
the ordering of the world.79 The world was usually envisioned as being born out of
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chaos.80 The gods subsequently conquered this unordered state and set up a precarious
existence in which order ruled. Walton notes that “once established, the order that exists
in the cosmos is constantly threatened with being undone.”81 Existence being predicated
on order, order must be kept at all costs. Thus ancient cosmogony reveals something of
the importance of order to the ancient Near Eastern mind. Chaos relentlessly challenged
order.
As the gods’ representative on earth, it was the king’s responsibility to prevent the
triumph of chaos.82 Warfare was simply a tool, then, in the important task of keeping
chaos at bay. We have previously noted Crouch’s contention that the Assyrians
maintained an ideology of “indigenous order over and against enemy chaos.”83 So Amos’
prediction that the six nations would suffer punishment may well have been an indication
that, in his mind, the actions of the nations represented the forces of chaos. Geyer notes
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that, “The sin of the nations disrupted the order of cosmos. Such irregularity had to be
eliminated before order, under the rule of Yahweh, could be restored. The same applied
to the sin of Israel.”84
In spite of all the violent language used, the intention cannot be the total, literal
elimination of nations. Apart from anything else that would be impracticable in actual
history. The intention is the elimination from the world of that which is inimical to the
rule of justice and righteousness, all that is contrary to the holiness of God.
This is not to say that the order/chaos dichotomy was foremost in Amos’ mind as he
railed against the various crimes of the nations. Nevertheless it seems entirely plausible
that the concepts of order and chaos formed a backdrop to his mode of thinking.
The order/chaos dichotomy may also serve as a bridge to link the military crimes
of the nations with the social crimes of Israel.85 The actions of the Hebrew nations could
be thought of in terms of chaos, just as were the actions of the nations.86 If, as Amos
seems to believe, the religious and social crimes of the Hebrew nations disrupted order to
the same degree that the military crimes of the foreign nations did, they were deserving of
the same punishment. An examination of Israel’s crimes in light of the broader culture
will help to illustrate his point.
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IV. AMOS AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE
The crimes of the Hebrew states were of a different order than were the sins of the
nations. Judah is condemned for “rejecting the law of the Lord.” As a result it, like the
nations, was promised judgment. The bulk of Amos’ bile, however, was reserved for
Israel. Unlike the oracles against all of the other nations, Israel is condemned for multiple
crimes in the opening section of Amos. The rest of the book follows up on this initial
indictment by adding further accusations against Israel. Many of his accusations
concerned Israel’s disregard for cultural norms concerning the treatment of the poor. In
this chapter we will explore in some detail Amos’ denunciation of Israel. We begin,
however, with an examination of the domestic situation in Israel during the mid-eighth
century BCE.
Eighth Century Israel
Amos lived at a seemingly enviable time. There was relative peace on the
international scene. Both Judah and Israel took advantage of the comparative calm to
expand their borders. Each nation flourished under the extended reign of a single king,
respectively Uzziah in Judah and Jeroboam II in Israel. Israel, especially, enjoyed a
period of stability rarely matched in its history. Jeroboam’s long reign extended the rule
of Jehu’s family to a fourth generation. For almost one hundred years the northern
kingdom had been unshaken by the turmoil that often accompanied dynastic change.
Jeroboam’s reign totaled forty-one years, the longest of any Northern Kingdom
monarch.1 History provides few details about his reign, but he must have been a capable
king. That he was successful militarily we know from 2 Kings 14. Under his reign Israel
1
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expanded to encompass territory it had not controlled since the time of Solomon.2 We can
also conclude that Jeroboam was a competent administrator. He boasted a long reign in a
nation noted for its coups and assassinations.3 Israel prospered during Jeroboam’s reign, a
fact supported by archaeology. Note, for example, the large number of costly ivories
unearthed from Samaria dating to Jeroboam’s reign.4 Israel’s prosperity, however, was
not shared by all her citizens. Most continued to eke out a sparse existence from the
rocky ground that had sustained their ancestors for generations. A change had come to
Israel, however. The story of that change needs to be told.5
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The land of Israel, unlike the land in Mesopotamia or Egypt, was not conducive to
irrigation. The Jordan River, the most reliable river in the area, ran most of its course well
below sea level and below the surrounding land. Farmers in Palestine thus had to rely on
natural precipitation. While a sufficient quantity of rain usually fell to make agriculture
productive, its distribution was problematic. The majority of rainfall came within a brief
four to five month span.6 There existed only a small window of opportunity in which to
prepare the soil and plant the crops before the inevitable long dry period began. Seven
months of hot, dry weather hardened the ground sufficiently to prevent Iron Age plows
from breaking the soil.7 Thus plowing for a new agricultural year could not take place
until after the first rains (usually in October-November). Either a delay in these early
rains or a marked difference in their normal quantity might prevent or postpone planting,
thus leaving insufficient time for the crops to mature before the summer heat arrived.
Rain which fell near the end of the rainy season provided sufficient moisture to allow the
crops to ripen during the long dry season. If the latter rains failed to materialize, the
farmer’s yield would be drastically reduced. Flooding rains might wash away the
farmer’s seed. Insufficient time existed following the latter rains to allow replanted crops
to establish themselves before the arrival of summer. Thus the rains had to fall at the right
times and in the right amounts or the consequences for the farmer could be dire. David
Hopkins has estimated that in three years out of ten the rains came in other than their
usual pattern, threatening the harvest. In one or two years out of ten, there might have
Bernhard Lang, "The Social Organization of Peasant Poverty in Biblical Israel," in Anthropological
Approaches to the Old Testament, ed. Bernhard Lang (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).
6

David C. Hopkins, "Agriculture," in Near Eastern Archaeology: A Reader, ed. Suzanne Richard (Winona
Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2003), 127.
7

Oded Borowski, Agriculture in Iron Age Israel, Reprint ed. (Boston: American Schools of Oriental
Research, 2002), 47.
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been an overall lack of rain.8 David Hopkins has concluded that the Iron II Age farmer
utilized risk-spreading methods to counteract this perpetual uncertainty.9
Risk-spreading methods were often antithetical to increased yields, but survival
trumped efficiency for the Iron II peasant farmer.10 They staggered the planting of cereals
to mitigate the effects of uneven rainfall patterns.11 Reliance on a single crop was also
risky, so farmers planted pulses and various types of vegetables as well as multiple types
of cereals.12 Farmers tended small vineyards and orchards to provide grapes, olives, and
nuts, giving variety to their table.13 These products required different labor patterns than

8

David C. Hopkins, "Life on the Land: The Subsistence Struggles of Early Israel," The Biblical
Archaeologist 50, no. 3 (1987): 184. Lang notes that, in recent times, Iraqi peasants can break even if no
more than one in four harvests fail. Bernhard Lang, "Peasant Poverty: Rent Capitalism in the Days of
Amos," in Hebrew Life and Literature: Selected Essays of Bernhard Lang, ed. Bernhard Lang (Farnham,
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10

Premnath defines a peasant as “small-scale rural cultivators who cultivate the land with access to simple
technology for their own livelihood and for the transfer of the agricultural surplus to the dominant ruling
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unit.” Lang, "Peasant Poverty," 49.
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Daniel Zohary and Maria Hopf, Domestication of Plants in the Old World: The Origin and Spread of
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that needed for the cereals and thus complemented cereal production. Animal husbandry
also contributed to the ethos of risk-spreading. Animals grazed on land unsuitable for
agriculture. They were also allowed to graze on fallow land, contributing their manure to
the fertility of the soil. The young were tasked with herding the animals, again
complementing rather than competing with labor requirements. Animal products such as
milk and butter expanded the variety of the family’s larder. Animals also provided the
raw materials necessary to clothe the farmer’s family. Finally, animals represented a
“disaster bank on the hoof.”14 Herds would have been allowed to increase in size in the
good years, converting surplus vegetation into meat. During bad years, the herds could be
thinned to conserve resources and provide food for the family. Farm life in Iron Age
Palestine would thus have been labor intensive, inefficient, and fraught with risk but,
given a reasonable chance, farmers would have normally met the needs of their families.
Several non-meteorological factors disrupted the farmers’ ability to provide for
their families, however. Perhaps their greatest challenge existed in the form of the
monarchy.15 The needs of the central government competed with the requirements of the
subsistence farmer. By the mid eighth century, ruinous taxation left little surplus to carry
the farmer through difficult times. The exactions of the state prevented the farmer from
allocating his resources according to his experience and skill. Farmers often had to resort

achieving it. Since the consumption of meat contributed far few calories to the ancient diet than it does the
modern one, dietary fat had to come from plant rather than animal sources.
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Hopkins, "Life on the Land," 188.
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Ironically, it was perhaps the ancestors of the farmers that requested the elders to implore Samuel for a
king. They requested a king because Samuel’s sons “perverted justice (1 Sam 8:3).” They also desired to
king to fight their battles for them, presumably leaving them to tend to their fields in peace. The denizens of
ancient Israel discovered the hard way that one should always take care in what one wished for. Or, to put it
another way, they found that is difficult to live without government, but also impossible to live with it.
This, of course, is no news to the modern citizen.
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to loans to see them through marginal years. Interest on the loans acted as a further tax,
reducing further the available surplus. Eventually farmers faced the specter of eviction
and loss of the land that had sustained their family, perhaps for generations.
The first monarchs of Israel maintained relatively small bureaucracies. By the
eighth century, however, the size of the bureaucracy had grown enormously. The goals of
the monarchy necessitated the maintenance of a diplomatic corps and a standing army.
The diplomatic corps would have been tasked with developing markets for Israel’s
produce and the military were tasked with protecting the trade routes over which
important commodities flowed.16 In the eighth century, Jeroboam’s military successes
added territory to Israel. The king’s personal estate probably also saw significant
expansion.17 This increased territory called for a concomitant increase in the bureaucratic
structure necessary to support that territory. D. N. Premnath writes, “The need to oversee
and administer the expanding kingdom resulted in the establishment and maintenance of
a huge bureaucracy. The members of the bureaucracy were awarded land for their
services. Thus emerged the systems of acquiring land through patrimony and land
grants.”18 Premnath notes these grants were often considered hereditary. Over time a
16

An increased military would probably also have been necessary to quell any disturbances caused by the
high taxation. Rainer Kessler writes, “It was only in the eighth century that the early form of the state gave
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Introduction (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 103-4.
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relatively few families were able to amass a considerable amount of land. The growth of
lands in the hands of the king and his retainers competed directly with the farmer’s need
for land to feed an increasing population.
Despite the increased size of the nation’s bureaucracy, it should be noted that
members of the bureaucracy and other well-to-do citizens constituted only a small
proportion of the overall populace. Marvin Chaney estimates that no more than two
percent of the population of the Hebrew nations controlled up to half of the total goods
and services produced.19 Thus the mid eighth century was characterized by increasing
social and economic differentiation.20
Obviously Hebrew kings, their retainers, and other elites did not themselves suffer
privation. Their positions allowed them to indulge in luxuries unavailable to the average
Israelite. The privileged class increasingly used their vast estates to cultivate grapes,
19

Marvin L. Chaney, "Systemic Study of the Israelite Monarchy," Semeia 37, no. (1986): 55-6. Conversely,
Chaney writes that seventy to ninety percent of the population consisted of peasant farmers. Chaney,
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Research 287, no. (1992). Assuming both Chaney and Broshi/Finkelstein are correct, than approximately
nine thousand people belonged to the elite class that controlled half of the nation’s economy.
Conservatively assuming that the average elite household consisted of five persons, fewer than two
thousand individuals wielded a disproportionate amount of power.
20
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Poverty," 48.
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olives, and wheat for commercial purposes in order to pay for their luxuries.21 Wine and
oil (and to a lesser degree wheat) were shipped throughout the ancient Near East in the
eighth century and served as two of Israel’s prime exports.22 The consequent wealth from
trade in commercial commodities did little to help the average farmer, however. Hopkins
states that such trade “had only limited influence on the local economy or on the
occupational distribution of the country’s inhabitants.”23
The increased size of the bureaucracy led the central government to levy higher
taxes.24 The burden of these taxes was ultimately borne by the subsistence farmer. 25
Taxes created multiple burdens for the farmer. For example, the temporal needs of the
government did not necessarily coincide with the harvest season.26 Taxes were often paid
in kind. Unless their taxes were due at harvest time, farmers might be required to

21

Long distance trade was controlled by the king in the ancient Near East. Premnath writes, “It is important
to keep in mind the fact that regional or interregional trade in agrarian societies of antiquity was initiated,
maintained, and monopolized by the state/royal crown.” Premnath, Eighth Century Prophets, 19. Like the
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reallocate the proportion of their fields given to commercial crops in order to meet their
tax requirement at the time it was due. This reallocation often worked contrary to the
risk-spreading methods farmers relied on. It may be presumed that the tax rate remained
relatively steady while the yield of any given harvest might also be highly irregular. Thus
in some years taxes could consume a significant fraction of a family’s available
resources.27 To meet their increased obligations, farmers would have been required to
increase production. This would have necessitated either an increase in yields, an increase
in efficiency, or an increase in the amount of arable land put under cultivation. It was
beyond the technological capability of the Iron Age farmer to significantly increase yield.
Thus farmers had two options: to increase their efficiency and/or to bring more arable
land under cultivation.
As we have already noted, increased efficiency came at the expense of a farmer’s
normally conservative approach to agriculture. It can be surmised, for example, that a
farmer, faced with the necessity of increasing revenue, either by choice or by compulsion
would have dedicated more land to the cultivation of olives and grapes. The labor
required for this change would have been substantial and the farmer would have seen
little immediate return on his investment. Hopkins notes that the grapevine does not begin
to produce “substantial yields” for anywhere from three to five years. Olive trees could
take ten to twenty years.28 He further states that,
Establishing an orchard indefinitely subtracted land from the production of
cereal and legume staples or pastoral pursuits at the same time as it
27

This seems to be the rationale behind Amos’ complaint in Amos 7:1-2. “This is what the Lord GOD
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demanded a sizeable commitment of labor with no immediate subsistence
gain. Notably the olive repaid the labor only in the long term; given
human life spans, one planted an olive orchard for the next generation.29
Risk spreading thus became a casualty to the necessity of paying taxes to the central
government.
There is also archaeological evidence to suggest that Israel’s farmers attempted to
bring more land under cultivation during the eighth century. Hillsides were terraced to
increase the arable acreage.30 The expenditure of effort required to build these terraces,
however, would have been enormous and would have decreased the time available for
other duties. Much of the new land was presumably suboptimal or it would have been
cultivated in the first place. To reiterate, the time spent bringing new land under
cultivation would have reduced the time available for other agricultural chores and yet
the resultant return on investment would have been small.
The intensification of commercial farming during the eighth century conflicted
directly with the ability of the peasant farmer to endure bad agricultural years. With less
reserve to operate from, the farmer often had to rely instead on borrowed money.31 The
29
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peasant farmer would have had to turn to rich townspeople to provide the loans, probably
at usurious interest rates.32 Lang understands the resultant outcome as a form of rent
capitalism.33 Premnath asserts that the rich loaned money to the poor with the express
intent of controlling their land.34 The peasant farmer continued to work the land, but no
longer controlled the decisions regarding its use. Landlords may have required that more
land be dedicated to the production of commercial crops. The requirements of the
monarchy thus caused a shift in the locus of decision making from the traditional family
unit and other sub-tribal social units to the central government.35 As Hopkins writes,
The chief importance for labor of social institutions relates to who controls
the labor input. Under most circumstances, the farming family would
prefer to devote its labor to agricultural production for its own
consumption. Surplus would be stored, bartered, or shared. Under
arrangements of heavy taxation, tenancy, or indebtedness, the same family
could lose control of agricultural decision making, control of the fruit of
its own labor, and even rights to its traditional land.36
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A (substantial) portion of the peasants produce would have been paid as rent to
the creditor to satisfy their debt.37 Rent, on top of the requisite taxes, only added to the
burden of the eighth century farmer. As more land became dedicated to cash crop
production, less land remained to provide food for the farmer’s family. The farmer would
have been forced to purchase items they once would have grown themselves. The scarcity
of land dedicated to victuals would have increased the price of common foods. Premnath
suggests that peasants, unfamiliar with market conditions, would have found themselves
easily cheated.38
The burden of loan payments and taxes would have created significant stress on
the eighth century Hebrew farmers. Over time many of these farmers must have defaulted
on their loans. Ultimately the land would have been foreclosed on. While the particulars
of Israelite legal practices are unknown, it must be presumed that the act of foreclosure
required an intervention by the courts. The courts in the eighth century, however, were
not the courts of earlier Israel. Israel’s early court system was village based. Judges were
drawn from the surrounding families and clans and were thus presumably of a similar
social stratum as the contestants in any particular lawsuit. The monarchy, however,
overlaid a centralized judicial system on top of the earlier, village-based system. These
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courts would have been unfamiliar with local conditions. The judges, as part of the
bureaucracy, would have had a vested interest in seeing the concerns of the commercial
farmer prevail over those of the subsistence farmer.39 Consequently the eighth century
prophets accused the courts of participating in land steals. Dearman writes, “The culprits
of the prophets’ accusations are not simply the anonymous rich and powerful in a
community but are those who benefit from official status and position.”40
The once independent farmer, having lost his land, became a day laborer with all
the consequent instability of that social position.41 The loss of the land not only had
tremendous economic and social implications, but political and religious ones as well.42
The rich grew richer and they did so at the expense of the poor.
The above sketch has been drawn from biblical texts as well as anthropological
models. Archaeology, too, has done its part in illuminating the social structure of the
eighth century in Israel. Several archaeological discoveries bear particularly on the above
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reconstruction. First are the so-called lmlk jars. These fragmentary pieces of pottery jars
contained traces of wine and olive oil. Stamped on the handles of the jars were the
Hebrew letters lmlk, a phrase meaning “for or belonging to the king.”43 These jars were
found in four particular sites in Judah, usually thought to be either military and/or
administrative centers.44 It is thought that the jars contained the wine and oil collected in
taxes that were then distributed to the various centers for use.45
Archeology has also documented an increase in wine and olive cultivation and
production in the eighth century. During the Iron Age, and especially during Iron Age II
Palestine, the technology of olive production became more sophisticated. These
technological advances were necessary to process the vast quantity of olive oil produced.
By far the most impressive finds related to the olive industry have been discovered at Tel
Miqne, biblical Ekron. Ekron was located in the territory that had traditionally belonged
to the Philistines, but was probably in the hands of Israel during the eighth century.
During Iron II, Ekron was a large city occupying fifty acres and home to as many as
6,250 people.46 While only four percent of Ekron has been excavated, 115 olive oil
installations have been found. It has been estimated that Ekron produced as much as

43

Paula M. McNutt, Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel, Library of Ancient Israel (Louisville,
Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), 150.
44

The sites mentioned in the ostraca were Hebron, Socoh, Ziph, and Mmšt. The latter site is unknown but,
like the others, is presumed to have been located in the hill country of Judah, just as the other three sites
are. Premnath, Eighth Century Prophets, 59.
45

McNutt writes, “The vessels apparently were royal property and served to provision official places in
various locations, although it is not clear who was supplied with the provision or where they originated.”
The lmlk jars are thought to belong to the late eighth century. McNutt, Reconstructing, 158.
46

Seymour Gitin, "Tel Miqne-Ekron in the 7th Century B.C.: City Plan Development and the Oil Industry,"
in Olive Oil in Antiquity; Israel and Neighboring Countries from the Neolithic to the Early Arab Period,
ed. David Eitam and Michael Heltzer (Padova: Sargon srl, 1996), 219,31.

111

290,000 gallons of olive oil or one thousand tons per year.47 This quantity would have
provided oil sufficient to supply over fifty-two thousand people for a year. Since this
number is many times the presumed population of the city, it is obvious that Ekron was
producing oil for export.
It is estimated that as many as two thousand people were involved in oil
production in Ekron.48 The quantity of oil produced at Ekron would have required as
many as ten thousand jars per year to store and ship the oil, requiring a large complement
of potters (perhaps day laborers?) as well.49 Over twelve thousand acres of land planted
in olive trees would have been necessary to supply the oil produced by Ekron.50 Most of
the olive presses found at Ekron were of the same type. This suggests that the industry
was planned and did not just evolve haphazardly.51 Thus archaeology gives us a sense of
the scale of commercial agriculture during the time of Amos.
Various literary remains also attest to the commercial ventures of Israel. For
example, ostraca (fragments of broken pottery) from Samaria appear to be tax receipts.52
An ostracon from Tell Qasile in Israel seems to be a bill for a quantity of oil sent from the
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royal estate in Israel to a town in either Phoenicia or Egypt.53 The Yavneh-Yam letter is
an intriguing find. It does not document a commercial transaction, but rather contains a
plea for relief. The unknown writer was a laborer employed in the grain harvest. For an
unspecified reason, a certain (presumed) official seized the letter writer’s garment. The
writer petitions for the return of his garment, claiming to be guilty of no crime. The
addressee of the letter is unknown. It has been suggested that the letter was “an
extrajudicial petition addressed to the king.”54 The concluding part of the letter reads, “So
please return my garment. If the official does not consider it an obligation to return your
servant’s garment, then have pity upon him and return your servant’s garment from that
motivation. You must not remain silent when your servant is without his garment.”55 This
letter, although dating about a century after the time of Amos, documents the plight of a
common laborer. Unfortunately the resolution of the laborer’s case is unknown, but it is
clear that he was attempting to obtain the justice that he felt had been denied him. The
author of the Yavneh-Yam letter might well provide the voice of the numerous and
nameless peasant farmers from eighth century Israel.
To summarize, then, the prosperity of Jeroboam’s kingdom was enjoyed by only a
relative few. As Dearman notes, “the wealth and power of Jeroboam’s kingdom have
been overestimated; it is likely that only the court and its officials were well-to-do in this
period.”56 These few used their wealth to perpetuate their positions, often at the expense
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of the small, landed farmer. It is against this backdrop that Amos delivered the various
oracles that make up the book that bears his name.
A Catalog of Israel’s Crimes
The following catalog of Israel’s crimes is not intended to be comprehensive. The
most extensive texts in Amos describing the conditions in eighth century Israel are
surveyed, however. Particular attention is paid to Amos’ identification of both the rich
and the poor. Where appropriate, parallels from the other eighth century prophets will be
cited.57
Amos 2:6-8. Thus says the LORD: For three transgressions of Israel, and
for four, I will not revoke the punishment; because they sell the righteous
for silver, and the needy for a pair of sandals—they who trample the head
of the poor into the dust of the earth, and push the afflicted out of the way;
father and son go in to the same girl, so that my holy name is profaned;
they lay themselves down beside every altar on garments taken in pledge;
and in the house of their God they drink wine bought with fines they
imposed.
Amos’ initial set of charges against Israel, contained in the oracles against the
nations, sets the tone for the rest of the book. Amos here introduces the nature of Israel’s
crimes and identifies the victims. The text includes four pairs of indictments.58 The first
couplet introduces two classes of victims. The first Amos labels the righteous (Hebrew
צַּדִ יק, ṣadîq). Paul suggests the term could mean “innocent guiltless party” or, “in a

nonforensic sense, an ‘honest man.’”59 Amos describes the second group of victims as the
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’( ֶאבְיֹוןebyôn). The NRSV translates this as “the needy.” J. David Pleins understands the

word to denote the beggarly poor.60 The word is one of a number of Hebrew words
expressing the basic idea of poverty.
It must be noted that poverty carried a different connotation in the ancient Near
East than it does in modern Western societies. W. R. Domeris explains;
Where Western thinking stresses the economic aspect of poverty, the ANE
understood poverty in the context of shame and honor. So the possession
of land, power, economic security, and social status made a person rich,
and the absence of these factors made a person poor.61
The poor were also understood to have a special relationship with the divine. We
have already seen how Near Eastern societies paid at least lip service to the idea that the
poor were to be protected. Amos’ opening salvo against Israel thus involves crimes that
were considered to be crimes not only within the borders of Israel, but throughout the
broader culture. Israel’s crimes could be construed to be of a social and economic nature.
The special relationship between Yahweh and the poor would have made Israel’s crimes
religious as well as economic and social.62
Although the victims are clearly identified, the exact nature of the crime
mentioned in this couplet is debated. Andersen and Freedman compare Amos’ indictment
to an Assyrian document that mentions the selling of a person for a garment. They
suspect that the Assyrian construction may be a proverb that is now impenetrable.
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Nevertheless, they conclude that Amos is referring to the fact that the righteous poor
were being sold for a small amount.63 They also note that selling here may well refer to
selling into debt slavery.64 Many scholars accept the basic argument that Amos is here
describing the selling of the poor into debt slavery for a trifling amount of debt.65
Shalom Paul, however, rejects this common understanding. He notes that the word
translated ‘sandals’ is a hapax legomenon, found only here in the Hebrew Bible. He
argues that, by simply repointing the Hebrew word it can take on the meaning of “a
hidden gift” or even “payoff.”66 Paul thus understands Amos to be alleging that the needy
were “sold out.” Their worth as humans was considered less important than the profit
they could bring. If Paul is correct, then Amos essentially accuses Israel (specifically her
wealthy) of being complicit in the same kind of crime for which he indicted Tyre and
Edom. Paul concludes that Amos condemned Israel for displaying a “lack of pity and
contempt for human dignity.”67
Ari Shveka makes a compelling case that the mention of shoes in this context
derives from a custom also known from the Hittite laws.68 In particular, law 22 indicates
that a Hittite returning a runaway slave from a short distance would be granted a pair of
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shoes.69 Shveka concludes that Amos was inveighing particularly against the very
institution of debt-slavery.70 Regardless of which interpretation is correct, Amos
immediately identifies the victims as being the righteous and innocent poor. The culprits
he describes as greedy and insensitive to the needs of the poor.71
The second couplet states that the heads of the poor are “trampled into the dust”
and the afflicted are “pushed out of the way.” Amos here utilizes two different Hebrew
words to denote poverty. The first is the plural ( דַּ לִיםdalîm). The word seems to denote the
poor peasant farmer.72 Members of this group were not totally destitute. Rather, they had
enough to be subject to taxation.73 The word translated “afflicted” in the NRSV
represents the Hebrew word ‘( ֲענָֹויםănāwîm). It seems to be a fairly generic word for the
poor although both here, in Amos 8:4, and in Isaiah 32:7, the word is linked to social
69
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injustice.74 Once again Amos depicts the poor as being treated with contempt. The exact
meaning of the couplet is difficult, but it is clear that the poor are deliberately mistreated
and possibly even physically abused.75 It has also been suggested that the phrase “push
the afflicted out of the way” bears a legal connotation and thus might be understood as
the denial of legal justice.76 Paul concludes that the poor are “bullied and oppressed by
the wealthy, who deprive and block them from obtaining the privileges and prerogatives
to which they are naturally entitled.”77 Thus, according to Irani’s definition given above,
the poor were denied justice.
In his third indictment Amos accuses a father and son of “going into” the same
girl. The verb used in this text is commonly understood as referring to a sexual
encounter.78 The word denoting girl indicates a young woman of marriageable age.79
Thus some scholars assume Amos is here referring to some form of sexual irregularity or
perversion. This seems to be the position of Andersen and Freedman. They understand
“the girl” ( ַּהנַּע ֲָרה, na‘arâ in Hebrew) of the text as referring to a prostitute, perhaps a cultic
74
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one.80 However, I believe the context suggests a deeper meaning. All three of the other
couplets comprising this oracle relate to economic crimes perpetrated against the poor. It
seems reasonable to assume that this infraction also involves the misuse of poor. The
meaning of the text revolves around the identity of the girl. Jeremias understands her to
be a minor, perhaps dependent on a master.81 He concludes that “Amos sees before him a
society in which sexual desire determines a person’s actions, desire shamelessly selecting
socially dependent persons as its victims.”82 Jeremias is correct as far as he goes. He does
not identify the reason for the dependency, however. Paul places her as a member of the
 דַּ לִיםand the  ֲענָֹויםof the previous verse.83 Reiner Kessler correctly writes, “the ‘girl’ to

whom, according to Amos 2:7, ‘father and son go in,’ is apparently a daughter already
given into debt slavery and is sexually abused by her owners and overseers.”84 Thus the
crime identified here is both sexual and economic. The girl has been put into the position
where she was sexually abused because she was poor. Perhaps this is the reason Amos
couples the abuse of the girl with the profanation of Yahweh’s holy name. He considers
the abuse of the girl as a crime, not just against her, but against Yahweh as well. Israel’s
crime, even by the standards of the surrounding nations, was indefensible.
The final couplet, like the third, again connects social and economic crimes with
religious ones. Amos accused Israel of using items intended as collateral for debt in their
80
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worship. It is unclear whether Amos understands the multiple altars he refers to as altars
to Yahweh or to some other deity. This text may contain an implicit criticism of the
heterodoxy of Israel, although this theme is largely absent from the book.85 Perhaps the
text might also offer a veiled critique of Israel’s multiple shrines to Yahweh. What seems
clear, however, is that Israel is once again accused of violating a law that was well known
throughout the ancient Near East. Amos appears to charge the wealthy with holding a
surrendered garment overnight. This was clearly a violation of the Hebrew law which
states that a cloak taken in pledge must be returned before sundown.86 Mesopotamian
society had similar laws. Paul notes that Hammurabi’s laws “forbid the distraint of a
debtor’s corn (LH 131) or his ox (LH 241)…”87 He concludes that Hammurabi’s code,
like the Covenant Code in Exodus, attempted to protect the poor from losing “their only
means of subsistence.”88 The Yavneh-Yam letter, mentioned above, also presupposes that
the garments of the poor could not be indefinitely withheld from them.
The second stanza of this couplet accuses the rich of financing cultic (perhaps
sacrificial?) wine from fines imposed on the poor. Andersen and Freedman understand
85
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this charge as being directed against the priests.89 Priests probably functioned as
government officials and were thus a part of the bureaucracy. Amos seems to be accusing
them of being complicit with the wealthy in the robbery of the poor. Wolff writes that the
fines delineated in the Hebrew Bible were meant to be used “to make restitution for
damages and not to finance drinking bouts.”90
Amos is not accusing the rich of being irreligious. The opposite seems to be the
case. The wealthy, at least in their own eyes, considered themselves to be very religious.
They were, however, more concerned with their rites then they were with treating fellow
Hebrews with dignity. They ignored Yahweh’s obvious concern for the poor as well as
the ancient Near Eastern standards for relating to the oppressed.
Note that, although the victims have so far been clearly identified, Amos has not
yet specified the identity of the offenders. There is little mystery about who they are,
however. They are the ones who have the ability to “trample the head of the poor” and
“push the needy out of the way” and the means to “sell the righteous for silver.” It is
unlikely that Amos is here referring to other members of the lower classes. The middle
class had little presence in antiquity. Obviously the target of Amos’ ire was the well-todo in Israel. This is not to suggest that Amos was engaging in class warfare. Israel, like
the nations surrounding it, was a hierarchically structured society. Amos does not attack
the foundations of a society so constructed; it was considered part of the natural order of
the world. However, as we have seen, it was the responsibility of the king to preserve that
order by acting justly and fairly. The ancient Near Eastern notion of justice presupposed
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that the poor were to be protected. The failure of Israel to do so Amos regarded not only
as a social and economic crime but as an affront to Yahweh. In a manner that would have
been natural in the ancient Near East, he laid the responsibility for that failure at the feet
of the leaders of society. There may have been members of the middle class who took
advantage of the poor and some of the poor themselves may have participated in the
exploitation of other poor people. And perhaps not all of the upper class were as venal as
those described in the text. Nevertheless, it was Israel’s affluent that set the tone for
society and they, at the very least, permitted and often engaged in the exploitation of the
poor. Thus Amos targeted the wealthy, as a class, in his indictments. Throughout this
monograph I will, like Amos, use the wealthy as a convenient label to include all those
involved in corrupting Israel’s society, regardless of class. The wealthy, however, bore
the lion’s share of the responsibility because they functioned as leaders in Israel and
because only they, of all of the people of Israel, held the power to change society.
Amos 2:12. “But you made the nazirites drink wine, and commanded the
prophets, saying, "You shall not prophesy."91
This accusation bears no obvious connection to the ill treatment of the poor.
Instead Amos here highlights the arrogance of Israel. Once again Amos does not
explicitly identify the guilty parties. While not oppressing the poor in this verse, the
guilty are still oppressive. They target two new groups of people bearing a special
relationship with Yahweh. Both of these groups properly owed their allegiance only to

91

Isaiah mentions the deleterious effect of wine on prophets and priests in Isa 28:7. Micah says that a lying
connoisseur of wine and strong drink would be considered the perfect preacher by the Judeans (Mic 2:11).
Micah also mentions that the recipients of his oracles were unwilling to hear his message, instead
demanding that he stop preaching about condemnation (Mic 2:6). Isaiah apparently had a similar
experience (Isa 30:9-11).

122

Yahweh. Nazirites took a vow of abstinence. The prophets stood as spokesmen of
Yahweh. Yet they were forced to go counter to their call.
Paul assumes the guilty party includes Israel generally. He writes, “By such
impudent action, the populace establishes its own rules of behavior, which run counter to
the will of the Deity.”92 Wolff, however, believes that Amos again targets the rich in this
verse. He suggests that the rich suppressed the activities of the nazirites because their
lifestyles served as an indictment of the wealthy.93 Many scholars consider this verse to
be a continuation of Amos’ oracle against Israel. Thus the context would suggest that
Wolff is correct in his identification of the wealthy as the object of Amos’ wrath.
Ironically, as we have already seen, the wealthy prided themselves on their religiosity yet
they oppressed not one but three different groups protected by Yahweh. Already Amos
has established the superficiality of the worship of Israel.
Amos 3:9-10. “Proclaim to the strongholds in Ashdod, and to the
strongholds in the land of Egypt, and say, ‘Assemble yourselves on Mount
Samaria, and see what great tumults are within it, and what oppressions
are in its midst.’ They do not know how to do right, says the LORD, those
who store up violence and robbery in their stronghold.”
The accusation does not properly begin until the second half of verse nine. The
text begins with an invitation to the nations to “assemble… and see.” The language
resembles the well-known rîb or “covenant lawsuit” pattern.94 Several eighth-century
examples of this pattern are known. For example, Isaiah wrote,
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The LORD rises to argue his case; he stands to judge the peoples. The
LORD enters into judgment with the elders and princes of his people: It is
you who have devoured the vineyard; the spoil of the poor is in your
houses. What do you mean by crushing my people, by grinding the face of
the poor? says the Lord GOD of hosts. (Isa 3:13-15)
Similar patterns can be found in Hosea 2:4-5 and Hosea 4:1-3. Perhaps the most familiar
prophetic text of this form is found in Micah 6:1-8 where Yahweh calls on the mountains
and hills to hear the case between himself and Israel (Judah). In the Amos text, however,
Yahweh calls on two foreign nations to witness Israel’s actions on his behalf. The fact
that Yahweh’s witnesses are foreign nations is significant. It clearly suggests that Amos
considers the actions of Israel to be in clear violation of principles held in common by the
nations of the region. Wolff thinks these nations were called on as witnesses because they
served as Israel’s peers. He writes, “In case one might question the evaluative
competence of Amos himself, experts with respect to a highly developed style of living
are to be brought in.”95 That one of Yahweh’s witnesses is among the nations condemned
in the opening oracles may well indicate that Amos held the crimes of Israel to be
equivalent to those of the nations.
This indictment does not specifically name the oppressed in this charge against
Israel. Instead, Amos describes the condition of Samaria (and, by implication, the rest of
Israel). To make his case, Amos calls upon the witnesses to view the “great tumults” that
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are within Samaria as well as the “oppressions” that are “in its midst.” The root behind
the word rendered “tumults” (Hebrew מְהּומֺת, məhumōt) expresses the idea of utter
confusion. The word often refers to the confusion and panic of war. The same word is
used in Deuteronomy to refer to the curses pronounced on the people if they should break
the covenant, perhaps an impression that Amos intended to make.96
Although Amos does not explicitly identify the oppressors, most commentators
assume that Amos addresses the wealthy in this indictment. Jeremias, for example,
understands the word translated strongholds in the NRSV to mean palaces. Palaces were
typically well prepared for defense and so functioned as fortresses as well. The palaces
were the center of Israel’s society and of her sin. They would also be the center of her
punishment.97 Paul notes that the word translated tumults “is a general, all-inclusive term
for the great fear and confusion within the society due to the outrages committed by the
wealthy.”98 Stuart writes that Amos is stating that the conditions in Samaria are such that
no one is safe from possible violence at the hands of the rich.99 The Hebrew term
translated “oppression” (עֲׁשּוקִם, ‘ăšuqîm) is often used in the Hebrew Bible to describe the
oppression of the poor by the rich. The word has “strong overtones of ‘extortion.’”100
Amos avers that, instead of order in Samaria, utter confusion reigned; instead of justice,
96
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Amos saw only oppression.101 Thus, despite first appearances, this indictment also seems
to be aimed at Israel’s affluent.
Amos continues his accusation by stating, “They do not know how to do right.”
Stuart writes that the wealthy had so completely devolved from the Mosaic standards that
they no longer recognized right.102 Wolff mentions that Amos borrowed the word “right”
(נְכֺחָה, nəkōḥâ in Hebrew) from the vocabulary of the Hebrew wisdom tradition.103 The
wisdom tradition in Israel, as in the rest of the ancient Near East, often concerned
relationships between people. Wisdom literature, although not necessarily coterminous
with the wisdom tradition, typically found its home in the court, the presumed location of
many of Amos’ malefactors. Once again Amos may be pointing to the irony of “the wise”
not recognizing themselves in the literature they produced or copied. Amos accuses the
rich of living in a world in which they set their own standards, disregarding the standards
of Yahweh or of contemporary society. Amos again makes manifest the arrogance of the
rich.
In the second half of his indictment, Amos accuses Israel of storing up “violence
and robbery in their stronghold.” Israel very well could now add violence to its list of
crimes. Violence (Hebrew  ָחמָס, ḥamas) does not always refer to physical violence
although the word often has that connotation. Swart and Van Dam describe the word
thusly; “The verb and nominative express the cold-blooded and unscrupulous
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infringement of the personal rights of others, motivated by greed and hate and often
making use of physical violence and brutality.”104
Amos here, as in the first half of the indictment, again mentions the “strongholds”
of Israel. Wolff writes that the word “must designate sections of the royal palace, or of
the capital city generally, which could easily be defended.”105 Thus, although Amos does
not explicitly name the rich as the authors of “the tumults” and “oppressions” in Samaria,
there is strong evidence to suggest that he indeed intended the wealthy to recognize that
they were the cause of Israel’s coming punishment.
This indictment describes the wealthy as having brought about a situation in
which chaos and violence reigned in Israel. This, of course, contrasts with the
responsibility, recognized throughout the ancient Near East, of the king and his retainers
to maintain justice and order. Amos’ words may be presumed to have indicted not just
Israel’s wealthy, but her king as well.
Amos 4:1. “Hear this word, you cows of Bashan who are on Mount
Samaria, who oppress the poor, who crush the needy, who say to their
husbands, "Bring something to drink!"
Amos names an unusual group of offenders, by Hebrew Bible standards, in this
charge. He accuses the wealthy women of Israel of being complicit in the crimes
committed against the poor.106 Amos reuses the same word for “oppress” that he used in
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Amos 3:9. The poor are the dalîm, referred to in Amos’ initial oracle against Israel. As
mentioned previously, the word seems to describe the poor peasant farmer, a group not
totally destitute but nevertheless vulnerable to the vicissitudes of chance. Rather than
protecting them, the offenders add to their woe.
The general consensus among scholars seems to be that the “cows of Bashan” are
the wives of those whom Amos has previously accused of oppressing the poor.
Specifically Wolff implicates the wives “of court officials, of the wealthy proprietors of
large estates and of the merchants.”107 Amos’ picturesque method of referring to them
may highlight the placid conditions in which they lived as well as, perhaps, calling
attention to their physique.108
The normal Hebrew word for husband does not appear in Amos’ critique of these
women. Perhaps this is because Amos finds these women to be not only self-indulgent,
but dominating.109 The literature of the Hebrew Bible often describes wives as both
compassionate and subservient to their husbands. While this view may be overly
simplistic and stereotypical, it nevertheless reflects the ideal of womanhood in Israel.110
Instead of the ideal, however, Amos represents these women as corpulent, besotted, and

have far greater influence over political and economic affairs than he thinks they should have. I think the
latter is likely when this verse is viewed with Amos 4:1 in mind.
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sassy, their sole concern being their own comfort. In their arrogance, they saw the poor as
mere tools to that end.111 Their henpecked husbands oppressed the poor at their behest.
The fairer sex instigated the subjugation of the oppressed.
Amos 4:4-5. “Come to Bethel—and transgress; to Gilgal—and multiply
transgression; bring your sacrifices every morning, your tithes every three
days; bring a thank-offering of leavened bread, and proclaim freewill
offerings, publish them; for so you love to do, O people of Israel! says the
Lord GOD.”
Once again the subject of this indictment is primarily religious. Although Amos
does not specify the target of his oracle, it seems to be obliquely aimed at the rich.
Certainly the worship centers Amos named were open to the entire population of Israel. If
taken literally, however, only a very few in Israel could afford to bring daily sacrifices,
pay tithes every third day, or present multiple offerings. It is commonly understood that
Amos refers here to pilgrimages to the respective sanctuaries.112 Stuart argues that Amos
engaged in hyperbole and did not intend that the reader should understand his mention of
daily sacrifices to be taken literally. He writes that Amos’ exaggerations were meant to
portray the Israelites as “doing nothing but making pilgrimages.”113 This would again
point towards the rich as the object of Amos’ accusation. It is doubtful if the poor would
have been able to spare the time required to make multiple pilgrimages. Nor could they
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have afforded the requisite costs. Thus, whether taken literally or not, Amos appears to
indict the wealthy in this text.114
Obviously Amos does not condemn the wealthy for neglecting the cult. Just the
opposite, he acknowledges that they have the appearance of total dedication to their
worship. The appearance was a false one, however. Their dedication, in reality, was
primarily to their own desires. Amos accuses the rich of perverting the cult for their own
purposes. Note that the freewill offering involved the sacrifice of an animal, much of
which was consumed by the worshipper.115 The common diet in the ancient Near East
only rarely included meat. Amos appears to imply that the wealthy have changed worship
from a cultic ceremony into an occasion of conspicuous consumption. The rich have
converted worship from a Yahweh-centered activity into a self-centered one. Jeremias
writes that, “Worship has become an end in itself and is celebrated for the sake of selfassuagement; it does not reach Yahweh, and no longer creates any fellowship with
him.”116
Amos’ accusation contrasts with Hosea’s indictment of Israel. Hosea was a near
contemporary of Amos and his ministry was also centered in the northern kingdom. 117
Hosea condemned Israel for practicing idolatry and spiritual harlotry. Hosea writes of
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Israel, “for you have played the whore, departing from your God. You have loved a
prostitute’s pay on all threshing floors. (Hos 9:1b)” The viewpoints of Amos and Hosea
do not necessarily contradict each other, however. Amos does not say that Israel’s
worship is orthodox, only that it is extravagant. Hosea also suggested that, although Israel
worshipped other gods, the worship of Yahweh still flourished. He wrote, “For I desire
steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings. (Hos
5:6)”118 The text implies the Hosea also recognized Israel’s overt worship of Yahweh.
However, Hosea’s primary concern is the increasing heterodoxy of Israel; they combined
their worship of Yahweh with the worship of other gods.119 Amos highlighted instead the
moral turpitude of the wealthy and the consequent disruption of the social order. Both
prophets recognized the intense religiosity of Israel and both condemned it. Hosea
denounced Israel for adulterating the worship of Yahweh. Amos condemned the rich for
practicing a religion focused on self-gratification.
While Hosea does not focus on social conditions in Israel, he does allude to
problems similarly identified by Amos. For example, Hosea speaks of the corruption of
Israel when he writes, “when I would heal Israel, the corruption of Ephraim is revealed,
and the wicked deeds of Samaria; for they deal falsely, the thief breaks in, and the bandits
raid outside. (Hos 7:1)”120 Hosea accuses Israel of engaging in orgies. “When their
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drinking is ended, they indulge in sexual orgies; they love lewdness more than their
glory. (Hos 4:18)” (Amos 5:1 references the wealthy women’s penchant for alcohol as
well, although Amos does not there refer to orgies.) Hosea mentions legal troubles that
will soon come in focus in Amos as well. For example, Hosea writes, “They utter mere
words; with empty oaths they make covenants; so litigation springs up like poisonous
weeds in the furrows of the field. (Hos 10:4)” Hosea perhaps references the source of
wealth of the rich when he writes, “Threshing floor and wine vat shall not feed them, and
the new wine shall fail them.” (Hos 9:2) Hosea, like Amos, accuses Israel of injustice. In
Hosea10:13, he writes, “You have plowed wickedness, you have reaped injustice, you
have eaten the fruit of lies. Because you have trusted in your power and in the multitude
of your warriors…” Most of Hosea’s references to social problems are rather tangential,
but this is to be expected due to the different focus of the respective authors. However,
like Amos, Hosea describes a nation in which chaos is apparently the order of the day.
Amos 5:7, 10-12; 6:12b. “Ah, you that turn justice to wormwood, and
bring righteousness to the ground! … They hate the one who reproves in
the gate, and they abhor the one who speaks the truth. Therefore because
you trample on the poor and take from them levies of grain, you have built
houses of hewn stone, but you shall not live in them; you have planted
pleasant vineyards, but you shall not drink their wine. For I know how
many are your transgressions, and how great are your sins— you who
afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, and push aside the needy in the
gate.”
“…But you have turned justice into poison and the fruit of righteousness
into wormwood.”121
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According to Amos, the wealth of the rich has been gained by taking advantage of
the poor. In this indictment, Amos accuses the wealthy of enlisting the courts in
perpetrating their transfer of property from the poor to themselves. Interestingly, this is
Amos’ first direct use of the word “justice.”
Before continuing, a brief excursus into the Hebrew vocabulary of ethics is in
order. The eighth century prophets used a small constellation of Hebrew words to
describe what we would describe as social justice. Included in this list would be the
words( חסדḥesed, variously translated “kindness,” “love,” or “steadfast love”), אמת
(´emet, translated “faithfulness”), and to a lesser degree ( רחמיםraḥəmîm, “compassion”).
By far the brightest stars in this constellation of words are the words “justice” (Hebrew
ׁשּפָט
ְ  ִמ, mišpaṭ), and “righteousness” (two related Hebrew words צדקand  ;צדקהṣedeq and

ṣedāqâ). Taken by itself, the Hebrew word mišpaṭ has a variety of meanings, all related

to the modern concepts of law and justice.122 The word is ubiquitous throughout the
Hebrew Bible, occurring about 425 times.123 Robert Culver finds thirteen distinct uses of
the word.124 Johnson recognizes five broad categories with several translations possible
within each category. Examples of specific usages of the word encompass, for example,
the English concepts of “commandments,” “oracular decision,” “verdict” (and by
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extension, “punishment,” or “deliverance”), and “custom” or “tradition.”125 Eliezer
Berkovits has noted that behind the meaning of mišpaṭ stands the primary concept of
order. He writes that “the original meaning of mishpat is to be sought on a more primary
level of human interest than that of justice or law. … It is more habit, the way a thing was
customarily done.”126 He concludes that mišpaṭ was a “universal principle,” the
“sustaining law of the universe.”127 Thus there is a general parallel between the Hebrew
mišpaṭ and the Egyptian concept of ma’at. The Israelite concept of justice also bore

similarities to the Mesopotamian idea of justice. In all three cases, justice carried with it
the connotation of order as opposed to chaos and connected life in the mundane world
with the world of the divine. Philip Nel writes that, “… ‘justice’ was the single most
important principle which connected the designed world of the gods with human conduct.
‘Justice’ was the convergence of religion and moral responsibility.”128
The Hebrew words usually translated righteousness ( צֶדֶ קṣedeq,  צְדָ קָהṣedāqâ)
derive from a single root. The root meaning revolves around something having or being
in the right or properly ordered. Words deriving from this root occur over 525 times in
the Hebrew Bible.129 The root is well-known in other Semitic languages, as well, where it
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has similar meanings. Scholars are divided on whether the two nominative forms, ṣedeq
and ṣedāqâ, have distinct meanings. One scholar, for example, notes that “ṣdq and ṣdqh
are to be distinguished: ṣdq concerns proper order, ṣdqh means the proper order of the
world, willed by Yahweh, which brings prosperity, ṣdqh its appropriate, proper,
prosperous state.”130 Others see “no essential difference between the two and treat them
without distinction.”131 B. Johnson finds the meaning of the Hebrew word ṣedeq
comparable to the Egyptian ma’at as well as the Akkadian words mēšaru and kettu.132
The terms express concepts that were familiar to the broader ancient Near Eastern context
in which the Hebrews lived. Righteousness was a particular responsibility of the king.
Nel comments, “In the final analysis the king was responsible for the establishment and
maintenance of a just order for society as a whole and, in particular, to protect the rights
of underprivileged and marginalized groups.”133 One of the primary ways the king carried
out this responsibility was by insuring that economic and social practices remained within
some form of balance.134 While the king as ultimately responsible for the establishment
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of a just society, individuals had a responsibility to “perform deeds of righteousness and
truth” as well.135
It is apparent that justice and righteousness carried similar connotations to the
Hebrew. Some scholars believe that the combination of the two words (mišpaṭ and ṣedeq
/ṣedāqâ) served a special purpose; to denote the concept of social justice.136 The word
pair, often translated righteousness and justice, is found together a total of fourteen times
just in the eighth century prophets.137 Two of those instances are found in the texts under
consideration.
Bearing our brief excursus into the vocabulary of justice in mind, it can be seen
that Amos’ complaint was equivalent to saying the rich had subverted the natural order of
the universe. They had turned justice into wormwood.138 Wormwood is a very bitter plant
used as a tonic or medicine.139 Amos’ expression is equivalent to a modern phrase. The
“victims” of Israelite justice were left with “a bitter taste in their mouth.” So, rather than
order, the actions of the rich had brought bitterness and chaos. I do not intend to suggest
135
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that “natural order” here refers to some kind of independent force, however. Just as the
Egyptians understood ma’at as both a concept and a divine being, so the Israelites would
have understood natural order to be an expression of Yahweh. Thus Amos was ultimately
accusing the rich of subverting the will of Yahweh. Understood this way, Amos’
condemnation of the worship practices of the rich in earlier texts becomes all the more
understandable. The wealthy in Israel are guilty of acting contrary to the very will and
nature of Yahweh.
Verses 10-12 are a continuation of the indictment Amos began in verse 7.140
Amos claims that the wealthy “hate the one who reproves in the gate.” The gate of the
city served as the de facto court house in the ancient world. Wolff says that the “one who
reproves” is the one who renders judgment.141 The “one who speaks the truth” is the
witness to a case. Amos seems here to be condemning the wealthy, not for dispensing
injustice in the place of justice (an accusation he has already made in verse 7), but rather
of begrudging the very idea of having to appear at court at all. The wealthy think of
themselves as above the law.
The identity of the culprits of the above accusations is made explicit in verse 11.
Amos charges the rich with trampling on the poor (dalîm, the peasant farmer who,
although poor, had resources that the rich could extract) and exacting “levies of grain.”
The verb translated “to trample” is difficult. Paul understands it to be from an Akkadian
cognate that refers to the exacting of a grain tax, thus paralleling the first phrase of the
verse with the second.142 Andersen and Freedman disagree, preferring to understand the
140
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word as it is rendered here. In any case, Amos is accusing the wealthy of taking what
little the poor had in order to enrich themselves further.
Amos further charges the wealthy of having “built houses of hewn stone,” and
“planted pleasant vineyards.” These actions required the expenditure of a substantial
amount of labor. The mention of vineyards and stone houses suggest permanence. The
wealthy were confident that they were building not just for themselves, but for their
descendants (a supposition that Amos vigorously contests). Apparently the wealthy gave
little thought to the fact that, by their own machinations, they were preventing the peasant
farmer from passing their land on to their children. While the land represented wealth and
perhaps status for the rich, for the poor it represented life. Ownership of land allowed
peasants the hope that they could adequately provide for their family. Ownership was
also invested with theological meaning. As we have previously stated, the removal of
peasants from their land had economic, social, and theological ramifications.143
Apparently this was of little import to the prosperous. Amos thus adds the charge of
callousness to the already long list of crimes perpetrated by the wealthy.
Once again Amos equates the economic and judicial depredations of the rich with
crimes against Yahweh. Amos has Yahweh say that he knows the transgressions and
great sin of the wealthy.144 Paul translates the phrase, “For indeed I know how numerous
are your transgressions and how countless your sins.”145 The Hebrew word rendered
“transgressions” is ( ִּפ ְׁש ַּעי ִםpešəyîm). The same word is used throughout the oracles against
143
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the nations and, as previously noted, might also be translated “rebellion.”146 Amos
accuses the rich, despite their apparent religiosity, of being in rebellion against Yahweh.
Amos then identifies three specific sins of which the wealthy are guilty. Two of the
crimes have obvious juridical settings. Considering the context, it can be assumed that the
crime of “afflicting the righteous” also made reference to injustice perpetrated on the
poor. Thus all three sins apparently relate to the illicit use of the law by the wealthy to
further their own interests.147 The rich persecuted the honest, accepted bribes, and refused
to grant the needy (in this case, the ’ebyôn, the beggarly poor) a hearing. The wealthy,
according to Amos, achieved and maintained their wealth, at least in part, through
corrupting the legal process.
Amos 5:21-24. “I hate, I despise your festivals, and I take no delight in
your solemn assemblies. Even though you offer me your burnt offerings
and grain offerings, I will not accept them; and the offerings of well-being
of your fatted animals I will not look upon. Take away from me the noise
of your songs; I will not listen to the melody of your harps. But let justice
roll down like waters, and righteousness like an everflowing stream.”
This text contains perhaps the best known of all of Amos’ charges against Israel.
Although the offenders are once again not specifically named, the context suggests that
the wealthy are Amos’ target. This text is part of a larger oracle addressed to those “who
desire the day of the Lord (Amos 5:18).” This is the earliest occurrence of the “day of the
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Lord” in the Hebrew Bible and it is apparent that Amos did not invent the concept. It is
also clear that Israel conceived of the day of the Lord as a day of salvation.148 The phrase
apparently referred to a period of time in which Yahweh would intervene on behalf of
Israel and bring about an end to a foreign threat. The wealthy had the most to gain by
keeping the status quo and thus would have welcomed Yahweh’s intervention against any
threatening foreign nation. Gary V. Smith writes, “[Israel’s] expectations are that [the
Day of the Lord] will be a positive day of joy and salvation with God’s presence in their
midst.”149 Their hope is apparently based on their practice of religion. Amos described
his audience as a group that based their security on their religiosity. They offered burnt
and grain offerings to Yahweh as well as sacrificial lambs and songs of worship. Amos,
however, threatened that the “day of the Lord,” rather than being a day of deliverance for
the rich, would instead become a day of disaster. Their worship, rather than being a
bridge to Yahweh, would act instead as an impediment. The implication seems to be that,
as far as Yahweh is concerned, the wealthy are themselves behaving like the foreigners
Israel generally held in contempt. If this is what Amos intended, than it also follows that
the day of the Lord would indeed turn out to be a day of deliverance; but for the poor
rather than for the wealthy. Thus Amos has turned the concept of the day of the Lord
completely on its head, at least as far as Israel’s elite are concerned.150
Amos uses three verbs to express Yahweh’s reaction to Israel’s worship. The first
is rendered “hate” in the NRSV. The semantic range of the word includes everything
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Ernst Jenni, "Day of the Lord," in The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. Keith R. Crim
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1976), 1:784.
149

Gary V. Smith, Amos: A Commentary, Library of Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Regency
Reference Library, 1989), 248.
150

Amos’ conception of the day of the Lord was borrowed and further refined by subsequent prophets. See,
for example, Isa 2:12-22, Jer 46:10, and the book of Zephaniah.

140

from an intense hatred to the wish to avoid something unpleasant.151 The context,
however, suggest that the former is more likely what Amos had in mind. The word
rendered “despise” often has covenant overtones and includes the connotation of
rejection.152 Both of these verbs Amos specifically applies to Israel’s festivals. The final
verb, rendered here as “take no delight,” ultimately derives from the concept of smell or
scent.153 The verb is negated, so Amos expresses the idea that the people’s cultic actions
produce a bad smell.154 Specifically Amos applies the verb to Israel’s “solemn
assemblies.” Israel’s current worship, especially vis-à-vis her cultic gatherings for
sacrificial purposes, rather than creating a pleasing odor, left a malodorous stench. Hence,
the offerings of the rich are unacceptable to Yahweh.
Amos explicitly writes that Yahweh refuses to accept the sacrifices of the
wealthy. Wolff notes that the Hebrew word rendered here as “accept” is a word at home
in the cult. The Hebrew verb (רצה, rṣh) was used by a temple priest to pronounce the
acceptance of an offering brought by a supplicant.155 Amos thus uses the language of the
cult to express the rejection of Israel’s cult by Yahweh. The nominative form of the verb
is the Hebrew word rāṣôn. Fretheim says of this form, “In its most basic sense, rāṣôn is
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the divine goodwill that reaches out to others in mercy and compassion.156 Amos has
made the case that the wealthy have denied mercy and compassion to others. Therefore
their sacrifices are deemed unacceptable and, the context suggests, they will themselves
be denied mercy and compassion.
Several scholars have noted that the elements of Israel’s worship mentioned here
closely parallel the elements that comprise the banquet described in Amos 6:4-5 (see
below).157 Apparently, at least from the perspective of the prophet, there was little to
distinguish between Israel’s worship and her entertainment. Both were done for the sake
of the worshipper and not for the sake of Yahweh.
Shalom Paul considers this oracle to be a complete repudiation of the cult by
Amos. He writes,
[Amos] upbraids in no uncertain terms Israel’s extensive ritual praxis,
rejecting it in toto: holidays, festal gatherings, and sacrifices, along with
their accompanying hymns, melodies, and musical instruments. … To all
of this ritual mayhem he replies that God demands justice and morality
and not the minutiae of the cult: Not rite but right is demanded; devotion
not devotions.158
Jeremias’ disagrees, however. It is his opinion that, in this text,
… it is not the significance of worship that is being weighed against the
significance of the ethos such that worship activities, compared with that
ethos, are devalued (as liberal theology imagines); rather, Israel in its sin is
being told that its worship activities are no longer reaching God in the first
place, and to that extent have become perverted into “service to
oneself.”159
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He argues that Amos did not reject the elements of the cult per se; he rejected the total
lack of sincerity that Israel has paid to the cult. Worship had become a meaningless ritual,
devoid of any ethical elements. Amos does did reject the cult, replacing it with his brand
of proper ethics. Rather, Amos averred that sacrifices became meaningful only when they
were accompanied by the proper concern for the poor.160
Amos offered a prescription for what ailed Israel. He wrote, “But let justice roll
down like waters, and righteousness like an everflowing stream.” Amos uses the visual
imagery of a streambed filled to overflowing after a heavy rain. An “everflowing stream”
calls to mind one of the few permanent streams that flowed through Israel’s territory.
Meir Weiss observes that, left to itself, such a stream will naturally “roll.” It is only when
it is impeded that a stream, like justice, ceases to flow.161 Justice and righteousness
should have been pervasive and abundant in Israel. Instead the rich deliberately
obstructed justice. Water, containing such potential power, will not endure being blocked
for an indefinite period of time. Eventually it will break through the obstacle, devastating
the area immediately downstream with a powerful flood.162 Amos here seems to extend a
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similar analogy to justice. Instead of an exhortation to do justice, the text thus becomes a
threat against those practice injustice. Justice has been obstructed for so long, Amos
seems to say, that its destructive power can no longer be restrained. Devastation can be
the only result.163
Amos’ denigration of an empty cult is a common theme found throughout the
corpus of eighth century prophets. Isaiah, for example, laments Judah’s reliance on the
cult to the exclusion of the establishment of justice and the protection of the oppressed.
He writes,
What to me is the multitude of your sacrifices? says the LORD; I have had
enough of burnt offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts; I do not delight
in the blood of bulls, or of lambs, or of goats. When you come to appear
before me, who asked this from your hand? Trample my courts no more;
bringing offerings is futile; incense is an abomination to me. New moon
and sabbath and calling of convocation— I cannot endure solemn
assemblies with iniquity. Your new moons and your appointed festivals
my soul hates; they have become a burden to me, I am weary of bearing
them. When you stretch out your hands, I will hide my eyes from you;
even though you make many prayers, I will not listen; your hands are full
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of blood. Wash yourselves; make yourselves clean; remove the evil of
your doings from before my eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do good; seek
justice, rescue the oppressed, defend the orphan, plead for the widow. (Isa
1:11-17)
Micah joins the chorus. The book of Micah records these words:
With what shall I come before the LORD, and bow myself before God on
high? Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves a year
old? Will the LORD be pleased with thousands of rams, with ten
thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression,
the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" He has told you, O mortal,
what is good; and what does the LORD require of you but to do justice,
and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God? (Mic 6:6-8)
Finally, Hosea adds, “For I desire steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God
rather than burnt offerings. (Hos 6:6)” All four of the eighth century prophets described a
community (or a portion of that community) that presumed that the extent of their
responsibility to Yahweh involved performing the various sacrificial rites delineated by
the cult. The prophets, however, claimed that Yahweh required more from them; he
required justice, righteousness, and love; attributes that Amos demonstrated were in short
supply in Israel.
Amos 6:1, 3-6. “Alas for those who are at ease in Zion, and for those who
feel secure on Mount Samaria, the notables of the first of the nations, to
whom the house of Israel resorts! … O you that put far away the evil day,
and bring near a reign of violence? Alas for those who lie on beds of
ivory, and lounge on their couches, and eat lambs from the flock, and
calves from the stall; who sing idle songs to the sound of the harp, and like
David improvise on instruments of music; who drink wine from bowls,
and anoint themselves with the finest oils, but are not grieved over the ruin
of Joseph!”164
In the preceding oracle, Amos decried the state of Israel’s worship. In this oracle,
he condemns her leisure time activities. Yet some of the language describing the two
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activities is identical. Whereas the recipients of the preceding oracle are not specified,
here Amos leaves no doubt as to whom he is addressing. The wealthy are soundly
criticized by Amos for their extravagant lifestyle.165
Some scholars believe that Amos describes in this text a Semitic social and
religious organization known as a marzeaḥ.166 According to King and Stager, the
institution had a long history; dating from the 14th century BCE through the Roman
period.167 The marzeaḥ may have functioned as a memorial banquet.168 Regardless of its
function, however, Stager and King write that the marzeaḥ consisted of five elements, all
of which are found in this text: couches (“beds of ivory”) on which the guests reclined; a
gourmet meal involving meat, the accompaniment of music, the drinking of wine, and the
anointing of the participants with oil.169
Whether or not the wealthy were engaging in a marzeaḥ, Amos describes in this
text conditions about which the poor could only dream. Our earlier survey of the
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economic conditions in eighth century Israel suggested that the poor would have had little
leisure time to engage in such activities and they certainly would not have had ivory
couches on which to recline nor the resources to provide meat and oil for a party of
guests. Stuart notes that “Many Israelites probably ate meat as infrequently as three times
a year – only at the festivals and even less often if they were poor.”170 Yet Amos charges
that the wealthy ate “choice meats.”171 Music, wine, and anointing oils were also a part of
the celebrations. These elements were descriptive of cultic activities as well.172 The
lifestyles of the wealthy stood in stark contrast with those of the poor.
Amos 8:4-6. “Hear this, you that trample on the needy, and bring to ruin
the poor of the land, saying, ‘When will the new moon be over so that we
may sell grain; and the sabbath, so that we may offer wheat for sale? We
will make the ephah small and the shekel great, and practice deceit with
false balances, buying the poor for silver and the needy for a pair of
sandals, and selling the sweepings of the wheat.’”173
This final indictment outlines the procedures that Amos said the rich used to
impoverish the poor.174 Amos identified the recipients of his oracle as “you that trample
on the needy, and bring to ruin the poor of the land.” The first phrase is reminiscent of the
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text of Amos 2:7. The needy in this text are the ’ebyôn, the beggarly poor. Amos also
uses the Hebrew word ’( ָענִיānī) to describe the “poor of the land.” The word connotes
humility and, according to W. J. Dumbrell, refers to the dispossessed. These were people
without land or social standing and thus stood at the same level in society as the resident
alien, the widow, and the orphan; which is to say they were liminal members of Israel’s
society.175 Thus they would have been closely related to the ebyôn. Both classes of poor
lived with very little margin of error. Yet it was this group that Amos portrays the rich as
targeting in their quest to add to their wealth.
Amos demonstrates the hypocrisy of the wealthy.176 Apparently they followed the
Hebrew law inasmuch as they desisted from selling on the Sabbath. In contravention of
the law, however, they neglected to provide for the poorest of the land. The law made
provision for the poor, insisting that land owners leave behind produce that the poor
could glean.177 Those with resources were to be generous with them, sharing with those
in need. Instead, the rich in Amos’ day were impatient for the sacred holidays to be over
so they could get back to fleecing the destitute. Amos accuses the wealthy of using
dishonest weights and measures, a practice specifically proscribed in the law.178 Amos

175

W. J. Dumbrell, " ," in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed.
Willem VanGemeren (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Pub. House, 1997), 455.
176

This hypocrisy prevented the rich from seeing their own deeds as wrong and thus permitted them to
continue to practice them. Jensen writes, “[Amos] has a special polemic against the cult because it allows
its practitioners to convince themselves that they stand in a right relationship to God and so encourages
them to continue evil practices.” Jensen, Ethical Dimensions, 89.
177

For example, “You shall not strip your vineyard bare, or gather the fallen grapes of your vineyard; you
shall leave them for the poor and the alien: I am the LORD your God. (Le 19:10)” and “When you gather
the grapes of your vineyard, do not glean what is left; it shall be for the alien, the orphan, and the widow.
(De 24:21)” In the book of Ruth, Boaz is praised for his generous treatment of Ruth precisely in this area.
178

“You shall not cheat in measuring length, weight, or quantity. You shall have honest balances, honest
weights, an honest ephah, and an honest hin: I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of
Egypt. (Le 19:35-6)”

148

also charges the rich with trafficking in the poor (specifically the dalîm and the ’ebyôn).
Finally, Amos indicts the wealthy for adulterating their grain, all the more to inflate their
profits at the expense of the poorest Israelites.
The Identity of the Offenders
In the above survey I have generally identified the offenders as the upper classes
of Israel. Five of the ten passages explored clearly implicate the wealthy.179 As I have
argued above, I believe legitimate arguments can be made that each of the remaining five
accusations also targeted the rich. In this section I will briefly summarize the arguments I
have made above and offer some concluding observations on the identity of the offenders
in the book of Amos.
Amos 2:12 is an anonymous indictment against those who would cause the
nazarites to break their vows and silence the prophets. While anonymous, the context
suggests that Amos was specifically implicating the wealthy. Wolff and Paul both
consider this verse to be an extension of the oracle found in 2:6-8.180 Thus it would not be
unreasonable to assume that this verse was also aimed at the affluent. The case might also
be made that only the influential of Israel could effectively stifle the activities of the
nazarites and the prophets.
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Amos 3:9-10 also does not explicitly implicate the wealthy. There are clues which
suggest that Amos had the prosperous in mind, however. As we have already noted,
Amos in this oracle invites those in the “strongholds in Ashdod” and Egypt to assemble
on Mount Samaria and witness the crimes contained within it. Mays writes that
“strongholds” denotes a building which is taller than surrounding buildings and built to
be defensible. He concludes, “Such buildings obviously would be the residences of the
richer and ruling class in a city.”181 Paul agrees and opines that Amos is calling on the
wealthy of other nations to denounce its peers in Israel for their lawless and corrupt
behavior.182
In Amos 4:4-5, Amos sardonically calls on Israel to “go to Bethel and transgress.”
Whether Amos is referring to all of Israel or just to the wealthy is open to question.
Again, the case can be made that, if speaking literally, only the wealthy could afford the
time and wealth necessary to make the mentioned pilgrimages and offer the stated
offerings. Even if taken as hyperbole, however, we have seen that the text probably refers
to pilgrimages which the poor would doubtless have been unable to take. It should be
noted that the verses immediately following this text mentions Yahweh’s attempt to
garner Israel’s attention by “[giving] you cleanness of teeth in all your cities, and lack of
bread in all your places. (Am 4:6)” The resulting famine would have impacted both the
rich and the poor. Thus the argument could be made that Amos intended this indictment
to refer to the nation as a whole. This may be the most ambiguous text surveyed when it
comes to identifying the offenders.
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Amos 6:12b is another anonymous indictment. Its content parallels Amos 5:7,
however, an oracle that specifically indicts the wealthy. Unfortunately the context of
6:12b muddies the waters somewhat. Amos 6:12b is part of an oracle that begins in verse
11. That verse reads, “See, the LORD commands, and the great house shall be shattered
to bits, and the little house to pieces.” If “little houses” here refers to the domiciles of the
poor, than Amos is apparently accusing the entire nation of subverting justice. This seems
improbable; however, as Amos has previously made the case that the poor had no voice
in the local courts. Wolff thinks that the “little houses” may be a reference to
“magnificently laid out vineyards.”183 Or it might reference the summer or “vacation”
homes of the wealthy that, while lavish by the standards of the poor, were nevertheless
less luxurious than were their primary homes.
The last of the oracles which does not specifically identify the rich is Amos’ pièce
de résistance, found in Amos 5:21-24. Once again, the context suggests that Amos may
have intended to target primarily the wealthy with his words. The evident expense of the
offerings Amos mentions could arguably only have been met by Israel’s most prosperous.
The indictment of the wealthy became somewhat of a favorite pastime of the
eighth-century prophets. Each of the prophets of that era castigated the wealthy of their
respective nations for their arrogant treatment of the poor. For example, Isaiah wrote,
Ah, you who make iniquitous decrees, who write oppressive statutes, to
turn aside the needy from justice and to rob the poor of my people of their
right, that widows may be your spoil, and that you may make the orphans
your prey! What will you do on the day of punishment, in the calamity
that will come from far away? To whom will you flee for help, and where
will you leave your wealth… (Isa 10:1-3)
Hosea also condemned the arrogance of the rich when he wrote,
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But as for you, return to your God, hold fast to love and justice, and wait
continually for your God. A trader, in whose hands are false balances, he
loves to oppress. Ephraim has said, "Ah, I am rich, I have gained wealth
for myself; in all of my gain no offense has been found in me that would
be sin. (Hos 12:6-8)
Micah also railed against the insatiable appetites of the wealthy. He wrote,
Alas for those who devise wickedness and evil deeds on their beds! When
the morning dawns, they perform it, because it is in their power. They
covet fields, and seize them; houses, and take them away; they oppress
householder and house, people and their inheritance. (Mic 2:1-2)
Later generations remembered the accusations that Amos and the other eighth century
prophets made against the wealthy. Zechariah, writing over two hundred years after
Amos and following the Babylonian exile, attributed the deportations of both Israel and
Judah to the mistreatment of the poor by the wealthy. He warned the newly returned Jews
of their responsibilities towards the poor and the dangers of neglecting that duty.
The word of the Lord came to Zechariah, saying: Thus says the Lord of
hosts: Render true judgments, show kindness and mercy to one another; do
not oppress the widow, the orphan, the alien, or the poor; and do not
devise evil in your hearts against one another. But they refused to listen,
and turned a stubborn shoulder, and stopped their ears in order not to hear.
They made their hearts adamant in order not to hear the law and the words
that the Lord of hosts had sent by his spirit through the former prophets.
Therefore great wrath came from the Lord of hosts. Just as, when I called,
they would not hear, so, when they called, I would not hear, says the Lord
of hosts, and I scattered them with a whirlwind among all the nations that
they had not known. Thus the land they left was desolate, so that no one
went to and fro, and a pleasant land was made desolate. (Zech 7:8-14)
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the vast majority of Amos’ indictments
implicated only the wealthy in Israel. It must be noted, however, that several scholars
take a contrary view. M. Daniel Carroll R., for example, argues that the book of Amos
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provides a window into the popular religion of eighth century Israel.184 This religion was
shared equally by both rich and poor. He writes that “both those privileged by social or
economic station as well as the masses go to the same holy places and join together in the
same cult. Even if agendas and motivations differ, all are part of a shared religious life
and rhythm that Yahweh abhors and will judge at a terrible cost.”185 He says that Amos
2:6-16, for example, implicates the wealthy while also condemning the general
populace.186 As a result, “no social class will escape the mourning, and no group
responds to death and Yahweh in ways the text would consider appropriate.”187 Paul
Noble largely agrees. He notes that,
…although it is the rich and powerful who are charged with exploiting the
poor, it is the people as a whole that is indicted for the cultic
transgressions at Bethel and Gilgal (iv 4-5) and charged with ‘iniquities’
(iii 1-2). Consequently, the punishments depicted in Amos are often of an
indiscriminate nature, striking against all sections of society. Both the
‘large house’ and the ‘small house’—i.e. dwellings of every degree—shall
be shattered at Yahweh's command (vi 11). Likewise, famine, drought,
and blight (iv 6-9) are no respecters of social class or piety.188
Kapelrud also argues that all of Israel stood condemned. He says, “Amos accepts the
ancient idea of collective responsibility, probably because he is of the opinion that sin has
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M. Daniel Carroll R., "'For So You Love to Do' Probing Popular Religion in the Book of Amos," in
Rethinking Contexts, Rereading Texts: Contributions from the Social Sciences to Biblical Interpretation,
ed. M. Daniel Carroll R (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 188.
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“Whatever the precise nature and location of worship in view here, these sacrilegious excesses are
possible only because the powerless have been taken advantage of. Nevertheless, at the same time, the
wider context of the oracle (2:6-16) incorporates the people as a whole into the prophetic condemnation.”
Carroll R., "So You Love to Do," 174.
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Carroll R. here refers specifically to the oracle in Amos 6:8-10. Carroll R., "So You Love to Do," 176.
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Paul R. Noble, "Amos' Absolute 'No'," Vetus Testamentum 47, no. 3 (1997): 336. Noble references
Carroll R. as having a similar position. Carroll R., referring to the oracle contained in Amos 4:4-5, writes,
“In this oracle, in other words, the unacceptable worship practices of a few is part of a wider refusal to
respond properly to the voice and will of Yahweh.” Carroll R., "So You Love to Do," 175.
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permeated the whole of society.”189 Finally, Jeremias alleges that although Amos indicted
only the wealthy, the entire nation stood guilty. He writes, “In contrast to the oracles
against the nations, it is not only the ruler and the politically responsible who perish, but
rather everyone, without exception, because everyone has become guilty.”190
Jeremias’ response illustrates what I believe to be the problem with this position.
Jeremias, as does Carroll R., apparently assumes that all Israel is guilty because the entire
nation was destroyed. While this might be more ethically palatable than the alternative, it
ignores the fact that Amos almost exclusively proclaims the guilt of the wealthy. It also
ignores the fact that the poor would have been less impacted by a change in
administration as represented by the defeat of Israel. This is not to suggest, however, that
the poor would not suffer as a result of the coming military disaster. As I will argue in the
final chapter, this position also diminishes the guilt of the prosperous in Israel.
It would, perhaps, be better to assume that Amos intended for his readers to
understand that Israel’s punishment would be directed at the wealthy alone. The poor
were simply “collateral damage.” While modern readers might be squeamish about the
notion of innocents suffering alongside of the guilty, it must be recognized that this is an
inevitable result of punishment. The same phenomenon occurs in modern society and it is
not often lamented. Rarely does the court or the public clamor for leniency because an
offender’s prison sentence (or worse) would unduly harm the family of the guilty
189

Arvid S. Kapelrud, "God as Destroyer in the Preaching of Amos and in the Ancient Near East," Journal
of Biblical Literature 71, no. 1 (1952): 35. Kapelrud views Israel’s moral failings as a proxy for her
relationship with Yahweh. He writes, “It is always dangerous to generalize, but the chief points in the
preaching of the prophets may be summed up in a few words: Yahweh’s doom had to come because the
people had turned away from their god. They preferred Ba’al and the fertility gods and practiced a foreign
cult. Closely connected with this apostasy was the people’s reject of ancient moral standards.” Kapelrud,
"God as Destroyer," 36.
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party.191 The reality, today as in antiquity, is that the innocent often suffer along with the
guilty.192
Summary
Using biblical material as well as sociological models and archaeological data,
scholars have pieced together the socioeconomic conditions of eighth-century Israel and
Judah. They have concluded that only a very few enjoyed the seeming prosperity of Israel
during the mid-eighth century. Not only did the wealthy not share their resources with
those who had less, they used their wealth and influence at the court and in the courts to
deprive the poor of what little they had left. The rich coveted the land possessed by the
poor. They used their wealth to aggregate lands which they had confiscated into large
estates and planted them in vineyards and olive groves, and to a lesser extent, wheat
fields; all products with commercial value. While all peasant farmers may not have been
dispossessed of their land, nevertheless most found themselves in a situation where they
no longer controlled decisions regarding it. Without that control, they were no longer able
to practice appropriate risk-spreading techniques. Thus the poor were left vulnerable to
the vagaries of the weather and other natural disasters.
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I have yet to see Irving Picard, the trustee for the victims of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme,
castigated for driving Madoff’s oldest son to suicide because he relentlessly pursued justice and
compensation for the victims of the scheme. As far as I am aware, it is unknown if Mark Madoff played a
part in the scheme although his lawyers denied that he held any responsibility. Yet Mark Madoff and his
family, especially his two year old son, paid a heavy price for Picard’s pursuit of justice. (Arguably, many
other factors, including perhaps guilt may have contributed to Mark Madoff’s suicide.) Nevertheless, I find
it doubtful that any disinterested observer would blame Picard for attempting to provide a modicum of
justice to Madoff’s victims. The ultimate responsibility for all of the suffering has to be laid at the foot of
the perpetrator of the fraud, Bernard Madoff himself. As one victim proclaimed regarding Mark Madoff’s
suicide, Bernard Madoff paid “the ultimate punishment” for his deeds. Larry Neumeister and Tom Hays,
"Madoff Son's Suicide Follows Battle with Trustee " MSNBC online edition, December 13 2010. I believe
the same principle applies to the wealthy in eighth century Israel.
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This is the very basis for modern jurisprudence’s notion that crimes are committed against “the state”
rather than the individual. As John Darley notes, “…the intentional infliction of a wrong injures not just the
victim but what might be called the ‘fabric of society.’” Darley and Pittman, "Psychology," 330.
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Amos includes several social classes in his description of the poor. It is interesting
to note, however, that Amos nowhere describes the archetypal biblical poor; the resident
alien, the widow, and the orphan.193 Rather, Amos often describes the poor as the
“working poor;” as small landholders, or as day-laborers. Perhaps this is because poverty
was considered the natural condition of the widow, the orphan, and the alien. The same
could not be said of many of those Amos describes, especially in light of the evident
prosperity of the country. Counterintuitively, that prosperity, rather than being broadbased, actually swelled the ranks of the poor. The sin of Israel’s elite came in its total
disregard for the vast majority of Israel’s population and their exploitation of them.194
Amos accused Israel of committing crimes that are, in most cases, not overtly
religious in nature.195 But this does not mean that Amos was unconcerned about religious
matters. As we have seen, at least two of his indictments directly involved cultic matters.
The fact that Amos’ list of crimes was relatively “secular” seems to have been
193

Rainer Kessler writes, “Those whose economic existence was thus threatened do not appear to have
been the classic biblical oppressed persons; the book of Amos never speaks of widows and orphans. Rather,
these are small farmers who are expected to hand over more and more, and who, when nothing more is to
be had from them, fall into debt slavery.” Kessler, Social History, 109. It should be noted that the other
eighth-century prophets do specifically mention the “typical” poor.
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Kessler writes that in Amos “wealth and poverty are seen in a cause and effect relationship. The wealthy
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The bifurcation of religion from secular life is a notion peculiar to modern living. Amos probably
understood his indictments as being religious in nature. Nevertheless, the crimes that he highlights are of a
different nature than those of Hosea, for example. Hosea’s indictments can be more readily identified as
violations of Israel’s law. For example, Hosea writes, “Hear the word of the LORD, O people of Israel; for
the LORD has an indictment against the inhabitants of the land. There is no faithfulness or loyalty, and no
knowledge of God in the land. Swearing, lying, and murder, and stealing and adultery break out; bloodshed
follows bloodshed (Hos 4:1-2).” He accuses Israel of having “forgotten the law of your God (Hos 4:6)”.
Hosea likens Israel’s behavior to that of a prostitute because they have worshipped idols rather than
remaining faithful to Yahweh. “My people consult a piece of wood, and their divining rod gives them
oracles. For a spirit of whoredom has led them astray, and they have played the whore, forsaking their God
(Hos 4:12).” Hosea also rails against the social crimes of Israel when he wrote, “for they deal falsely, the
thief breaks in, and the bandits raid outside (Hos 7:1)” and “You have plowed wickedness, you have reaped
injustice, you have eaten the fruit of lies (Hos 10:13).”
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intentional. Amos was condemning Israel for committing crimes that even those who did
not worship Yahweh would have identified as wrong. One did not need to worship
Israel’s God to recognize the basic injustices committed by the antagonists in Amos’
story. Israel’s crimes went against the customs of her culture as well as those of her God.
Thus Israel’s coming punishment could only be considered well deserved. Israel, of all
nations, should have recognized that fact. Amos’ indictments against Israel demonstrate
the rightness of Yahweh’s actions and indemnify Yahweh against any accusation of
injustice.
It must also be noted that, despite Amos’ concern for the poor, he cannot be said
to champion them. He does not call for economic reforms nor demand that the nation’s
prosperity be somehow shared. In fact we learn little of the underprivileged classes.
Amos’ true focus turns out not to be the poor at all, but the rich. Thus the bulk of Amos’
invective was targeted at the small percentage of Israel who controlled the majority of its
wealth. Amos’ accusations are graphic and disturbing.196 He describes the rich as
arrogant. They relied on their privileged positions to shield them from prosecution. The
message of Amos is that privilege did not alleviate the wealthy from the responsibility to
act morally. Amos also accused the rich of being self-serving, hypocritical, greedy, and
cruel. They thought only of themselves and gave no concern to the impact their actions
had on others. They stole (by deception) from the poor, physically and sexually abused
them, sold them into slavery, and denied them justice. Although the wealthy were
apparently scrupulous in their praxis of the cult, Amos claims that it will be of no avail.
196

As graphic as Amos’ accusations are, they cannot match those of Micah 3. There Micah compares the
leaders of Judah with butchers. He wrote, “And I said: Listen, you heads of Jacob and rulers of the house of
Israel! Should you not know justice?—you who hate the good and love the evil, who tear the skin off my
people, and the flesh off their bones; who eat the flesh of my people, flay their skin off them, break their
bones in pieces, and chop them up like meat in a kettle, like flesh in a caldron. (Micah 3:1-3)”
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Their rituals were worthless and devoid of real meaning because they were not backed up
by compassion.
Amos acknowledged the uniqueness of Israel when he wrote, “You only have I
known of all the families of the earth. (Amos 3:2a)” That fact, however, did not diminish
Israel’s responsibility in his mind. Rather, it increased it. Amos continued, “…therefore I
will punish you for all your iniquities. (Amos 3:2b)” In another place, Amos minimized
Israel’s special connection with Yahweh. He wrote, “Are you not like the Ethiopians to
me, O people of Israel? says the LORD. Did I not bring Israel up from the land of Egypt,
and the Philistines from Caphtor and the Arameans from Kir? (Amos 9:7)” Israel’s status
as Yahweh’s chosen nation did not give her a free pass when it came to her treatment of
the poor. Amos seemed to consider the wealthy as no more righteous than the foreigners
he condemned at the opening of his book. One wonders if Amos would account the
wealthy as essentially foreign in nature; true Israel consisting of the poor that the rich had
done so much to impoverish.
In the final analysis, the aggrieved party in the book cannot be said to be the poor.
Israel’s elite have sinned against Yahweh. There must be consequences for such actions.
Thus the book of Amos includes not only a catalog of crimes, but also the promise of
retribution against those responsible. The punishment of the wicked is the subject of the
next chapter.
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V. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Something of Amos’ character is revealed through his indictments against the
nations, and particularly those aimed at Israel. We learn, for example, that Amos
considered arrogance and disregard for others as something deeper than just a character
flaw; to him these actions were criminal. Israel’s crimes went against those of her culture
as well as those of her God. Thus Israel’s coming judgment could only be considered
well deserved. The punishments that he announced inform us about Amos’ depth of
feeling regarding these crimes. It is telling that, if anything, the punishments reserved for
Israel are more severe than they were for the nations. The announcements of Israel’s
punishment occupy proportionally more space than did Amos’ indictments.1 The focus of
this chapter concerns the range of punishments Amos predicted would befall Israel.
The Nature of Israel’s Punishment
The announced penalties Israel could expect can be roughly divided into three
categories: generic pronouncements of punishment; predictions of military defeat and
exile; and the specter of natural disasters/cosmic disturbances. In the paragraphs
following, we will briefly examine the punishments Amos expected to soon some upon
Israel.
Generic Pronouncements of Punishment. Amos leaves unspecified the mode or
agency of the predicted disaster in three texts. In the first, he wrote, “You only have I
known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities.
(Am 3:2)” The focus is less on the punishment in this text than it is on the Israel’s
1

The following is once again not necessarily a comprehensive list, but incorporates most of the extended
passages which announce punishment on Israel: Amos 2:13-16, 3:2-8, 3:9-11, 3:12-15, 4:2-3, 5:1-3, 5:4-6,
5:11, 5:16-20, 6:7, 6:8-11, 6:12-14, 7:8-9, 7:17, 8:1-3, 8:7-10, 8:11-14, 9:1-4, and 9:8-10. Unlike the
previous chapter, these predictions will be treated topically.
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relationship with Yahweh. Israel prided itself on its favored status with Yahweh. Amos
acknowledged that special relationship, but argued that such privilege came with great
responsibility. As Jeremias writes, “Israel misunderstood God’s election and nearness in
the sense of the self-assurance of the favored one, instead of comprehending the
commission to be a model for the world of nations.”2 Instead of being a model to the
nations, Yahweh was forced to call on the nations to witness Israel’s crimes (Am 3:9-10).
One can almost sense the disappointment Amos feels in Israel through his words.
The mode of punishment also remains unspecified in Amos 3:14-15. The text
reads,
On the day I punish Israel for its transgressions, I will punish the altars of
Bethel, and the horns of the altar shall be cut off and fall to the ground. I
will tear down the winter house as well as the summer house; and the
houses of ivory shall perish, and the great houses shall come to an end,
says the LORD.
The language of the passage might indicate an earthquake or perhaps a military defeat.
Amos’ interest is not in the mode of the punishment, however, but in the author of it.3
Amos makes it clear that the responsibility for Israel’s judgment falls squarely on
Yahweh.4
Another generic announcement occurs in one of the five visions recorded in the
book of Amos. There Yahweh showed Amos a basket of over-ripened fruit. Yahweh
interpreted the visual metaphor, saying, “‘the end has come upon my people Israel; I will
2
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Andersen and Freedman write of the book of Amos, “There is little or no interest in secondary causes or
agencies. Yahweh will do it, as is shown by the ‘I’ clauses of judgment speeches.” Andersen and
Freedman, Amos, 338.
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Amos often ascribes to Yahweh the responsibility for Israel’s punishment, even when it is obvious that
humans will be the agents of that punishment. Andersen and Freedman write, “There is little or no interest
in secondary causes or agencies. Yahweh will do it, as is shown by the ‘I’ clauses of judgment speeches.”
Andersen and Freedman, Amos, 338.
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never again pass them by. The songs of the temple shall become wailings in that day,’
says the Lord GOD; ‘the dead bodies shall be many, cast out in every place. Be silent!’
(Am 8:2b-3)” Amos does not specify the cause of death. It might be due to famine,
plague, or war. Amos was instead interested in the humiliating circumstances in which
Israel would soon find itself. As Wolff writes, “The judgment of death is intensified by
the shame of not being buried; the corpses are consequently consumed by dogs and birds
or they lie about like dung, fertilizing the fields.”5 Once again the pathos of Israel’s
situation is obvious.
In each of these texts, the exact cause of destruction is unknown. It should also be
noted that it is not the cause that Amos is most interested in. Rather, he highlights another
aspect of the coming punishment that he finds important. In Amos 3:2 he focused on
Israel’s misunderstanding of its relationship with Yahweh. In Amos 3:14-15 he identifies
Yahweh as the author of Israel’s pain. In Amos 8:2-3 he highlighted the shame that
would accompany Israel’s defeat or death.
Military Defeat and Exile. Numerous texts in Amos specify that Israel’s
punishment will involve military defeat and exile. For example, Amos warned,
“Therefore thus says the Lord GOD: An adversary shall surround the land, and strip you
of your defense; and your strongholds shall be plundered. (Am 3:11)” Throughout the
book, the adversary remains unnamed. For example, in chapter six Amos wrote, “Indeed,
I am raising up against you a nation, O house of Israel, says the LORD, the God of hosts,

5

Wolff, Amos, 320. The other eighth century prophets also gave general predictions of disaster. For
example, Isa 1:24 reads, “Therefore says the Sovereign, the LORD of hosts, the Mighty One of Israel: Ah, I
will pour out my wrath on my enemies, and avenge myself on my foes!” and Hos 3:9b says, “I will punish
them for their ways, and repay them for their deeds.” Micah wrote, “The best of them is like a brier, the
most upright of them a thorn hedge. The day of their sentinels, of their punishment, has come; now their
confusion is at hand. (Mic 7:4)”
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and they shall oppress you from Lebo-hamath to the Wadi Arabah. (Am 6:14)” Amos
specified only that a nation would oppress Israel, and that it would do so at the behest of
Yahweh. The anonymous agent operated as an instrument of Yahweh’s judgment.6 In this
text, Amos referred to Yahweh as “the Lord of hosts.” This is often understood by
scholars to be a military title. Thus, as Wolff comments, “Amos is a messenger, not of
any particular world power, but of the one and only commander-in-chief of all powers,
Yahweh.”7
The previous texts told of Israel’s victimization at the hand of an enemy. In Amos
2:14-16 Amos revealed the magnitude of that defeat. He wrote that
Flight shall perish from the swift, and the strong shall not retain their
strength, nor shall the mighty save their lives; those who handle the bow
shall not stand, and those who are swift of foot shall not save themselves,
nor shall those who ride horses save their lives; and those who are stout of
heart among the mighty shall flee away naked in that day, says the LORD.
The defeat would be marked by personal humiliation as fear robbed the speedy of their
speed and the strong of their strength.
Amos returned again to the magnitude of Israel’s defeat in chapter five. For
example, in Amos 5:3, he threatened, “For thus says the Lord God: The city that marched
out a thousand strong shall have a hundred left, and that which marched out a hundred
shall have ten left.” Taken literally, Amos predicts a ninety percent mortality rate.8 Amos
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It may well be that Amos remains enigmatic as to the identity of the conquering nation for just this reason.
The focus was not to be on the conquering nation but on Yahweh, who commissioned the nation to carry
out his will.
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Wolff, Amos, 289.
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Wolff does not believe that Amos is necessarily predicting that a remnant of Israel will survive. As in
Amos’ metaphor of the torn sheep, he understands the mention of the remnant to simply be a demonstration
that Israel’s fate was sealed. Wolff comments, “It is true that interpreters still want to see in this oracle
reference to a saved remnant, but Amos’ own interpretation of this oracle, found in the immediately
preceding funerary lament, shows that there is as little thought of a remnant here in 5:3 as there is in 3:12.
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does not intend to be taken literally, however. In Amos 6:9 he writes, “If ten people
remain in one house, they shall die.”9 In Amos 9:1b, he says “…those who are left I will
kill with the sword; not one of them shall flee away, not one of them shall escape.” His
point is simply that Yahweh’s anger is relentless. Amos reinforced that theme when he
warned,
Though they dig into Sheol, from there shall my hand take them; though
they climb up to heaven, from there I will bring them down. Though they
hide themselves on the top of Carmel, from there I will search out and take
them; and though they hide from my sight at the bottom of the sea, there I
will command the sea-serpent, and it shall bite them. And though they go
into captivity in front of their enemies, there I will command the sword,
and it shall kill them; and I will fix my eyes on them for harm and not for
good. (Am 9:3-4)
The evil of Israel was such that Yahweh would go to any length to eradicate it, even if it
meant completely destroying the entire nation.
It must be presumed that Israel’s defeat will be particularly crushing because it
has come to think of itself as a military power to be reckoned with. Amos highlighted
Israel’s confidence when he wrote, “you who rejoice in Lo-debar, who say, ‘Have we not
by our own strength taken Karnaim for ourselves?’ (Am 6:13)” Wolff notes that the place
name Karnaim is the plural for the noun “horn,” a symbol of strength and power.10 Israel
in its arrogance had congratulated itself on its military prowess. In the end, however, the
nation would be humiliated in the same way that Amos had predicted individuals would
be disgraced in Amos 2:14-16.11
If in Israel’s cities only a hundred men out of a thousand, or ten out of a hundred return from the war, then
the death sentence has been pronounced over the state of Israel.” Wolff, Amos, 237.
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The context suggests that the city Amos is referring to is Samaria, the capital of Israel. Paul, Amos, 214.
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Colloquially, Amos seems to be saying that the neighborhood bully (Israel) is about to get its comeuppance at the hands of an even more powerful bully. As on the playground, Amos must have expected that
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Exile often accompanied military defeat, and Amos predicted that this fate would
befall Israel as well. He alluded to exile in one of the texts quoted above. (Am 9:4. “And
though they go into captivity in front of their enemies, there I will command the sword,
and it shall kill them…”). The theme is also contained in Amos 5:4-5. There Amos wrote,
“For thus says the LORD to the house of Israel: Seek me and live; but do not seek Bethel,
and do not enter into Gilgal or cross over to Beer-sheba; for Gilgal shall surely go into
exile, and Bethel shall come to nothing.” Amos specified that certain cities would be
carried into exile. He also singled out a specific group facing deportation, the “cows of
Bashan” of Amos 4:2-3. Amos even promised exile to a particular individual. That story
is told in Amos 7:10-17. The text relates a confrontation that took place between Amos
and Amaziah, a priest at Bethel.12 Amaziah wrote to the king of Israel, accusing Amos of
“conspiring against the very center of the house of Israel.” This charge of treason was a
serious one and presumably would not have been taken lightly. Jeroboam must have
remembered that Jehu, his great-grandfather, ascended to the throne on the strength of
Elisha’s prophecy. The prophets might be disregarded, but they were not to be ignored. 13
Amos responded to Amaziah’s accusation by predicting that “Your wife shall
become a prostitute in the city, and your sons and your daughters shall fall by the sword,

no one would lament the diminution of the small bully’s status, just as no one would celebrate the specter
of now dealing with a new, stronger bully.
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It is normally understood that Amaziah was the head of the state-sponsored Yahweh cult and thus a
retainer of the king. Wolff, Amos, 239. As such he would have been a member of the class excoriated so
thoroughly by Amos. His complaints can only be seen as self-interested. Wolff argues that this event took
place near the end of Amos’ ministry and, indeed, brought about the end of it. Wolff, Amos, 309. Andersen
and Freedman postulate that, as a result of the confrontation with Amaziah, Amos was imprisoned until a
hearing was convened before the king. They suggest that subsequently he was imprisoned for life or
possibly even martyred. Andersen and Freedman, Amos, 86-7.
13

Amaziah’s charge seems to be almost a tacit admission that Amos’ indictments were accurate. He was
apparently fearful that Amos’ words would cause a popular uprising.
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and your land shall be parceled out by line; you yourself shall die in an unclean land, and
Israel shall surely go into exile away from its land. (Am 7:17)” Amaziah represents the
fate of the entire nation. As Wolff writes, “Thus does Amos specify in particular for the
priest in Bethel a fate which corresponds to that announced for Israel as a whole in the
threats of war and deportation.”14
Amos was not alone in his predictions of military defeat of the Hebrew nations.
Each of the eighth century prophets had essentially the same message for Israel and/or
Judah.15 Military defeat and exile were essentially the same punishments that Amos had
predicted would befall the foreign nations in his oracles against the nations. Amos is thus
declaring that the severity of Israel’s crime equaled that of the nations.16
Natural Disasters and Cosmic Disturbances. Natural disasters and cosmic
disturbances—earthquake, drought, famine, pestilence, solar and lunar eclipses—being
undirected by humans, were thought of as a form of communication directed by the gods
towards humanity. Natural disasters might well affect an entire nation. As such, they
were often thought of as divine retribution on a national scale. The concept that the gods
might destroy their own nation was not unique to Israel. As Kapelrud writes, “The
ancient Near Eastern gods did not hesitate to destroy their own people. That idea is no
invention of the Hebrew prophets, as is sometimes popularly believed.”17
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Wolff, Amos, 316.
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For example, see Isa 1:20, Isa 3:24, Hos 5:8-9, Hos 7:16, and Mic 1:15-6. For specific predictions of
exile, see Hos 8:13 and Hos 9:3.
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Wolff writes, “Amos considers Israel to be considerably more guilty than her foreign neighbors. Israel
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A text by an anonymous author lamenting over the destruction of the Sumerian
city of Ur provides a ready example. The exact date of the text is unknown, but it was
probably written sometime in the first half of the second millennium BCE.18 An excerpt
from the lament reads:
When they [that is the leaders of the pantheon and the assembly of the
great gods] ordered the utter destruction of my city,
When they ordered the utter destruction of Ur,
When they gave instructions that its people be killed –
On that day, I verily did not forsake my city,
I verily did not neglect my Land;
Truly I shed my tears before An,
Truly I myself uttered supplication before Enlil:
‘May the city not be destroyed!’ I said indeed to them,
‘May Ur not be destroyed!’ I said indeed to them,
‘May an end not be put to its people!’ I said indeed to them.
But An never changed that word,
Enlil never soothed my heart with that
‘It is good; so be it!’…
Verily they gave instructions that my city be utterly destroyed,
Verily they gave instructions that Ur be utterly destroyed,
Verily they decreed its destiny that its people be killed.19
The author of this poem ascribed the destruction of the city of Ur (and presumably the
empire that it presided over) to the gods; An and Enlil in particular. Although the exact
reason for the destruction of Ur is unspecified, the text hints that “sins” may have been
the cause of the gods’ anger. A broken line near the end of the lamentation reads, “May
the hearts of its people that committed evil, be purified before you!”20
Another example dates from the mid-first millennium BCE. Unlike the previous
example, this text details an ongoing national disaster rather than the memory of one. An
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Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 1:535.

19

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 1:536.

20

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 1:538.
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epidemic raged through the Hittite kingdom of Mursili II.21 The plague had already killed
the nation’s previous two kings, Mursili’s father, Suppiluliuma I, and his brother
Arnuwanda II. Mursili viewed the plague as a punishment sent by the gods for a wrong
committed by his father. Mursili wrote a series of prayers, appealing to the gods for
relief. One extant prayer records Mursili’s attempt to propitiate the gods.
Now because Hatti has been very much beaten down by the plague, and
Hatti continues to experience many deaths, the affair of Tudhaliya has
begun to trouble the land. It was ascertained for me (through an oracle) by
[a god], and I made (further) oracular inquiries [about it]. They will
perform before you, [the gods], my lords, the ritual of (transgressing of)
the oath which was ascertained for you, [the gods], my lords, and for your
temples in regard to the plague. They will purify [… before you]. And I
will make restitution to you, the gods, my lords, with reparation and
propitiatory gift on behalf of the land.22
Mursili informed the gods that he was about to offer gifts to them in order to regain their
favor.
The Hebrew Bible often attributed natural disasters to the hand of Yahweh.
Biblical authors often associated the earthquake with Yahweh. For example, Exodus
19:18 connected the quaking of Mount Sinai with the presence of Yahweh. The Psalmist
illustrated the majesty of Yahweh by depicting the earth as trembling and melting before
him.23 The Song of Deborah in Judges 5 used the imagery of an earthquake to symbolize
Yahweh’s intervention in battle.24
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Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 1:156. According to Kuhrt, Mursili II was sole monarch from
about 1321-1295 BCE. Kuhrt, Ancient Near East, 1:254.
22

Hallo and Younger, Context of Scripture, 1:157.
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“His lightnings light up the world; the earth sees and trembles. The mountains melt like wax before the
LORD, before the Lord of all the earth. (Ps 97:4-5)”
24

“LORD, when you went out from Seir, when you marched from the region of Edom, the earth trembled,
and the heavens poured, the clouds indeed poured water. The mountains quaked before the LORD, the One
of Sinai, before the LORD, the God of Israel. (Judg 5:4-5)”
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The book of Amos also remembered past natural disasters and attributed their
occurrence to Yahweh. In Amos 4:6-10 Amos reports,
I gave you cleanness of teeth in all your cities, and lack of bread in all
your places, yet you did not return to me, says the LORD. And I also
withheld the rain from you when there were still three months to the
harvest; I would send rain on one city, and send no rain on another city;
one field would be rained upon, and the field on which it did not rain
withered; so two or three towns wandered to one town to drink water, and
were not satisfied; yet you did not return to me, says the LORD. I struck
you with blight and mildew; I laid waste your gardens and your vineyards;
the locust devoured your fig trees and your olive trees; yet you did not
return to me, says the LORD. I sent among you a pestilence after the
manner of Egypt; I killed your young men with the sword; I carried away
your horses; and I made the stench of your camp go up into your nostrils;
yet you did not return to me, says the LORD.
In Amos’ view, recent occurrences of drought, blight, locusts, pestilence and war—
presumably resulting in famine—served as Yahweh’s unsuccessful attempts to gain
Israel’s attention. Finally, in exasperation, Yahweh responded, “Therefore thus I will do
to you, O Israel; because I will do this to you, prepare to meet your God, O Israel! (Amos
4:12)” Israel’s king and her leaders, unlike the Hittite Mursili, ignored the divine portents
and apparently took no steps to regain Yahweh’s favor. Or perhaps they attempted to
appease Yahweh through sacrifices. We have already seen Amos’ reaction to Israel’s
brand of worship, however. Whether or not Amos knew of Mursili and his attempts to
appease the gods, it is certain that he was aware that other nations, when faced with
national disaster, often turned to their gods. Israel, in its recalcitrance, did not measure up
even to the standards of the surrounding nations.
Many of the disasters mentioned in the Hebrew Bible are prophetic rather than
historical. For example, a close contemporary of Amos wrote, “Therefore I will make the
heavens tremble, and the earth will be shaken out of its place, at the wrath of the LORD
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of hosts in the day of his fierce anger. (Isa 13:13)”25 The author of 1 Kings told of the
prophet Elijah’s prediction of a severe drought. The text reads, “Now Elijah the Tishbite,
of Tishbe in Gilead, said to Ahab, ‘As the LORD the God of Israel lives, before whom I
stand, there shall be neither dew nor rain these years, except by my word.’ (1 Ki 17:1)”
The sixth century prophet Jeremiah also predicted national disaster against Israel. He
wrote, “Although they fast, I do not hear their cry, and although they offer burnt offering
and grain offering, I do not accept them; but by the sword, by famine, and by pestilence I
consume them. (Jer 14:12)”
Amos thus used a familiar concept when he used his oracles to predict natural
disasters. Although his language is often metaphorical, Amos seems to allude to a
Yahweh-sent earthquake in three separate oracles. Amos 2:13 reads, “So, I will press you
down in your place, just as a cart presses down when it is full of sheaves.” This is
understood by several commentators as referring to an earthquake. They assume that the
furrowed ground served as a metaphor for the fissures sometimes left by earthquakes.26
Paul uses this text to directly connect the prosperity of the wealthy with an earthquake.
He writes, “The imagery is actually paradoxical. The reason the cart comes to a halt is

25

Of the eighth century prophets, Isaiah and Micah joined Amos with predicting some form of natural or
cosmic phenomenon. Isaiah predicted drought. He wrote, “And now I will tell you what I will do to my
vineyard. I will remove its hedge, and it shall be devoured; I will break down its wall, and it shall be
trampled down. I will make it a waste; it shall not be pruned or hoed, and it shall be overgrown with briers
and thorns; I will also command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it. (Isa 5:5-6)” He also foretold an
earthquake (in the above text) and also in Isaiah 5:25. That text reads, “Therefore the anger of the LORD
was kindled against his people, and he stretched out his hand against them and struck them; the mountains
quaked, and their corpses were like refuse in the streets. For all this his anger has not turned away, and his
hand is stretched out still.” Micah envisioned the mountains melting in the presence of Yahweh. “For lo,
the LORD is coming out of his place, and will come down and tread upon the high places of the earth. Then
the mountains will melt under him and the valleys will burst open, like wax near the fire, like waters poured
down a steep place. (Mic 1:3-4)”
26

See, for example, Wolff, Amos, 171. and Jeremias, Amos 43.
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that it is overloaded, which is precisely a reflection of the abundance and prosperity of
the accused.”27
Amos 9:1 perhaps alludes to an earthquake as well. In his fifth vision, we are told
that Amos “saw the LORD standing beside the altar, and he said: Strike the capitals until
the thresholds shake, and shatter them on the heads of all the people…” Wolff notes that
the word translated “shake” (Hebrew root רעׁש, r´š) is used exclusively in the Hebrew
Bible to refer to earthquakes or cosmic disturbances.28 Thus this may be an enigmatic
reference to a coming earthquake.
A third possible reference to an earthquake occurs in Amos 8:8. There the prophet
asked, “Shall not the land tremble on this account, and everyone mourn who lives in it,
and all of it rise like the Nile, and be tossed about and sink again, like the Nile of Egypt?”
Paul believes that Amos was using the annual inundation of the Nile as a simile for an
earthquake.29
Thus, according to Amos, Israel’s destruction would not be the result of military
defeat alone. Yahweh would add natural disaster to Israel’s troubles. Obviously only
Yahweh could wield the weapon of an earthquake. Earthquakes were terrifying
phenomena, occurring without warning and allowing for no defense. They symbolized a
threat to the very order of the world. As Wolff writes, “the presupposition here, as in Hos
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Paul, Amos, 95.
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Wolff, Amos, 339. Other commentators treat the text less literally. For example, Mays writes that some
commentators believe that Yahweh ordered Amos to strike the capitals, thus causing the subsequent
collapse of the temple. Mays believes the command to strike is simply rhetorical. Mays, Amos, 153-4. The
word Amos uses in 9:1 is a different Hebrew word than that used in 8:8.
29

Paul, Amos, 260-1. Wolff has a similar understanding. Wolff, Amos, 329.

170

4:1-3, is that anyone in Israel who tampers with the just orders of life draws the earth and
its inhabitants into perdition at the same time.”30
Amos’ use of the earthquake as a sign of Yahweh’s displeasure must have taken
on a particularly powerful meaning to Amos’ audience. The book’s superscription dates
the book to the reigns of “King Uzziah of Judah and in the days of King Jeroboam son of
Joash of Israel, two years before the earthquake. (Am 1:1)”31 Thus not long after Amos’
prediction, a powerful quake evidently impacted much of Israel. The earthquake was
severe enough that it was remembered by the prophet Zechariah over two centuries
later.32 No record survives of the impact of the earthquake on Amos’ audience.
Amos did not confine his predictions of disaster to earthquakes alone. For
example, in Amos 8:9 adds the threat of a disaster of cosmic proportions. Amos wrote,
“On that day, says the Lord GOD, I will make the sun go down at noon, and darken the
earth in broad daylight.” Shalom Paul observes that Amos is here referring to a solar
eclipse.33 A partial solar eclipse is known to have occurred in 763 BCE, probably
coinciding with the ministry of Amos. A total solar eclipse had also occurred some
twenty-five years earlier on Feb 9, 784.34
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Wolff, Amos, 329.
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Paul says that this earthquake is usually associated with evidence of an earthquake found in the
archaeological record as Hazor and normally dated about 760 BCE. Paul, Amos, 35.
32

It was apparently this earthquake that Zechariah mentions in Zech 14:5. “And you shall flee by the valley
of the Lord’s mountain, for the valley between the mountains shall reach to Azal; and you shall flee as you
fled from the earthquake in the days of King Uzziah of Judah. Then the LORD my God will come, and all
the holy ones with him.” While the dating of the last chapters of Zechariah remains problematic, a date no
earlier than the Persian or Hellenistic period seems probable. Thus the earthquake that is mentioned in
Amos was remembered and regarded as a particularly noteworthy event at least 250 years after the fact.
33

Paul, Amos, 262.

34

Wolff, Amos, 329. Wolff, however, is less sure that Amos intends to be taken literally in this text. He
understands Amos to be speaking metaphorically. Wolff writes, “In this context, however, the only thing to
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The solar eclipse was universally regarded in the ancient Near East as a portent of
impending disaster.35 In the context of the book of Amos, the threatened cosmic
disturbance comes in relation to the abuse of the poor by the prosperous. Amos implies
that the exploitation of the oppressed contradicts the cosmic order to such an extent that
the normal workings of the world begin to malfunction. As Jeremias writes, “When the
community of the people of God collapses, the world order, including nature and all
human beings, are drawn into the catastrophe.”36
The Target of Yahweh’s Punishment
We have already established that Amos aimed most of his indictments specifically
at Israel’s wealthy. Some of the promised disasters also specifically target this group. For
example, the context of Amos 2:13-16 suggests that the target of this punishment will be
the wealthy. The oracle predicts the destruction of Israel’s army. The army protected the
nation (and thus the source of Israel’s wealth) from outside forces. It was also a tool of
the wealthy to enforce their will on the people of Israel. Wolff notes that members of the
be said is that, on the day of the announced end of Israel, not only the female singers of the court and all
inhabitants of the earth, but even the heavens will join in the mourning.”
35

Paul writes, “Eclipses were considered portents of disaster throughout the entire ancient world because
they were seen as reflexes of the anger of the gods. Compare in Mesopotamia: ‘An eclipse of the moon
took place on the fourteenth, and this occurrence of an eclipse is ill-portending.’” Paul, Amos, 262. M.
Nissinen relates a Babylonian text in which an official of Esarhaddon recommends that a substitute king be
appointed for the duration of an upcoming eclipse. The text reads, “If it suits the king, my lord, a common
man should, as before, be appointed to the office of the šatammu … When [an eclipse] afflicting Babylonia
takes place, [he] may serve as a substitute of the king, my lord.” Martti Nissinen, References to Prophecy in
Neo-Assyrian Sources, State Archives of Assyria Studies (Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Corpus Project,
University of Helsinki, 1998), 71. An eclipse was considered such a bad omen that, in this text, the author
has suggested that a substitute king be appointed in the place of the ruling monarch to assure that any bad
fortune would fall on the substitute rather than the actual king. A further text relates the death and burial of
the king, presumably not from natural causes. Nissinen, References to prophecy, 68-9.
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Jeremias, Amos 149. Joel 2:10-1 also unites the specter of an earthquake with the phenomenon of an
eclipse. Joel specifically associates the portents with the Hebrew concept of the ‘Day of the Lord.’ He
wrote, “The earth quakes before them, the heavens tremble. The sun and the moon are darkened, and the
stars withdraw their shining. The LORD utters his voice at the head of his army; how vast is his host!
Numberless are those who obey his command. Truly the day of the LORD is great; terrible indeed—who
can endure it?”
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military elite were probably drawn from the upper class in Israel.37 Thus Amos predicts
that the wealthy would specifically suffer the consequences of their own actions.38
However, it is also apparent that a serious military defeat would impact all of Israel. If the
military elite were members of the upper class, there is little doubt that the common foot
soldier belonged to the lower classes. It could even be surmised that enrollment in the
military was one of the few occupations left to those who had lost their land to the
depredations of the wealthy. So while the wealthy would suffer for the consequences of
their own actions, their victims would also suffer.
The oracle of Amos 3:9-11 was particularly addressed against the “strongholds of
Israel.” As we discussed in chapter four, the strongholds of Israel were inhabited by the
wealthy. In Amos 3:12-15, Amos mentioned the destruction of winter and summer
houses. Of course only the wealthy could afford such luxuries, and so this oracle was also
aimed at the upper class. The punishments mentioned in Amos 4:2-3 were directed
against the “cows of Bashan,” a metaphorical expression for the wives of Israel’s leaders.
Amos 5:11 continues in the same vein. There Amos wrote, “Therefore because you
trample on the poor and take from them levies of grain, you have built houses of hewn
stone, but you shall not live in them; you have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall
not drink their wine.” Paul describes this as a “futility curse.” He writes,
The prophet proceeds to pronounce a retaliatory punishment in the form of
a ‘futility curse,’ that is, a curse that describes the reversal of one’s
37

“Although in his threats against foreign nations Amos always made particular reference to the national
rulers, in the oracle against Israel he does not do so. On the other hand we would expect to find here a
comparable reference to the fate of the rich, and it seems likely indeed that they comprise the military elite
among those to be so disastrously routed.” Wolff, Amos, 172.
38

As well as the association of the military elite with the social elite, it was noted above that Paul regarded
the symbolism of a heavily loaded cart as suggesting that this oracle was specifically targeted at the elite in
Israel.

173

expectations. Because the upper class had enlarged its property and wealth
at the expense of the poor, its own possessions will be taken from it. The
people of the upper class will not enjoy the fruits of their own labor.39
It was only fitting that the guilty should suffer for their crimes and the above texts
suggest that Amos envisioned that such would be the case. However, there are many
other oracles in Amos which appear to suggest that the wealthy would not suffer alone.
For example, Amos 3:1-2 reads, “Hear this word that the LORD has spoken against you,
O people of Israel, against the whole family that I brought up out of the land of Egypt:
You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all
your iniquities.” Amos here apparently addresses the entire nation. Likewise Amos 5:1-3
seems to refer to a broader population than just the upper class. There Amos wrote,
Hear this word that I take up over you in lamentation, O house of Israel:
Fallen, no more to rise, is maiden Israel; forsaken on her land, with no one
to raise her up. For thus says the Lord GOD: The city that marched out a
thousand shall have a hundred left, and that which marched out a hundred
shall have ten left.
It is unlikely that the small villages Amos alludes to were populated by the wealthy.
Rather, they were probably inhabited by the victims of the wealthy and thus the poor
would have found themselves doubly victimized.40
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Paul, Amos, 173. Examples of the futility curse can be found in each of the other eighth century prophets.
See, for example, Isa 5:8-10, 9:20; Hos 3:10a; and Mic 6:15.
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Several scholars have suggested that Amos referred to military forces in verse three. For example, Mays
writes, “The military forces of Israel were organized into units of ‘thousands’ and ‘hundreds.’ Translated
into modern terms, Amos is saying that a battalion would be left a company, and a company reduced to a
platoon.” Mays, Amos, 86. While it may be tempting to again call attention to the close association of the
military with the wealthy, Mays rightly identifies the units mentioned as conscripts. Whether or not Amos
views the commoner as culpable of sins that rise to the level of those of the wealthy, he certainly
recognizes that the entire nation will suffer as a result of Yahweh’s imminent punishment. Andersen and
Freedman also understand verse 3 as a reference to military units. They, however, assume that this is
describing two military encounters of the same unit. The first time the unit goes to battle it loses ninety
percent of its troops. A subsequent engagement reduces the one hundred that were left to a mere ten
survivors. Thus Andersen and Freedman claim that this verse refers to a ninety-nine percent casualty rate.
Andersen and Freedman, Amos, 477.
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Amos, in Amos 3:14-15, rather obliquely refers to the extent of Israel’s
destruction. He apparently describes the death of the entire nation. Amos wrote, “Thus
says the LORD: As the shepherd rescues from the mouth of the lion two legs, or a piece
of an ear, so shall the people of Israel who live in Samaria be rescued, with the corner of
a couch and part of a bed. (Am 3:12)” Amos is here referring to a practice well known to
shepherds of the Israel, a profession of which Amos was a member. If a sheep under the
charge of a shepherd was killed by a wild animal, the shepherd was expected to bring
some of the animal’s remains to the owner. This exonerated the shepherd from stealing
the sheep under the guise of an animal attack. The “remains” in this text, then, do not
represent a “surviving” portion of the sheep. Rather, they are proof that the animal is
indeed dead. This appears to be Amos’ intent with this text in regards to Israel. He is not
necessarily predicting that a remnant will survive the coming onslaught. Rather, he is
warning that Israel’s destruction will be total and the few remaining alive will merely
serve as proof that the nation has indeed died. In Amos’ metaphor, Yahweh does not play
the part of the sheep owner; he is the lion that causes the slaughter.41
Summary
Amos’ prediction of Israel’s coming disaster creates some thorny ethical
questions for the modern reader. At the very least, it would seem to be poetic justice that
nations guilty of war crimes should themselves become victims of war. Amos, however,
predicts identical penalties against Israel. Yet Israel’s crimes, on the surface, seem to
simply be infractions of what we would call the “laws” of social justice. Amos, and by
41

“The ‘rescue’ of a small body part in this context naturally represents nothing more than proof that
nothing could have prevented this death. Read in connection with vv. 3-8, the metaphor simultaneously
forces the readers of this prophetic saying to realize that the God on whose automatic help they count is
himself now the ravaging lion bringing death.” Jeremias, Amos 59.
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extension, Yahweh, appear to be overzealous in their pronouncements of judgment
against Israel.
The natural disasters and military defeats predicted by Amos were, by their very
nature, indiscriminate in their choice of victims. One can only presume that the poor,
with fewer resources to begin with, would have been disproportionately impacted by
famine, pestilence, and other natural disasters. War not only decimated the population
and destroyed resources; it also damaged social institutions (including, for example, the
practice of religion). The poor would have suffered along with the wealthy in the
destruction of these social institutions.
Apparently Amos was untroubled by what seem to be difficult problems for the
modern reader. Amos’s presuppositions are foreign to us and the culture of his day seems
primitive in relation to ours. If one is to accept as normative the ethics of Amos, as many
modern readers of Amos attempt to do, the gap between Amos’ culture and our own must
be bridged. The final chapter will attempt to build that bridge.
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VI. AMOS AND MODERN ETHICS
Amos’ charges against the various foreign nations resonate with modern, Western
notions of justice. The practices of running farm implements over defenseless populations
or selling entire communities into slavery would be defended by virtually no one today. 1
These acts would qualify as war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.2
The actions of Israel’s wealthy would no doubt be considered unsavory and
unethical by a large segment of the modern population as well. Nevertheless, many of the
‘crimes’ of the Israelite elite would not be accounted as criminal by today’s standards.3
Their actions would not violate any modern laws. Some of their activities may well not
have violated any Hebrew statutes either. Israel’s wealthy were indicted, as much as
anything, for the general attitude they held towards the poor. While this attitude

1

This is not to say that war crimes are no longer perpetrated today. Recent history is filled with examples
of despicable actions directed against an enemy. But, as in antiquity, the fact that these actions are taken
does not imply that laws against them do not exist. These laws make the actions indefensible. As we have
discussed above, the laws in antiquity were often informal, taking their shape in customary laws rather than
in formal statutes.
2

Article 7, Paragraph 1 defines a crime against humanity as “any of the following acts when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack: …” Specifically included in the list are murder (item ‘a’), and ‘deportation or forcible transfer of
population’ (item‘d’). Article 8 defines war crimes and includes willful killing (item 2.a.i), torture and
inhumane treatment (item 2.a.ii), and unlawful deportation (item 2.a.vii). "Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court", http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (accessed December 3, 2011).
3

This is not true of all of Amos’ accusations. Some of the activities that Amos describes might violate
modern statutes. For example, if Amos described a case of rape in 2:7, then this is obviously a crime by
today’s standards. Amos 2:6 described the wealthy as “selling the righteous for silver.” Assuming this is
speaking of some form of debt slavery, this would be a crime by modern standards, although not by the
ancient Near Eastern standards. Amos 3:10 mentions the robbery and violence that characterized Samaria.
These actions would certainly have been illegal in Amos’ day just as they are today. Amos does not specify
the guilty party in his indictment, however. It might be that these crimes were committed by the poor in
retaliation to their treatment by the rich. Amos also indicts the wealthy for taking bribes in Am 5:12. The
context suggests this was a suborning of justice, which would today be considered illegal. (Note that the
modern punishment would be much more restrained than that predicted by Amos.)
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contravened the prevailing standards of the day, Amos does not indict Israel on the basis
of existing Israelite laws.
It is worth noting that, in some sense, that the actions and attitudes of Israel’s
upper class are being repeated today. As I write this in 2011, the protests of the “99
percent” have become front page news. The manifestos of these demonstrators closely
echo statements we might imagine the workers of Amos’ day made. For example, one
supporting website makes this statement,
We are the 99 percent. We are getting kicked out of our homes. We are
forced to choose between groceries and rent. We are denied quality
medical care. We are suffering from environmental pollution. We are
working long hours for little pay and no rights, if we're working at all. We
are getting nothing while the other 1 percent is getting everything. We are
the 99 percent.4
The web site of the Occupy Wall Street movement, the progenitor of many related
movements in the United States, contains the following mission statement:
Occupy Wall Street is leaderless resistance movement with people of
many colors, genders and political persuasions. The one thing we all have
in common is that We Are The 99% that will no longer tolerate the greed
and corruption of the 1%. We are using the revolutionary Arab Spring
tactic to achieve our ends and encourage the use of nonviolence to
maximize the safety of all participants.
This movement empowers real people to create real change from the
bottom up. We want to see a general assembly in every backyard, on every
street corner because we don't need Wall Street and we don't need
politicians to build a better society.5
These movements decry the growing disparity between the wealthiest and the poorest in
the United States. Their notion that the government is nothing more than a tool of the
wealthy to oppress the poor might have been lifted from the book of Amos as well.

4

"We are the 99 percent", http://wearethe99percent.tumblr.com/ (accessed November 26, 2011).
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"Occupy Wall Street", http://occupywallst.org/ (accessed November 26, 2011).
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The demonstrations in the US have remained largely non-violent. The same
cannot be said for the Arab Spring protests, however. The Arab Spring movement, which
served as inspiration for the US protests, also originated in 2011. This movement has
been marked by violence. Revolution has erupted in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Syria is
embroiled in conflict. Many other Arab countries have experienced various degrees of
unrest.6 The Arab Spring owes its origin to conditions that closely mimic those found in
the Israel of Amos’ day. Alexander Orlov cites the gap between the rich and the poor as
an important factor in Arab unrest. Socioeconomic issues affecting the poor include high
unemployment, inadequate healthcare (and its attendant rise in mortality rates), falling
educational standards, and rising prices.7 On the other hand, the Arab rich are gaining
ground at the expense of the poor. Orlov writes, “…the relatively well-off part of society,
the caste of modern patricians, enjoys absolutely unlimited benefits without essentially
giving anything back to the remaining part of the population and in no way justifying the
astronomical standards of its existence.”8
The non-violent nature of the American protestors has been notable.9 Despite our
history of participation in wars, including our current involvement in two military

6

The Arab Spring movement was literally ignited by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouzid of Tunisia.
Once again it is easy to imagine that the conditions that moved Bouzid to protest his straits in such a final,
public fashion are mere echoes of the conditions experienced by the poor of Amos’ Israel. Bouzid was a
poor fruit vendor responsible for the care of an extended family. Unable to afford either a license to sell his
fruit or to pay the bribes of the police, he was harassed and insulted by a policewoman. He made a futile
attempt to appeal to provincial authorities. When they refused to hear him, he set himself on fire. Rania
Abouzeid, "Postcard: Sidi Bouzid," Time 177, no. 5 (2011). Laila Lalami, "Winter of Discontent," Nation
292, no. 8 (2011).
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Alexander Orlov, "First Revolutions of the 21st Century," International Affairs: A Russian Journal of
World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations 57, no. 4 (2011): 43-4.
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Orlov, "First Revolutions," 44.
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The protestors have themselves, however, been the victims of violent reactions. See, for example,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/occupy-protesters-beaten-pepper-sprayed/story?id=14990310. Another marked
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conflicts, Americans (at least in their rhetoric) often prefer the non-violent solution. As
such, we quail at the judgments that Amos pronounced against Israel and the nations.10
The punishments seem harsh and, in the case of Israel, perhaps even seem
disproportionate to the crime. How are we to understand the message of Amos in the light
of modern culture? In this chapter, I will attempt to provide one possible response to the
ethical problems of the book of Amos.
Retributive Justice
Chapter two presented several competing modern theories of justice. In the time
of Amos, only the retributive form of justice seems to have been widely understood and
used. The concept of retributive justice has many modern proponents as well. Despite its
widespread use in antiquity and today, however, a vocal segment of the modern
population finds the notion of retributive justice repugnant. To begin our discussion of
this form of justice a more detailed definition is in order.
The basic premise of retributive punishment states that society has the right to
harm an offender who has injured another. The nature of the harm brought about by
society often includes methods not normally permitted. It is not, for example, normally
permissible for members of modern Western societies to hold people against their will.
Yet imprisonment is a common punishment in those same societies. Some modern
societies permit the execution of criminals for certain egregious actions despite the fact
that, in most other situations, the causing of death would be a punishable offense. The

difference between the US and Arab protests is the openness with which these miscues by authorities are
discussed in the national media.
10

The modern Near East perhaps has standards that more closely align with their forbears. In Libya, at any
rate, the former leader, members of his family and some high ranking officials have been murdered in the
recent overthrow of the government.
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moral philosopher Peter French defends the concept of retributive punishment when he
writes, “I have already maintained that the offender’s actions in violation of moral
principles or prohibitions, in effect, bestow on everyone else the moral liberty to do
things to the transgressor that would otherwise be forbidden by morality.”11
It is this basic premise of retributive punishment that has created a philosophical
divide among modern scholars and non-scholars alike. David Boonin agrees that
retributive punishment allows society to commit normally impermissible actions. He
writes, “Legal punishment involves treating those who break the law in ways that it
would be wrong to treat those who do not.”12 Boonin, however, finds the concept
unacceptable. He asks, “How can the fact that a person has broken a just and reasonable
law render it morally permissible for the state to treat him in ways that would otherwise
be impermissible?”13 French asks in turn, “How bad can vengeance and retributive
punishment be when performing them does not sully the hands of God, who remains
morally pure?”14
These brief statements from opposite perspectives help frame the scope of the
arguments. There is little common ground between the two positions, and it would be
presumptuous of me to think that I could resolve an impasse that has existed for many
years. My goal will be more modest. I hope to show that Amos’ pronouncements of
punishment on both the nations and Israel fit the spirit and even the letter of retributive
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French is defending a specific subset of retribution which will be discussed in more detail below. French,
Virtues of Vengeance, 169.
12

Boonin, Problem of Punishment, 1.
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Boonin, Problem of Punishment, 1.
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French, Virtues of Vengeance, 108. Of course some would argue that such violence does sully the hands
of God.
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punishment as espoused by modern philosophers. I recognize at the outset that those who
reject any form of retributive punishment will be unconvinced by the arguments
presented.15 The best I can hope to achieve is to demonstrate that the book of Amos can
be a valid participant in modern discussions of punishment and justice.
A Definition of Retributive Punishment. Numerous scholars have attempted to
adequately define and describe retributive justice. There seem to be as many definitions
as there are scholars. These scholars recognize that not all forms of punishment are just.
They thus seek to properly define the conditions under which punishment can be said to
be fair. The many available definitions usually include similar elements. I will highlight
four components usually considered to be necessary ingredients of just punishment.
The first element seeks to define who may punish. There is a general consensus
among modern theorists that the punisher must have the proper moral authority to
administer punishment. This element, for example, can be found in H. L. A. Hart’s
classic definition of retributive justice. He states that punishment “… must be imposed
and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence
is committed.”16 In other words, the punisher must have jurisdiction over the offender.
For the purposes of this discussion, we will label this element the “authority condition.”17

15

A recent poll found that 61% of Americans approve of the use of the death penalty (down three points
from last year and 25% from 17 years ago) Frank Newport, "In U.S., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39Year Low," (2011). http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/Support-Death-Penalty-Falls-Year-Low.aspx
(accessed February 2, 2012). It seems reasonable to assume that support for the death penalty could act as a
decent proxy for the percentage of Americans who would also support at least some form of retributive
justice. Presumably, then, a significant portion of the American population would agree with Amos, at least
in theory, that abhorrent crimes demand dire consequences. This is not to suggest that they would agree
with the particulars of Amos’ announced punishments.
16

Hart’s definition will be referenced again below. His definition of punishment includes the following five
components: “(1) it must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant; (2) it must be
for an offense against legal rules; (3) it must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence; (4) it
must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender; and (5) it must be imposed
and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed.” H.
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A further condition we will label the “prior knowledge” condition. This condition
relates to the offense committed. According to this condition, an act must have been
considered criminal prior to the offender’s actions. Hart states simply, “[the punishment]
must be for an offence against legal rules.”18 John Rawls defines punishment in a way
that incorporates this and related conditions. He states that,
… a person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally deprived of
some of the normal rights of a citizen on the ground that he has violated a
rule of law, that violation having been established by trial according to the
due process of law, provided that the deprivation is carried out by the
recognized legal authorities of the state, that the rule of law clearly
specifies both the offense and the attached penalty, that the courts construe
statutes strictly, and that the statute was on the books prior to the time of
the offense.19
Rawls notes that the prior knowledge condition specifies that not only must the offense
have been predefined; the attached penalty must have been set out as well. An important
corollary of the prior knowledge condition states that there must be a reasonable
expectation that an offender would have or should have known that their actions were
criminal. Thus a criminal action includes intent (the concept of mens rea in modern
criminal law).
A third condition placed by modern theorists on just punishment requires that an
offender must deserve his/her punishment.20 This element we will label the “desert
L. A. Hart, "The Presidential Address: Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 60, no. (1959): 4.
17

I am borrowing this label from Peter French. French, Virtues of Vengeance, 112.
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Hart, "Presidential Address," 4.
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John Rawls, "Rule Utilitarianism," in Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, ed. Gertrude Ezorsky
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972), 89. Notice that Rawls’ definition also contains a
moral authority clause. Specially, he writes that punishment is just, “provided that the deprivation is carried
out by the recognized legal authorities of the state.”
20

Hart’s definition says that the punishment, “… must be of an actual or supposed offender for his
offence.”
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condition.”21 A. M. Quinton calls this the first principle of retribution.22 The desert
condition is ultimately about the target of the retribution. The offender must be the one
punished and not someone else. Modern justice systems insist that an individual may not
be punished for another’s crime.23 Only the offender’s moral worth has been reduced.24
French writes,
People who do evil deeds have less moral merit than those who do not. I
think we all can agree on that. But if worth is proportional to merit, then
people who do evil have less moral worth than nonevildoers, and morality
would permit differential treatment: they do not have to be treated with the
same respect as good people.25
The desert condition explains why offenders may be treated in ways not normally
permitted by society. In essence, the theory of retributive punishment argues that the
actions of the offender have created an imbalance in society. Punishment is necessary to
restore that balance.
A final element of just retribution requires that the punishment fit the crime.26
French enumerates two constraints related to retributivism. He argues both that the
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Again I borrow the label from Peter French. French, Virtues of Vengeance, 173-206.
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“At any rate the first principle of retributivism is that it is necessary that a man be guilty if he is to be
punished.” A. M. Quinton, "On Punishment," in Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, ed. Gertrude
Ezorsky (Albany,: State University of New York Press, 1972), 7.
23

Certain societies in the past have allowed for the punishment of family members in place of the offender.
Hart gives the Roman example of Lex Quisquis. Hart, "Presidential Address," 11. The Hebrew Bible
contains the concept that an offender must suffer for their own crimes. Ezekiel 18:20 directly addresses the
issue. The text reads, “The person who sins shall die. A child shall not suffer for the iniquity of a parent,
nor a parent suffer for the iniquity of a child; the righteousness of the righteous shall be his own, and the
wickedness of the wicked shall be his own.” Numbers 14:33, however, says, “And your children shall be
shepherds in the wilderness for forty years, and shall suffer for your faithlessness, until the last of your
dead bodies lies in the wilderness.” An examination of the differences reflected in these texts is beyond the
scope of this monograph.
24

French, Virtues of Vengeance, 193.
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French, Virtues of Vengeance, 192.

26

Hart’s definition does not include the proportionality condition. Igor Primoratz includes the
proportionality condition in his definition of punishment. This definition includes: “(1) the moral right to
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severity of the punishment cannot exceed that of the crime but also that “punishment
must not be less than of a degree commensurate with the nature of the crime and the
culpability of the criminal.”27 Thus punishment must precisely fit the crime. Scholars are
virtually united in their recognition that this is one of the most difficult conditions to
meet.28 Igor Primoratz, for example, writes, “…it has frequently been remarked that the
lex talionis cannot always be applied, since it is often in the nature of the case that we
cannot requite the offense in the same way and in the same measure.”29 This element will
be labeled the “fit” or “proportionality condition.”30 The fit condition is properly the
domain of the Hebrew Bible concept of lex talionis.
To summarize, then, we have noted that just retributive punishment must meet
four necessary conditions. The punishment must be administered by one having the moral
authority to punish the offender. The offense must have been previously considered a
crime and the offender should have known that his/her actions would be considered
criminal. As a consequence of the offending action, the offender has lost moral worth and

punish is based solely on the offense committed; (2) the moral duty to punish is also grounded exclusively
on the offense committed; (3) punishment ought to be proportionate to the offense (the lex talionis); (4)
punishment is the ‘annulment’ of the offense; (5) punishment is a right of the offender.” Primoratz,
Justifying Legal Punishment, 12.
27

French, Virtues of Vengeance, 222.

28

French states that vengeance is often discouraged in practice, in part, because fit is so hard to determine.
Difficulty in determining fit does not, however, disqualify revenge as a viable means of punishment from a
moral standpoint. French, Virtues of Vengeance, 227. Charles K. B. Barton makes the statement that
determining fair punishment is not a particular problem of retributive punishment. Consequentialist theories
of punishment must also attempt to fairly fit the punishment to the crime. Charles K. B. Barton, Getting
Even: Revenge as a Form of Justice (Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 1999), 49.
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Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 80. Primoratz explains later that, “Properly understood, the lex
talionis requires that punishment should affect the offender as much as his offense has affected the victim.
This can be attained even in cases in which the principle ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’ cannot be
applied literally. This explains the use of fines and prison terms, which in respect of severity can be made
proportionate to all kinds of offenses.” Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 80-1.
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French discusses this element in French, Virtues of Vengeance, 207-30.
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thus deserves punishment. Finally, the punishment must fit the crime. Although this is an
admittedly abbreviated survey of a complicated subject, we have nevertheless established
sufficient grounds to allow a comparison of modern concepts of retribution with the
punishments announced by Amos. This comparison will take place in two domains; that
of Amos’ pronouncements against the nations, and that of his proclamations against
Israel.
The Punishment of the Nations. If we assume that that Amos is a reliable
witness, the actions of the nations would obviously be considered criminal by today’s
standards. It does not, however, necessarily follow that similar punishments would be
accepted by today’s society.31 The related issues can best be discussed by utilizing the
four components of retributive punishment discussed above.32
Most modern definitions of punishment assert that moral authority lies with the
state or some other legally recognized body. However there were no human supranational
legal bodies in the time of Amos. As we have seen, the gods were thought to constitute

31

In reality, the options open to modern society are still very limited. In recent memory, a favorite means of
discouraging rogue nations from violating modern rules has involved the invocation of various forms of
sanctions. Many have argued that these sanctions tend to hurt the average citizen more than the leaders
presumably guilty for perpetrating the crimes. Of course the recent actions in Iraq and Afghanistan show
that war is just as much of tool of law in modernity as it was in antiquity.
32

As I stated above, there are two schools of thought that do not speak in terms of deserved punishment.
One school sees punishment as a means to an end while the other abhors the concept of punishment
altogether. Members of the consequentialist school would presumably disagree with the idea that the
nations or Israel deserved punishment. They might agree that punishment was necessary to further the
common good. They could also conceivably disagree with the modes of punishment that Amos announces.
Those of the restorative justice school would argue that Yahweh’s use of punishment was simply morally
wrong. It is difficult if not impossible to bridge the gap between these schools of thought and the retributive
justice perspective. What follows, then, is simply an attempt to show how, from one point of view, Amos’
announced punishments might be justified in modern terms. To quote Robert Nozick on a nearly identical
topic, “I am trying to explain how it is possible that retributive punishment sometimes is appropriate or
demanded. Those who think it is never suitable will think there is no such fact to be explained. …Yet
perhaps even these deniers can see that the material that follows as providing … understanding if not
explanation, providing understanding of appropriate retributive punishment by placing it in an illumination
network of possibilities.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 366.
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that legal body in the ancient Near East. Presumably, then, the gods would have had the
moral authority to punish the nations for their breaches of international law. The problem
resides in ascertaining which deity/deities had jurisdiction over the nations. The foreign
nations condemned in Amos’ oracles did not worship Yahweh. How, then, did Yahweh
have the moral authority to punish these nations?
One possible answer might lie in a theoretical preexistent Davidic empire. As we
have already discussed, several modern scholars posit that such an empire existed in
Amos’ day. This empire would have been held together by various treaties that subsumed
all of the nations mentioned in the oracles. If these scholars are correct then the nations
would have, by agreeing to the terms of the presumed treaty, placed themselves under the
authority of Yahweh. Thus Yahweh’s moral authority would be obvious and the problem
essentially disappears. Unfortunately, the concept that some form of Davidic Empire lies
behind the book of Amos has remained a minority view. No treaties between the nations
have been found nor, with the exception of Tyre, are any such treaties even implicitly
mentioned by the biblical texts.33 I do not find the arguments for this position compelling.
Any notion of a Davidic Empire underlying the book of Amos remains essentially a
scholarly construct.
Modern readers might perhaps point to the fact that, at least in the case of two of
the nations, Amos claimed a previous association of the nations with Yahweh. Amos 9:7
says that Yahweh not only brought Israel up from Egypt, but also that he brought the
33

Solomon and the king of Tyre were apparently on good terms. They were trading partners and Solomon
took a wife from among the Sidonians (presumably a daughter of the king of Tyre, see 1 Ki 1:1). Later, the
Northern Kingdom’s Ahab married the daughter of Ethbaal, “king of the Sidonians” (1 Ki 16:31), also
implying a treaty arrangement. Foreign marriages were a part of ancient diplomacy and were often part of
the treating making process. (The wives were essentially hostages, guaranteeing the good behavior of the
treaty partner.) However, Ahab predates Amos’ time by well over a century. There is currently no textual
or archaeological support for an operational Davidic dynasty in Amos’ day.
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Philistines from Caphtor and the Arameans from Kir. Thus Amos establishes an historical
link between Yahweh and these two nations. However, it does not follow that Yahweh’s
previous actions on behalf of the two nations would have been recognized within those
nations. Nor does it follow that Yahweh’s assistance necessarily gave him moral
authority over the nations. Even if it did, it is too large a leap to assume that Yahweh’s
prior association with two nations necessarily gave him authority over all of them. This
explanation, like the previous one, is ultimately unsatisfactory.
It must be noted that the question of moral authority was probably a non-issue in
Amos’ day. War, pestilence, and famine were considered instruments of the gods. The
outcome of war, for example, was thought to be determined in advance by the gods.
Although the outcome was determined in advance, humans could not know the decision
of the gods until the smoke had cleared. The war must be fought. It was supposed that,
when two opposing kingdoms went to war, their gods went to war as well. The winning
nation was victorious because their god was stronger. Or it might be that the vanquished
nation was being punished by their god for some transgression. Either way, from the
perspective of ancient Near Eastern culture, the victory of one nation over another
signaled that the god of the winning nation had the moral authority to punish the losing
nation. A modern explanation of the events would come to the opposite conclusion. From
a modern perspective, we would suggest that the title of most powerful god, and thus the
moral authority of that god, devolved on a deity because their nation won the war. We
would perceive that moral authority stemmed from military might. The ancients would
say that military might demonstrated a god’s moral authority. To a large degree, the
question of moral authority is predicated upon the presuppositions of the observer.
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Amos is a special case in that he did not predict Israel’s victory. Rather he
predicted the demise of the nation as well as the punishment of the foreign nations. The
claim of Amos (and other Hebrew prophets) is perhaps unique in that he assumed that
Israel’s defeat demonstrated Yahweh’s sovereignty, and hence moral authority, over the
nations.34 His point, of course, is that Yahweh will allow such devastation because of
Israel’s sin.
This discussion highlights the point that, although we might use modern
principles to examine the book of Amos, nevertheless that standards by which the book
is judged must remain the standards of the culture from which the book derived. If we
utilize Amos’ standards, then we can consider the moral authority condition met. As we
will see in the next section, however, I believe there is a subset of retributive punishment
that better resolves the moral authority problem.
Another problematic question pertaining to Amos’ judgments concerns the prior
knowledge condition. As we have discussed, this condition states that actions must have
been previously defined as criminal before violators can be held liable. There being no
international criminal court in the time of Amos, no formal law against the actions of the
nations would have existed. As I have already argued, however, custom dictated that noncombatants be accorded a certain amount of respect in the ancient Near East.35 The fact
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Yahweh could only be presumed to be in control on the basis that he revealed to Amos the fate of Israel
and the nations prior to the actual events. It was fulfilled prophecy, in the mind of the prophets and their
disciples, which demonstrated the power of Yahweh despite the defeat of Israel (and subsequently Judah).
This view, of course, is still maintained by some groups in Judaism and Christianity. These groups would
reject the notion, posited by some modern scholars, that much of the prophecy in the Hebrew Bible is, in
reality, ex eventu prophecy.
35

It should be noted that customary law, especially at the international level, often carries as much weight
as statutory law, even in modern jurisprudence.
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that history demonstrates that this restraint was not always practiced does not grant that
no such custom existed.
It can be further argued that a prior, formal statement of law is not a necessary
condition of just punishment. All that is necessary is that there existed the presumption
that an action should have been known to be wrong. Robert Nozick writes,
A prior announcement that such acts will bring punishment (by an
authority reasonably expected to carry through) is one sufficient condition
for ‘should have known.’ However it is not a necessary condition. There
are ways other than through actual prior announcement that a person
should have known he would be punished for a wrong.36
Nozick notes, for example, that the knowledge that an action was previously considered
wrong or was considered wrong everywhere else would serve to meet the prior
knowledge condition. Nozick also argues that the presumption must exist that an action is
criminal if it is recognized that such an action would lead to punishment.37 The various
actions of the nations enumerated in Amos’ oracles were often considered casus belli in
the ancient Near East. If these actions could precipitate war, then it is clear that they were
considered morally wrong in the ancient Near East, just as they are today. Using these
criteria, it would appear that the nations were indeed culpable for the actions described by
the book of Amos. They should have known that their actions were criminal.
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Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 391.
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Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 391. Nozick uses a hypothetical argument involving Nazi Germany
as an example. He argues that, even if Germany had changed their laws to make the killing of Jews legal
and if international laws as they then existed did not hold persons (as opposed to communities) responsible
for such acts, the people committing the murders should have known that they were in the wrong. He
writes, “…the acts previously were considered wrong in Germany, and at the time they were considered
wrong everywhere else—except Poland.” He also argues that Germany should have known that they would
be punished by the opposing nations for their actions, assuming the opposing nations were victorious. In a
nutshell, might does not make right and customs and laws beyond one’s borders matter. It seems that
Nozick’s argument is valid whether applied to eighth century BCE nations of the ancient Near East or
twentieth century CE Germany.
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The third condition we have labeled the desert condition. This condition asserts
that the offender must be deserving of punishment. We have already established that, by
modern as well as ancient standards, such was indeed the case. The actions of the nations
were obviously wrong.
Finally, modern theories of punishment state that punishment should fit the crime.
Amos’ announced punishments seem to meet this criterion, although perhaps more
vigorously than many moderns would accept. Amos predicts that many of the nations
would suffer a fate identical to that which they perpetrated upon their victims; defeat and
exile. While this punishment may seem excessively harsh, nevertheless it should be
obvious that the punishment indeed fit the crime. If, as some scholars argue, there existed
a previous treaty between Israel and the nations, then the nations had even tacitly
accepted the possibility of such harsh punishment when they entered into the treaty.38 A
singular exception occurs with the nation of Moab. Amos predicted that Moab would be
destroyed because “he burned to lime the bones of the king of Edom.” Moab’s offense,
while appalling, would hardly be considered a capital crime today. This infraction does
not appear to merit such dire consequences. It might perhaps be that Amos used this
Moabite action as a proxy for other, more heinous, war crimes. Or perhaps this action
may have been considered a capital offense in the ancient Near East. Unfortunately the
full meaning of the expression is opaque to us.
38

See chapter two for examples of the curse-component of ancient Near Eastern treaties. One cannot say
that divine destruction would have been the expected outcome of breaking a treaty, however. Presumably if
there had truly been a one-to-one correspondence between treaty-breaking and divine destruction, then
nations would have respected treaties more consistently than they did. This is not to say, however, that
treaties and their attendant curses did not serve as a deterrent to treaty-breaking behavior. All signs point to
the fact that they did. But since divine destruction was not an automatic outcome of breaking the provisions
of a treaty, the deterrent value often depended more on the perceived strength of the opposing nation rather
than on the fear of divine curses. It may have been difficult to separate the two notions; however, since it
was thought that a nation became powerful because it had a powerful god.
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The Punishment of Israel. If the punishments of the nations seem harsh, the
predicted demise of Israel seems to be completely out of proportion to the severity of her
crimes, at least as judged by modern standards. Amos accuses the wealthy of a wide
range of crimes, including drunkenness, gluttony, conspicuous consumption, bribery,
theft by deceit, perverting the course of justice, rape, and perhaps the selling of the poor
into slavery. While some of these actions would elicit lengthy prison sentences in most
modern democracies, others would not be considered criminal at all but almost a natural
right: conspicuous consumption is virtually an American institution. Yet Amos
announces that Israel would suffer the same scope and scale of punishment to be visited
on the foreign nations. Israel’s population would be exiled and the nation itself would
cease to exist.
The argument might be made that Amos was not literally expecting such a harsh
punishment to fall on Israel. Perhaps he was simply using such rhetoric to persuade Israel
to turn away from its crimes. There seems to be no real evidence to back up such an
assertion, however. It is notable that, with few exceptions, Amos does not call for Israel’s
reform or repentance.39 Therefore I will operate under the assumption that Amos was
predicting the literal end of the Northern Kingdom.
As we have seen, ethical questions concerning the punishment of the nations
revolve around Yahweh’s moral authority. Such an objection cannot be made with the
nation of Israel, however. It is inconceivable that any rational person in the ancient Near
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Both Amos 5:4 and 5:6 contain similar injunctions to “Seek the Lord and live.” Amos 5:14 advises Israel
to “seek good and not evil.” Amos 5:15 tells Israel to “hate evil and love good.” The context of the last
named verse, however, reveals that judgment has already been passed. The best Amos can say is that, if
Israel turns away from evil, “it may be that the Lord, the God of hosts, will be gracious to the remnant of
Joseph. (Am 5:15b)” It may well be that Amos hoped that his message would lead to Israel’s repentance,
but this does not seem to be a major theme of the book.
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East would have denied that Yahweh held sufficient moral authority to punish Israel.40
Nor does it seem likely that any modern objections could be offered.
It also seems evident that the wealthy knew their actions were immoral, thus
meeting the prior knowledge condition. As we have previously noted, Amos’ handling of
this element is somewhat surprising. Presumably Amos could have called attention to
Israel’s laws in condemning the actions of the well-to-do, especially vis-à-vis the
treatment of Israel’s poor.41 Instead Amos, I believe intentionally, utilized contemporary
Near Eastern standards of justice in his indictment of Israel.42 Whether by means of
Israel’s laws or Near Eastern customs, however, Israel’s rich had no excuse. Their actions
were obviously wrong.
The prior knowledge condition not only demands recognition of the impropriety
of the action, it also implies intentionality in the commission of the crime. Amos 2:12
suggests that intentionality. In the text Amos indicts Israel’s wealthy for their attempts to
silence the prophets and rendering ineffective the ministry of the nazarites. Amos implies
that the elite understood the wrongness of their actions. Rather than changing their
behavior, however, they demanded that their actions not be exposed and they sought to
discredit those whose lifestyles revealed the excess of their own.
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According to Primoratz’s definition, Yahweh also had the responsibility to punish the nation. He regards
it a “right” of the offender to be punished. Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 12.
41

Although there is some debate as to when Israel’s law achieved written form, nevertheless most scholars
accept that the written law had ancient precedents that would have certainly been known in the time of
Amos. Isaiah, Amos’ slightly younger contemporary, certainly recognized elements of Israel’s ceremonial
law (Isa 1).
42

I am not making the argument that Israel’s contemporaries were necessarily any less cruel to the poor.
Undoubtedly similar crimes were being played out in numerous cities around the region. I am simply
arguing that Israel, along with the nations, understood that such treatment of the poor was wrong. Amos
was not required to cite Hebrew law to indict Israel. It stood condemned in light of the standards of its
culture.
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The desert condition requires that the guilty party, and only the guilty party, be
punished for their crimes. Retributive justice theories (unlike consequentialist justice
ones) prohibit the punishment of the innocent. Yet Amos could be accused of just such a
fault. I have previously argued that Amos’ indictments specifically targeted Israel’s
wealthy. Yet the mechanisms of Israel’s punishment were indiscriminant. Whether
through war, famine, or pestilence, the poor would have suffered along with the rich. This
seems to be a major breach of justice. I have argued in the previous chapter, however,
that Israel’s poor, although harmed, were not punished. Their harm was the regrettable
byproduct of the guilt and punishment of the wealthy. The harm suffered by the innocent
only intensifies the guilt of the offender. The poor were not only victimized by the
wealthy, they suffered as a result of the wealthy’s punishment as well. The poor were
thus doubly victimized by the rich.43 This may well have been part of Amos’ message.
The culpability of the wealthy increased because their punishment would have
necessarily involved the innocent poor. It is a tragedy when the innocent suffer because
of the actions of the guilty, but it is neither the fault of the judge nor of the executioner.
The plight of the innocent is a consequence of the ever-widening sphere of destruction
inevitably brought about by the continual practice of evil.
It is probably in terms of the fit or proportionality condition that modern readers
find their greatest discomfort. As previously noted, the fit condition is perhaps the most
difficult condition to accurately appraise. Peter French writes that no mechanical
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A similar case might well (and unfortunately often does) occur in modern jurisprudence. Suppose that a
child is physically abused by a parent. Obviously the child is a victim of the parent’s abuse. If the parent is
subsequently arrested and jailed, the child is victimized again by the loss of the companionship of the
parent (such as it was) and perhaps the loss of the resources that the parent provided. It could also be
argued, however, that the removal of the child from the abusive situation served the child’s best interests in
the long run. I believe a similar argument might be made for Israel’s poor.
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formulas are available to determine the appropriate punishment.44 Nevertheless, the
destruction of an entire nation for primarily economic crimes seems unduly severe.
Certainly the selling of individuals into slavery (2:6); the taking of bribes (5:12); the
utilization of false weights and measures (8:5); and the selling of substandard or
adulterated food (8:6) would qualify as bona fide crimes today. However, many of
Israel’s actions would, at best, be considered morally wrong by today’s standards. For
example, the sexual involvement of a father and son with the same girl (2:7) would in
many (although by no means all) circles be considered a moral wrong. Unless their
attentions were forced on the girl, however, this action would not be considered criminal.
Neither would involving the profits of ill-gotten gains in a house of worship (2:8), nor
extravagant spending (6:4-6) lead to jail time today, certainly not to execution. Even the
oppression of the poor (4:1) would not in most conditions be considered a criminal
offense by modern Western standards. And yet for those crimes, Amos assigns the same
level of punishment as he does to those that would rip open the wombs of pregnant
women.
Although we are applying modern philosophical ideas to an ancient text,
nevertheless, it seems that we must allow Amos to set the appropriate judicial standards.
To some degree, laws (and their attendant punishments) are culturally conditioned. As
Robert Solomon writes, “Justice claims are always contextual and presuppose a local set
of conditions and considerations.”45 Thus it must be recognized that, utilizing the
standards of Amos’ day, Israel’s announced punishment may not have been out of
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proportion to her crimes. Infractions similar to those contained in the book of Amos are
known from other ancient Near Eastern texts. In those texts, the crimes were often
punishable by death. For example, the Law of Eshnunna states that if the wife or child of
a commoner is taken in distraint and subsequently dies, the perpetrator’s life would be
forfeit.46 The Code of Hammurabi had a similar provision.47 Certain economic crimes
might also result in capital punishment. The Code of Hammurabi specifies that if a man
purchases a valuable (silver, gold, cattle, and slaves) without a witness or a contract, that
person would be considered a thief and executed.48 Hammurabi also designated the death
penalty for a case that bears some resemblance to that found in Amos 2:7. The code says,
“If a man selects a bride for his son and his son carnally knows her, after which he
himself lies with her and they seize him in the act, they shall bind the man and cast him
into the water.”49 The Egyptian Instruction of Amenemope cautions against the abuse of
the poor as well. Although the author does not threaten legal action, he warns that evil
may befall the one who oppresses the helpless. The text reads,
Beware of robbing a wretch,
Of attacking a cripple;
Don’t stretch out your hand to touch an old man,
Nor open your mouth to an elder.
Don’t let yourself be sent on a mischievous errand,
Nor be friends with him who does it.
…
He who does evil, the shore rejects him,
Its floodwater carries him away.
The northwind descends to end his hour,
It mingles with the thunderstorm.
46
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The storm cloud is tall, the crocodiles are vicious,
You heated man, how are you now?
He cries out, his voice reaches heaven,
It is the Moon who declares his crime.50
The text implies that these actions would bring about retribution, presumably at the hands
of the gods. There is evidence, then, to suggest that the proportionality condition may
well have been met using the criteria of the ancient Near East.
Although the crimes for which Amos indicted Israel were primarily economic, it
should again be noted that violent crimes were also committed.51 As we have seen, Amos
3:9-10 states that violence and robbery were prevalent. Amos later refers to a “reign of
violence.”52 Hosea also alludes to the violence of the day. He writes, “Ephraim herds the
wind, and pursues the east wind all day long; they multiply falsehood and violence. (Hos
12:1)” 53 Within its context, then, Amos does not appear to be overly extravagant in his
pronounced punishments against Israel. Israel stood convicted based on the standards of
the day and the evidence suggests that even Israel’s elite would have recognized the
fitness of Amos’ predictions.
To briefly summarize, then, we have examined four elements typically
incorporated in modern definitions of punishment and compared them with Amos’
50
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announced punishments against the foreign nations and against Israel. The first of these
elements concerned Yahweh’s moral authority to punish. It is difficult to dispute the
moral authority Yahweh held over Israel. His authority over the nations, however, is
more ambiguous by modern standards. According to ancient standards, however,
Yahweh’s moral authority seems more apparent. Amos relied on contemporary ethics and
customary law to indict both the nations and Israel. Thus there is every reason to believe
that the guilty understood their culpability and thus the prior knowledge condition is met.
Likewise the desert condition is satisfied. Both Israel’s wealthy and the leaders of the
foreign nations deserved punishment because they had obviously and intentionally
broken the customs of the day. In regard to the nations, the announced punishment easily
fits the crime as it essentially mirrors the criminal action.54 Amos thus applies the
principle of lex talionis to the nations. The case of Israel is more problematic. Exile and
the extinction of the nation (although not of the people) seem, by modern standards, to be
an overzealous prosecution of the law. However, by the standards of the ancient Near
East, even the proportionality condition may be said to have been met.
This brief analysis, then, suggests that Amos, when judged by modern principles
of retributive justice, meets the necessary criteria for their punishment to be considered
just. Nevertheless, especially as it pertains to the nations, Yahweh’s moral authority
seems tenuous. There is a subset of retributive justice which I believe more adequately
addresses this problematic element. This theory of justice has the advantage of being one
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that is often explicitly found in the Hebrew Bible. The theory involves the use of
vengeance as punishment.
“Wild Justice”
American society exhibits some schizophrenia with regard to punishment. We
often demand that criminals atone for their crimes with punishment commensurate with
the severity of their crimes. Hence the modern era of mandatory sentencing.55 Yet we
shun the idea of vengeance. Revenge is a concept not well regarded in today’s society.
Children are taught from a young age not to retaliate when mistreated. Many take
seriously the New Testament principle of turning the other cheek. Vengeance is seen as
primitive and is viewed with distaste, even disdain.56 The reactions against revenge are so
strongly entrenched that many who find themselves in situations where feelings of
vengeance would be normal instead deny any such emotion. Susan Jacoby, in her book
Wild Justice, notes that members of modern democracies often feel compelled to express
their possible desires for revenge in euphemistic forms. She concludes,
In countless instances, we see the tragicomic spectacle of victims (it
makes little difference whether they are survivors of death camps or of
muggings) who must deny any animus if their testimony is to be
considered credible and who …leave themselves open to bargain-

55

The reactions to the not-guilty verdict in the recent Casey Anthony trial illustrate the anger Americans
feel towards what they see as a perversion of justice. See, for example, Steven Hoffer, "Casey Anthony
Verdict: Instant Reactions " The Huffington Post (2011).
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/05/casey-anthony-trialverdict_n_890469.html#s303247&title=Leslee_Mitchell (accessed February 2, 2012); Susan Jacobson and
Anika Myers Palm, "Casey Anthony Verdict Shocks Central Florida," Orlando Sentinel (2011).
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-07-05/news/os-casey-anthony-verdict-react-20110705_1_baezand-cheney-mason-suburban-drive-casey-anthony (accessed February 1, 2012).
56

Charles K. B. Barton says this of the modern view of revenge: “Perhaps the greatest obstacle in the path
of substantial victim empowerment is the fear of revenge, as evidenced by revenge’s undeservedly poor
image. Especially in contemporary Western societies, revenge is widely thought of as being crazy, nasty,
and unworthy of the aspirations of truly civilized people, or of a civilized society.” Barton, Getting Even,
xiv.

199

basement analysis if they allow their disinterested masks to slip in
public.57
Despite this avowed denial of a need for vengeance, however, feelings of revenge are a
natural reaction to being wronged. Robert Solomon, for example, says,
Vengeance is an inescapable part of our psychology, perhaps it is even an
instinct. It forms the foundation of Old Testament justice in the measured
guise of the lex talionis, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” And the
New Testament does not reject vengeance; it only transfers it to God.
Retribution is the point (even if it is not the only purpose) of punishment.58
Note Solomon’s suggestion that retribution is a form of vengeance. Solomon was not the
first to suggest such an equation. Emile Durkheim regarded punishment as simply a form
of revenge. He wrote, “Punishment, thus, remains for us what it was for our fathers. It is
still an act of vengeance since it is an expiation. What we avenge, what the criminal
expiates, is the outrage to morality.”59
Vengeance, unlike most forms of justice in the Western world, is intensely
personal. Revenge often allows the victim of a crime to also be judge and executioner.
This intimate connection between the avenger/victim and offender sets revenge apart
from other forms of punishment. It is perhaps this close connection that causes modern
society to view vengeance with suspicion. The modern world has been conditioned to
presume that justice can only be done by impartial, even disinterested persons. As Peter
French writes, “Impartiality has been all the rage in moral circles since the
Enlightenment.”60
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While the modern world exhibits a distrust of vengeance, it was an important
ingredient in ancient Near Eastern society. H. G. L. Peels notes,
For modern man the word ‘vengeance’ has strongly negative connotations
(immorality, arbitrariness, illegitimacy, cruelty); ‘vengeance’ and love are
antipodes. In the OT, however, the concept of ‘vengeance’ has a positive
connotation, both from a semantic as well as from a theological point of
view: ‘vengeance’ has to do with lawfulness, justice, and salvation.61
The notion that vengeance can be a positive force has been the thesis of a small number
of recent scholars. They have attempted to rehabilitate the concept of vengeance as a
viable corollary to corporate punishment in modern society.62
Revenge, like retribution, has conditions of its own. 63 We have already met these
conditions: the moral authority condition, the desert condition, and the fit condition.
These conditions must necessarily be attached to vengeance to allow it to function as a
moral force. They also prevent vengeance from causing society to spiral downward into
disorder.64
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Revenge differs most significantly from institutional punishment in the realm of
moral authority. While the avenger must still be invested with moral authority, the shape
of that authority contrasts with that found in more formally administered punishment.65
For example the locus of moral authority has a different origin in revenge. As we noted in
the previous section, most definitions of retributive punishment assumed that moral
authority to punish was invested only in the community. Obviously vengeance must
derive its moral authority from a different source. According to Peter French, “the
avenger’s moral authority derives from the general liberty of everyone to punish
wrongdoers as constrained by the requirement to utilize reliable procedures to ascertain
the facts.”66 Thus, according to French, anyone may punish an offender as long as a
sincere effort is made to validate that vengeance is required. Note that, under this
definition, the avenger does not of necessity have to be either the victim or an agent of
the victim. French posits that the victim does not even have the right to assign an agent.67
Instead, the avenger must simply be one who desires and has the ability to right a

vengeance provoked the impersonal institutionalization of punishment. I am far more convinced of what
may be a version of a Lockean view of all of this. That is, I suspect that assessment of the trackdown costs
coupled with cowardice pointed the way to institutionalization. Fear of vengeance out of control, wild
justice, it seems to me, likely would have been a minor concern in communities.” French, Virtues of
Vengeance, 110.
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wrong.68 The avenger must not, however, seek vengeance merely to inflict pain.
Revenge, in this more technical sense, does not involve the spontaneous lashing out at an
offender in retaliation for a harm done. Nor is it an attempt to compensate the victim for
something lost. Rather, the purpose of vengeance is to reestablish the moral order that
was lost when the harm was done.69 Thus vengeance is ultimately about justice.
By French’s reckoning, any individual can serve as an avenger as long as revenge
is exacted for the proper reasons. Charles K. B. Barton is of a different opinion, however.
In his view, moral authority devolves only on the victim of the wrong or on one who has
a close relationship with the victim. In his taxonomy, an avenger with little or no personal
relationship with the victim should more properly be labeled a vigilante.70
Despite the requirement that vengeance must follow reliable procedures, it, unlike
retributive punishment, is not an emotionally neutral proposition. The immoral action that
68
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led to the need for vengeance naturally evoked feelings of anger and even hatred.
Vengeance recognizes the validity of these emotions while seeking to control their
impulses. French writes, “Perhaps the major moral saving grace of retributive hatred is
that the retributive hater not only desires to injure, even kill, the target, but he or she also
desires to restore the normal balance in the community that has been disrupted by the
actions of the target.”71 Thus, although vengeance may be an emotional activity (hence
the oft used label of wild justice), it is not to be an irrational one.
French noted that the avenger must take care to utilize reliable procedures before
revenge is taken. The need for vengeance and the identity of the offender must be
accurately ascertained. Not to do so would be to place the erstwhile avenger in an
immoral position. There are also other elements important to the concept of vengeance.
For example, Robert Nozick argues that retribution is “… an act of communicative
behavior.”72 Vengeance, according to French, communicates a “message of morality” to
the criminal.73 It tells the offender that morality matters and that it will be enforced. The
message must be a tacit one, however. The avenger must convey to the target the reasons
for the vengeful actions.74 An individual who has suffered a perceived slight or harm and
chooses to respond by surreptitiously and anonymously inflicting harm on the offender is
not truly taking vengeance. This act would of itself be considered immoral and hence
deserving of punishment. Thus it can be seen that the act of righteous vengeance requires
courage. Revenge, properly done, is not a cowardly action.
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The personal nature of revenge requires that the punishment of the culprit takes
place at the hands of the avenger. If harm befalls the target that is not the result of the
avenger’s action, revenge has not happened. French notes, for example, that there is little
satisfaction if a murderer is killed by an avalanche, unless the avalanche was started by
the one taking vengeance.75 Such would be a case of poetic justice, but not vengeance.
Revenge may well necessitate dramatic action by the avenger. Vengeance may thus be
costly, requiring the avenger to expend considerable financial and psychological
resources.76
While the primary difference between retributive punishment and vengeance falls
mainly in the realm of moral authority, the fit condition requires modification as well.
Notably, the avenger must determine a fitting punishment. Nevertheless the avenger’s
verdict must be validated by others.77 Vengeance, contrary to convention, is not a solo
affair. The avenger cannot be the only one convinced that justice has been done; the
observer must be persuaded as well.
Vengeance, understood in this way, is a long way from the stereotypical picture of
revenge that often comes to mind. Although it is personal and recognizes the deep
emotions of the victim/avenger, it nevertheless must seek justice first of all. The
assuaging of heated emotions must take a back seat to the righting of the moral order.
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The book of Amos does not use the vocabulary of vengeance. Nevertheless it was a
concept familiar to the Hebrew prophets. Words from the Hebrew root for vengeance
(נקם, nqm) appear in two of the four eighth-century prophetic books.78 Isaiah, for
example, writes, “Therefore says the Sovereign, the LORD of hosts, the Mighty One of
Israel: Ah, I will pour out my wrath on my enemies, and avenge myself on my foes! (Isa
1:24)”79 It is interesting to note that the previous verse identifies Yahweh’s enemies.
Isaiah says, “Your princes are rebels and companions of thieves. Everyone loves a bribe
and runs after gifts. They do not defend the orphan, and the widow’s cause does not come
before them. (Isa 1:23)” Yahweh’s enemies, according to Isaiah, bear a strong
resemblance to the oppressors found in the book of Amos. The wealthy, then, are the
targets of Yahweh’s vengeance in Isaiah’s prophecy. The concept of Yahweh’s
vengeance was thus current in Amos’ day. So although the book of Amos lacks
vengeance vocabulary, I believe a comparison of the concept of just revenge to the book
can yield some useful insights.
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes the concept of vengeance bridges the
moral authority gap between Yahweh and the nations. As we have previously noted, the
issue of Yahweh’s moral authority vis-à-vis the nations creates an ethical challenge for
the modern reader that is not easily resolved. Our description of “virtuous vengeance,”
however, reveals that the moral authority to punish an offender belongs to any who has
the desire to right the moral order and the ability to carry out the punishment. Or,
78
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following Barton, we might also require that there be a close connection between the
victim and the avenger. The book of Amos allows us to easily determine Yahweh’s moral
authority over the nations.
In the oracles against the nations, Amos normally left the identity of the victim
nation(s) unspecified. We are not explicitly told, for example, whose communities Tyre
turned over to Edom or the nationality of the victims of Ammon or Damascus (although
we are told the victims resided in Gilead). It is generally thought that the crimes
enumerated were committed against Israel. If this is the case, then Yahweh might be said
to have acted as avenger on behalf of Israel. However, this ignores the fact that the oracle
against Moab specifies that Edom (or more particularly, the corpse of Edom’s king)
served as the victim. It also seems strange to suppose that Amos would identify Israel as
the victims in the first few oracles, but consider them the offender throughout the rest of
his book.
It would perhaps be better, then, to argue that Yahweh acted as avenger for the
helpless and oppressed, regardless of nationality.80 This would seem to fit the context
better. In the case of the nations, the various victims were obviously civilians and thus
powerless to prevent their own victimization. In the case of Israel, the poor played the
part of victim to Israel’s wealthy. By virtue of the wrong done, therefore, Yahweh would
certainly have had the moral authority to avenge the victims in each circumstance.
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It may also be argued, however, that Yahweh was himself a victim. Amos would
have recognized Yahweh as the author of moral order. The actions of Israel and the
nations injured that order, thus bringing harm to Yahweh. It would be reasonable to
conclude, then, that Yahweh acted on his own behalf as avenger. Who better to restore
moral order then the author of that order himself?
We have already determined that vengeance, in order to be considered a moral
force, must meet certain conditions. We have noted, for example, the communicative
aspect of vengeance. The offender must be informed of the reason for the vengeful act.
This seems to be the raison d'être of the book of Amos. Amos delivers to both Israel’s
wealthy and to the foreign nations the rationale for their coming punishment. The
indictments were couched in language that anyone of Amos’ culture would have
understood, regardless of nationality.
A further condition of vengeance states that revenge must come from the hand of
the avenger. That is, the moral order is not rebalanced if harm befalls the offender apart
from the actions of the avenger. Amos makes it clear that the predicted punishments,
whether brought on by the armies of an unnamed assailant or by a seemingly arbitrary
plague, nevertheless came directly from Yahweh. For example, Amos, speaking for
Yahweh, says, “I sent among you a pestilence after the manner of Egypt; I killed your
young men with the sword… (Am 4:10a)” As far as Amos was concerned, Yahweh alone
was responsible for Israel’s punishment. Similarly, the oracles against the nations make it
clear that the demise of the nations would be the direct result of Yahweh’s actions. The
oracle against Damascus serves as an example. There Amos wrote,
Thus says the LORD: For three transgressions of Damascus, and for four,
I will not revoke the punishment; because they have threshed Gilead with
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threshing sledges of iron. So I will send a fire on the house of Hazael, and
it shall devour the strongholds of Ben-hadad. I will break the gate bars of
Damascus, and cut off the inhabitants from the Valley of Aven, and the
one who holds the scepter from Beth-eden; and the people of Aram shall
go into exile to Kir, says the LORD. (Amos 1:3-5).
It is clear that Amos recognizes Yahweh’s responsibility in bringing calamity to the
Arameans even though the agent of that punishment would be an unnamed aggressor.
As we have noted, the motive of the avenger plays an important role in righteous
revenge. The avenger must be interested in righting a wrong and not just in inflicting pain
on the offender. Amos demonstrates this characteristic, in the case of Israel, by
identifying them as Yahweh’s chosen people. Amos wrote, “You only have I know of all
the families of the earth… (Amos 3:2a).” In Amos 2:9-11 Amos reminded Israel of
Yahweh’s compassion when he prepared their land for them. Amos 9:11-14 reveals the
benefits that Yahweh would pour out on Israel at a future time.81 All of these examples
point to Yahweh’s compassion for Israel. This emotion is reinforced in Hosea’s
prophecy. He argued that Yahweh punished out of necessity and not out of pleasure.
Hosea gave voice to the plaintive cry of Yahweh when he wrote, “How can I give you up,
Ephraim? How can I hand you over, O Israel? How can I make you like Admah? How
can I treat you like Zeboiim? My heart recoils within me; my compassion grows warm
and tender. (Hos 11:8)”
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that Amos could mix optimism into such a highly pessimistic work. It is unclear to me, however, why the
original author would be prevented from adding an optimistic conclusion while allowing a later editor the
privilege. Certainly other texts in the Hebrew Bible contain drastic mood swings. The end of the book of
Hosea, for example, also contains an optimistic ending. Many of the imprecatory psalms contain a note of
praise following a long diatribe against an individual or corporate enemy. See, for example, Pss 5, 69, and
109.
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The moral authority of an avenger derives, not just from both the desire to right a
wrong, but also the ability to do so. It should be obvious that neither the victims of the
foreign nations nor Israel’s poor had the resources to redress their own grievances. Amos
presents Yahweh as having both the desire and ability to right the wrongs of the nations
and of Israel. Only Yahweh had the ability to heal the moral order and Amos promised
that he would soon do so, to the detriment of Amos’ intended audience.
We previously noted that the poor could not expect to benefit from Yahweh’s
punishment of the wealthy. As we have argued, however, the purpose of vengeance is not
to compensate the victim for past harms. It is to restore moral order. Thus vengeance
could do its duty without repairing the state of the poor.
Proper vengeance requires that the punishment fit the crime, not just from the
perspective of the avenger, but from the viewpoint of an observer as well. I have argued
that I believe this is a major feature of the book of Amos. Amos’ use of customary law to
condemn the nations invites any contemporary nation to witness the justice of Yahweh.
Similarly, Israel’s crimes are highlighted against the backdrop of its broader cultural
context. As we have already mentioned, Amos summons the “strongholds in Ashdod”
and “the land of Egypt” to view the “great tumults” in Samaria.82 Thus the nations
themselves were asked to judge the fitness of Amos’ (and by implication, Yahweh’s)
judgment. The text implies that no objections could be offered.83
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A similar invitation is issued by Isaiah in Isa 1:2. “Hear, O heavens, and listen, O earth; for the LORD
has spoken: I reared children and brought them up, but they have rebelled against me.”
83

The entire text of Am 3:9-11 reads: “Proclaim to the strongholds in Ashdod, and to the strongholds in the
land of Egypt, and say, ‘Assemble yourselves on Mount Samaria, and see what great tumults are within it,
and what oppressions are in its midst.’ They do not know how to do right, says the LORD, those who store
up violence and robbery in their strongholds. Therefore thus says the Lord GOD: An adversary shall
surround the land, and strip you of your defense; and your strongholds shall be plundered.”
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Approaching Amos from a vengeance perspective also helps clarify an interesting
issue noted by some commentators. It has been remarked that there is a paucity of reform
language in the book. Amos did not see himself as a reformer. Rather, he might best be
understood as an agent of the avenger. Sentence had already been passed. The job of
Amos was to deliver the reasons for which the avenger would soon take action. Amos
thus communicates French’s “message of morality” to the nations, to Israel, and perhaps
to his home country of Judah as well. The message of Amos included the novel idea that
offenses against the moral order would not be tolerated, even if committed by members
of Yahweh’s own people.
In this section, I have argued that a reasonable case can be made that the book of
Amos presents Yahweh as an avenger. While revenge is usually rejected by the
mainstream of modern Western society, ancient Near Eastern society (as well as many
other societies and subgroups, ancient and modern) recognized vengeance as a viable
form of justice.84 Further, I have demonstrated that the book of Amos meets the criteria
of virtuous vengeance. It might be best, then, to presume that Amos viewed Yahweh as a
virtuous avenger of the victims of oppression.
Conclusions
I have attempted in this monograph to place the book of Amos within its ancient
Near Eastern context. I have demonstrated that international relationships were governed
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Ralph Cintron has studied vengeance in the context of inner-city neighborhoods. He writes that revenge
often becomes the tool of the disenfranchised. He writes, “Indeed, if a legally based society is perceived by
such communities or individuals as fundamentally corrupt or anemic, vengeance, in contrast, might be
perceived as not only an alternative logic but the only reliable one.” Cintron, "Listening," 47.It is only
speculation, but perhaps some of the violence Amos reports came at the hands of the poor and directed
towards Israel’s elite. Thus part of his message may have included the idea that Yahweh would serve as the
avenger of the poor, thus removing the need of the poor to attempt revenge on their own behalf. Amos may
have intended the book to serve as encouragement to the poor as well as warning to the wealthy.
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by customary law. Although differing from modern notions of international relations,
nevertheless there was the expectation in antiquity that nations would adhere to certain
standards of international behavior. These rules provided the necessary order to allow the
peaceful coexistence of nations. The gods were considered a part of this ancient
international legal system. They were understood to be the guarantors of justice,
providing redress for violations committed against international norms. At times nations
willfully violated the customary rules. War often resulted. Even in war, however, there
were standards to be observed. While the ancients tolerated some activities (such as
slavery) that would today be considered repugnant, nevertheless needless cruelty was
condemned.
Ancient Near Eastern literature reveals a culture concerned about social justice.
While no doubt the reality often did not match the ideal, nevertheless their ideals reveal
the importance that the culture placed on the proper treatment of the poor and oppressed.
Their concern should not, however, be confused with modern notions of social justice.
The goal of ancient Near Eastern reformers was not necessarily equality, as accounted by
modern standards, nor the eradication of poverty. Rather, the goal was to preserve the
hierarchical social order of the day. This entailed the maintenance of families within their
respective social and economic classes. It was the duty of both the king and the individual
to provide for the poor and oppressed and to protect them from injustice (perhaps to
prevent uprisings of the lower classes). Evidence from Egypt and Mesopotamia indicates
that the poor were considered to be under the protection of the gods. Israel’s literature
evidences a similar regard for the poor.
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I have also explored the concept of punishment within Israel and found that it
shared with its broader culture common laws and forms of punishment. The concept of
lex talionis can be found throughout Ancient Near Eastern society. They labeled as
criminal many activities modern society would not consider as such. The punishments
handed down by their law codes often seem harsh and disproportionate to the severity of
the crime. Nevertheless, there is a consistency between Amos’ view of punishment and
that expressed in literature contemporary to him. Thus, when judged against its
background, it should be apparent that the book of Amos easily fits within its ancient
Near Eastern context.
Placing Amos within this context clarifies many elements of the book. As I have
noted, Israel’s wealthy constituted Amos’ primary audience. By virtue of their position,
they would have been participants in the international scene, probably in both the
economic and political realms. Consequently they would have been aware of the
customary laws that governed international relations. There can be little doubt, then, that
Amos’ audience recognized the culpability of the nations and would have readily agreed
with Amos’ conclusion that their punishment was warranted. They also could not have
helped but recognize the validity of Amos’ accusations against them. Their depredations
of the poor violated the customs that governed their world just as seriously as did the
crimes committed by the nations. Thus, Amos indicted the wealthy on terms they could
not have helped but understood. He neither needed nor resorted to appeals to Hebrew
law. Israel was guilty and stood so in front of her peers, the elite of the surrounding
nations. There could only be one conclusion. Israel’s elite, along with the nations,
deserved punishment.
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Amos also communicated the terms of Israel’s punishment in a language easily
understood. Their crimes were a violation of the moral order and divine retribution was
only to be expected. Amos’ audience would have understood that the appeals of the poor,
while ignored in Israel’s courts, would have been heard and adjudicated in Yahweh’s
court. Amos stripped away the privilege Israel’s wealthy had arrogated to themselves and
revealed instead their neglected responsibility to the poor and to Yahweh. The
consequences of that neglect were to be dire. Amos used the language of military defeat,
natural disasters, and cosmic disorders to describe Yahweh’s reaction to Israel’s
violations. Such language was at home in the culture of the ancient Near East.
We have noted that Amos used the methods of punishment known to him to
describe the justice of Yahweh. While those methods may seem cruel or unduly harsh to
us, nevertheless they fully conformed to the standards of his day. Yet while Amos’
standards belonged to his culture, I have argued that Yahweh’s actions meet the modern
criteria of just retribution, especially as embodied in the concept of virtuous vengeance.
Thus the book of Amos can be seen as embodying modern principles while utilizing
ancient standards. I do not pretend to think that my brief foray into ancient and modern
ethics will be considered satisfactory by everyone. Nevertheless I believe I have shown
that, like many features of the book, the ethics of Amos clearly reflect the ancient Near
Eastern context of which it was a part.
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